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ON GIVING
Then said a rich man, Speak to us of Giving.
And he answe red:
You give hut little when you give of your possessions.
It is when you give of yourself that you truly give.
For what are your possessions but things you keep and
guard for fear you may need them tomorrow?
And tomorrow, what shall tomorrow bring to the over-
prudent dog burying bones in the trackless sand
as he follows the pilgrims to the holy city?
And what is fear of need but need itself?
Is not dread of thirst when your well is full, the
thirst that is unquenchable?
There are those who give little of the much which they
have--and they give it for recognition and their
hidden desire makes their gifts unwholesome.
And there are those who have little and give it all.
These are the believers in life and the bounty of
life, and their coffer is never empty.
There are those who give with joy, and that joy is
their reward.
And there are those who give with pain, and that
pain is their baptism.
And there are those who give and know not pain in
giving, nor do they seek joy, nor give with
mindfulness of virtue;
They give as in yonder valley the myrtle breathes
its fragrance into space.
Through the hands of such as these God speaks, and
from behind their eyes He smiles upon the earth.
It is well to give when asked, but it is better to
give unasked, through understanding
;
And to the open-handed the search for one who shall
receive is joy greater than giving.
And is there aught you would withhold?
All you have shall some day be given;
Therefore give now, that the season of giving may be
yours and not your inheritors'.
You often say, "I would give, but only to the deserving.
The trees in your orchard say not so, nor the
flocks in your pasture.
They give that they may live, for to withhold is to
perish.
Surely he who is worthy to receive his days and his
.
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nights, is worthy of all else from you.
And he who has deserved to drink from the ocean of
life deserves to fill his cup from your little
stream.
And what desert greater shall there be, than that
which lies in the courage and the confidence,
nay the charity, of receiving?
And who are you that men should rend their Dosom and
unveil their pride, that you may see their worth
naked and their pride unabashed?
See first that you yourself deserve to be a giver,
and an instrument of giving.
For in truth it is life that gives unto lif'e--while
you, who deem yourself a giver, are but a witness.
And you receivers— and you are all receivers--assume
no weight of gratitude, lest you lay a yoke upon
yourself and upon him who gives,
father rise together with the giver on his gifts as
on wings;
For to be overmindful of your debt, is to doubt his
generosity who has the freehearted earth for
mother, and God for father.
--Kahlil Gibran, THE PROPHET.
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INTRODUCTION
*
"In the future days, which we seek to make
secure, we look forward to a world founded upon
four essential human freedoms.
"The first is freedom of speech and ex-
pression--everywhere in the world.
"The second is freedom of every person to
v/orship God in his own way- -everywhere in the
world.
"The third is freedom from want--which, trans-
lated into world terms, means economic under-
standings which will secure to every nation a
healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants--
everywhere in the world.
"The fourth is freedom from fear--which,
translated into world terms, means a world-wide
reduction of armaments to such a point and in
such a thorough fashion that no nation will be
in a position to commit an act of physical ag-
gression against any neighbor- -anwhe re in the
world .
"
1
I was lying in a field one day, daughter of the soil,
close to the land I love. Lazily, resting, I watched the
snowy clouds drifting aimlessly across the deep blue of" the
Aroostook sky, and my mind drifted aimlessly with them. The
world was at peace. Behind the barn i could hear the
laughing voices of the men as they returned from the morn-
ing’s labor eager for refreshment and rest. From a distant
field came the whirring of a tractor, and beyond the roar
of a busy threshing machine. Heaps of golden grain dotted
the surrounding countryside. The potatoes were awaiting
the harvest.
1. Roosevelt, Franklin D.
,
Annual message to Congress, January
6, 1341. Italics mine.
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Agriculture! Can it be possible that one word holds
so much? Men busy at work, work that calls forth pride in
developed muscles and ingenuity and creativeness in the
eternal struggle with the soil. Rolling fields patiently
awaiting the release of the riches they contain. Virginal
forests beckoning, waiting to share their resources. The
sea with its new and unexplored treasures of food. Food--
the most precious word of all! Food to feed mankind, to
give him strength to carry on his daily work, to give him
physical vitality, to give him health and the energy which
he needs to live a strenuous life, and thereby a happy life.
God is clever. He made life a difficult one. He real-
ized that only by struggling against apparently insuperable
odds can the human spirit attain its true heights and develop
the peace and the nobility and the serenity that creative
power can bring. The mere struggle to obtain the bare
necessities of life is a difficult one, but it is a chal-
lenging one. Life isn’t easy. It wasn't meant to be. God
gave to us the soil and the resources. It is up to us to
find a way to use them in order to live.
Our leading scientists insist that an economy of scar-
city is not inevitable. The resources of the world are
sufficient to meet all men's needs. There is labor power
enough to use those resources. What is lacking? For some-
thing surely is lacking! More than half of the people in
the world do not get sufficient food. In Asia and in the
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]tropics, three-fourths of the peoples survive on too low
diets. "In western Europe twenty to thirty percent of the
population were malnourished according to the best available
prewar evidence, and in the United States a third of the
people was reported to have diets below modern standards
for good health." 1' Billions of people have never known what
it is like to be healthy, have never been able to feel the
thrill of using their full potentialities, What is lacking?
The resources are there. The skill is there. But the proper
use of the skill and the resources is not there. Mankind
must learn to cooperate, must learn to devote all its
energies to the conduct of the war for existence in contrast
to our wars of destruction.
If so many millions of people suffer from malnourish-
ment and under- development in times of peace, little imagin-
ation is required to conceive of the vast suffering that war
must inevitably bring.
"The peace which we all seek must be rooted in
the first hurried work of rehabilitation and recon-
struction. The dimensions of this task can best be
measured by the dimensions of the disaster which
has overtaken the world. The Axis has extended its
despotism over the peoples of some 35 countries and
hundreds of islands, the dwelling-places of more
than half a billion men, women, and children. Al-
most all Europe lies unaer the dark cloud of Na~i
rule; Japan has overrun the rich islands of the
Western Pacific and has penetrated deep toward the
heart of heroic China. In occupied Europe and in
enslaved Asia the picture is universally the same--
starving people, impoverished land, and nations whose
whole economics have been wrecked.
2. The Work of FAO, Washington: FA3 Interim Commission, 1945«p.ll.
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"Food-condition statistics in the area of Axis
occupation are treacherous. But official reports
from Europe and Asia leave no doubt that hunger is
the general rule, that starvation is commonplace,
and that the area enslaved by the Axis is a breed-
ing-place for all the diseases of the body and of
the spirit that are born of starvation, suffering,
and death.
"Agricultural-production in Europe has dropped
substantially despite the desperate efforts of
Germany to make Axis-dominated Europe selfsupport-
ing. As the months roll on, the manpower shortage,
the wastage and deterioration of machinery, the
neglect of the soil, andthe increasing disorgani-
zation of the economy will cut even deeper into
total food-production.
"The once matchless flocks and herds of Europe
have declined to figures in some cases a third
oelow pre-war levels. Horses are disappearing
at a rate that indicates that a shortage of draft
animals may he a problem even more acute than the
shortage of manpower in the first harvest of peace.
The occupied nations have been systematically
drained of their resources, raw materials, and
commercial goods to serve a vicious new order.
Never before has the world witnessed so ruthless
a despoliation of so many in so short a time." J
The destruction was enormous, and reconstruction will
be difficult. Substantial gains have already been made.
UNRRA has accomplished a tremendous undertaking. But much
remains to be done. It will be years before Europe and Asia
and the world will be back to their "normal" standards, and
it will be decades and perhaps never before the peoples of
the world will be enabled to attain the maximum of "the
necessities of life. It may seem like an ideal or a hope-
less task, but mankind survives on ideals. Only by striv-
ing endlessly tov/ard some future goal can anything of worth
be accomplished in this life of ours. And what nobler
ideal could there be than that all men should be able to
live a full and vigorous life!
It is impossible for me to deal with that, whole vast
problem of reconstruction. That would provide material
3. Herbert H. Lehman, in a speech before the Foreign Policy
Association, J une, 194-3, as quoted in UNRRA: Gat eway to Re -
covery . Washington: National Planing Ass. , 1945. p.2.
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for hundreds of theses. Economists and financial experts
must restore the wrecked economies of the world. Psych-
iatrists must build new minds. Religion must give to the
people a new desire to live and a new method for working
with others. Diplomats must ease the bruised feelings of
selfish nations and guide them toward a true union. Educa-
tion must train mankind in the joys that a peaceful life
can contain. Every aspect and resource of life must be
called into action to make the world shole again.
My purpose is a far more humble one. I merely wish
to examine the immediate problems of relief and rehabilita-
tion, the things that have had to be done urgently to en-
able people to survive long enough so that they may apply
their talents to seeking an answer for the many problems
which confront them. Starving people cannot plan how to
restore healthy conditions of trade. Diseased people cannot
build new homes and plow devastated fields. Refugees, with
no home and no welcome, cannot devote their energies to
buidling up a shattered industry. There are a number of
such urgent problems which must be settled before any per-
manent reconstruction can take place. It is with such
problems that I deal.
Let me explain that my main emphasis has been food. It
would be Infinitely beyond the limits of the resources of
time available to me to go into complete detail about all
the asoects of relief and rehabilitation. But at the same
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time I have tried to present a rounded picture. I have
pointed out the more important aspects of all the major
problems of relief and rehabilitation.
I have approached this work from an historical point
of view in an effort to reveal what methods have been used
for relief and rehabilitation in the past, and how each
institution slowly evolved into its successor. It has been
impossible for me to deal with the political aspects of
relief and rehabilitation, for there is insufficient re-
liable data available with which to work. Only the long
perspective of history will be able to ascertain to what
extent the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admin-
istration was twisted to the selfish purposes of individual
nations. Political aspects, I grant, are gaining more and
more importance. Relief has definitely become a political
weapon. Nations are binding food and clothing with guns
and military equipment. Common, fundamental love of human-
ity, if it has ever existed, seems to have been replaced by
a brutal display of power politics. In Chapter X, I have
tried to point out the major trends that relief appears to
be taking. The recent enunciation of what has been termed
the "Truman Doctrine" in March, 1947, Is the best available
evidence of the political purposes to which relief has now
been devoted.
My aim herein has been, on the other hand, to analyze
the organization of relief and rehabili tation, to see how
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such relief has actually been administered in the past. Be-
cause of' the importance that relief has become on the inter-
national scene, such an investigation cannor help but oe
enlightening in an analysis of present events.
The first section of this work deals with those aspects
of relief and rehabilitation which occurred before the es-
tablishment of UNRRA. Then in the second section we shall
examine UNRRA itself, its organization, methods and accomp-
lishments. And finally, in Fart III, we shall appraise
the extent to which the need for relief still exists and
determine to what extent that need is being met. And
finally we shall conclude -ith a survey of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which ap-
pears to be the only hope of insuring that some day the
peoples of the world may truly achieve an eternal freedom
from want.
Since this work is a contemporary one, no books have
as yet been written on the subject. The investigation has
been carried on largely through the use of newspapers and
periodicals. Reference has been made wherever possible to
the original government documents. An examination of the
bibliography will inform the reader upon exactly what
sources this research has been based.
Are we ready? Let's then plunge together into this
fascinating task? Just what have the nations done to provide
relief and rehabilitation? What remains to oe done? What
agencies have been established to carry on the task?
..
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Part, I
FOOD RELIEF BEFORE UNRRA

)CHAPTER I. RELIEF IN WORLD WAR I
v
As a background for our study of' the present problems
of relief and rehabilitation, it might be well to write a
brief chapter on the general methods of relief in i.orld
War I. It would certainly be wise to present at least
the lessons that were derived from that first wholesale
attempt at international relief.
COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in
1914, individual citizens began to send relief into Bel-
gium. By April, 1915, the relief had oeen extended to
northern France. From 1914-1919, the Commission for Relief
in Belgium "brought into the occupied zone more than
5,000,000 metric tons of foodstuffs, at a cost of over
$394, 000, 000.
"
z The Commission for Relief in Belgium, or
CRB, was technically a neutral sovereign, possessing its
own flag, passports, fleet, funds and committees all over
the world, but it was predominately American.
Herbert Hoover was the Chairman of the Commission.
The members of' his staff of purchasing and shipping experts,
as well as his supervisors in Belgium, were American, "while
50,000 of the 75,000 members of the local CRB committees
1. This chapter is based on: Winifred N. Hadsel, "U. 3. Relief
for Europe in .orld War I, ' Foreign Policy Reports
,
XIX
(March 15
",
1943), 2-11. 2. Hadsel, p. 2.
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throughout the world liven in the Unitea States and its
territories." Forty-seven percent of the funds of CRB came
from the United States, and the oulk of the supplies were
purchased from the United States. The supplies were dis-
tributed by local Belgian and French committees.
UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION
When the United States entered the war in 1917, food
was transformed into a weapon of the war. ft i Is on named
Hoover as the director of his new Food Administration, which
was to enable the United States to feed its fighting Allies.
INTER-ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL FOR RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION
A conflict of policy occurred as the time for the
Armistice drew near. The British and French ’’proposed a
common relief program that was to be controlled by a board
on which the great powers would have equal representation."
The United States, however, insisted upon maintaining com-
plete independence. Hoover ’’proposed an organization simi-
lar to that which had been used in Belgium, with the Al-
lies and the United States handling their sales independent-
ly and in the usual commercial 7vTay." The United States
policy was clearly revealed by Hoover in a cable of Novem-
ber 7, 1913, to a representative of the American Food Admin-
istration in London:
"For your general advice this government will not
agree to anything -vhich even looks like Inter-Allied
“2
J • Ibid. 4 . I bid
. ,
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control of our economic resources after peace. After
peace, over one-half of the whole export food supplies
of the world will come from the United States, and for
the buyers of these supplies to sit in majority in
dictation to us as to prices and distribution is whol-
ly inconceivable. The same applies to raw materials.
Our only hope of securing justice in distribution,
proper appreciation abroad of the effort we make to
assist foreign nations, and propoer return for the
service that we will perform will revolve around com-
plete independence of commitment to joint action on our
part.
”
The United States in a technical sense did not get its
own way. In December, 1913, an Inter-Allied Supreme Council
for Relief and Reconstruction was set up with Hoover as the
Director. But, ’‘after a few weeks of ineffectual life, the
organization expired, and its functions were absorbed into
the Food and Relief Section of the new Supreme economic
Council, which was charged with coordinating Allied and Am-
erican economic activities during the Armistice period."'
This was not real inter-Allied collaboration.
AMERICAN POLICY
"In the meantime, while the Allies and the United state
were deadlocked over the organization of relief, the Amer-
icans were proceeding independently with their own program,
and the British were acting in a similar way." 1* Hoover had
the War Department and the food Administration send foods
overseas, and simultaneously worked out plans for Its sale.
"So far as possible, he tried to secure payments
in cash, and fifteen countries, in fact, made at least
p. o.5. Ibid.
,
6. Ibid.
,
p. 7
•
. r.
.
.
'
.
'
(
i
part of their purchases in this way. Bulgaria, Ger-
many and Turkey, the only enemy countries that had
gold reserves, or other forms of securities, were
obliged to pay cash for all their supplies. ... In
the unsettled conditions of Europe, however, Govern-
ments were often unable to buy without first being
furnished with the necessary funds, and since these
sums were not available on the continent, the United
States advanc d over f 194, 000, 000 to the liberated
and enemy countries during the Armistice period. In
ad ition, the Grain Corporation of the food Adminis-
tration paid for $16,000, 000 worth of supplies from
its wartime surplus, and the Treasury loaned to the
Allies approximately $40,000,000, on the understanding
that this sum should be reloaned to the Austrian
government, which was ineligible for direct advances
from the United States. That the debtors subsequently
defaulted on approximately 94$ of their advances as
clearly not foreseen.
”
'
Relief was gradually tapered off by August, 1919* Dis-
tribution had been exceedingly difficult. Civil wars were
rampant. The blockade was cotinued beyond tne Armistice.
Transportation and communication systems were disorganized.
There were many political difficulties.
!, The feeding of under-nourished children in many
countries had begun as an American philanthropic venture in
the spring of 1919, and it was continued and extended dur-
ing the reconstruction period. The United States contri-
buted approximately $15,000,000 to this effort, and another
$15,000,000 was provided by various other government sub-
sidies and private charitable contributions.""
According to the Rev; York Time s, the United States
Government from 1919 to 1923 provided , 437, 000, 000 worth
of relief gifts, and private charity $227,000,000.
?• Ibid. 3. Ibid., p. 10.
Gov-
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ernment loans amounted to $1,200,000,000.
PRINCIPLES OF FOOD RELIEF
Haasel formulated six principle which Were gained
from the relief experience in World War I. In the first
place, broad basic policies should be formulated by the
United Nations during the war to avoid disagreements with
each other on such matters as the blockade, treatment of
ex-enemy populations, and the policy toward revolutionary
governments. The yardstick should be that oi need and not
politics--a difficult measure to apply, plans for distri-
bution should be made before the war ends to avoid long de-
lays. Surpluses should be stockpiled and on hand when fight-
ing stops. Shipping should come from all available sources.
One country should not be expected to provide all the relief,
finally, the lend- lease principle of payment according to
the recipient’s ability should be adopted.
Let us now move on to Y/orld War II to see how these
lessons were applied.
9. New York limes
,
December 3, 194-5, P* 12.
10. Hadsel, p. 11.
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CHAPTER II AXIS-OCCUPIED EUROPE
FREEDOM FROM RANT
Very little occurred in the matter of food relief in
the period between the two World ars. Isolated attempts
were made to formulate the principles of relief into inter-
national law, but there was no concrete result. Herbert
Hoover and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald did meet in 1929
at the Rapidan Camp in Virginia, where Hoover advanced the
proposal that "the powers should agree that in time of war
ships carrying food to belligerent countries should be free
from any danger of interference to remove starvation of
women and children from the weapons of warfare."' The Brit-
ish were cautious, however. The blockade was too potent
an instrument to be easily surrendered.
Again in 1939, before the Internation Convention of
Christian Endeavor Societies, Hoover urgeo. that nations
should agree not to attack food ships in time of war and not
to bomb civil populptions. Neutral nations were to serve
as referees." But his pleas were ineffectual. His was a
lone voice crying in the wilderness. Nations were not yet
ready to make such a wholehearted attack upon the problems
of peace and humanity. Another war was to bring a new
round of privation and want and suffering.
1. New form Time s, April 17, 1944, p. 1.
2. Ibid., July 7, 1939, p. 1.
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The prospect of postwar relief was adopted early after
the beginning of World War II, ana proven to be a powerful
propaganda device. <*ay oacx in August, 1940, Churcnill in
a speech to the Commons promised the people of Europe that
the "shattering of Nazi power would bring them food, free-
dom and peace." ’ Roosevelt made similar suggestions in his
sppech containing the food freedoms delivered to the U.S.
Congress in January, 1941. The l wlantic Charter of August,
1941, proclaimed "Freedom of Want" to all the war-
stricken peoples of the globe. Such announcements could
not help but become a potent psychological weapon, for
hungry peoples will turn to those who have promised them
aid. Were the promises ever1 fulfilled? Will not empty
promises create new resentment and hatred? Even the path-
way of the giver is strewn with thorns.
Soon after his promise of food in 1940, Churchill
established a Committee on Surpluses, under the chairman-
ship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, "to arrange for the pur-
chase of surplus commodities and to provide a reserve of
relief goods."
THE BLOCKADE
Britain's blockade was a significant factor in the
starvation which resulted in Europe. The Europe that Ger-
many controlled and Britain blockaded was not self-suff'i-
3. UNRRd
,
Organization, Alms, Progress . Wash.: UNRRA, 194-4.
p. 4.
4. Ibid.
..
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cient in essential foodstuffs. Normally it imported 4,000,
000 metric tons of wheat rye, 5,500,000 metric tons of oats,
barley and corn, 1,342,000 metric tons of fats and 327,000
3
metric tons of sugar. There were three main commodities
which were essential to Germany-steel, oil and food. The
British had to attack food with the olockade, It may seem
inhumane, out war itself is inhumane. It is folly to try
to delineate those weapons which may be used and those which
are forbidden. As long as total warfare exists, innumanity
is an inevitable result. Like an oil fire, the heart of it,
the existence of war itself, must be attacked, and not the
flames which lick around the edges.
And inhumanity was definitely the result, in the form
of starvation. But the main suffering was felt by the Nazi
victims rather than by the Germans themselves. for Germany
drained offthe foodstuffs from the occupied countries to
fill her own larder, irregardless of the needs of others.
Goering even boasted that before the Germans went hungry,
occupied Europe would starve. And starve they did I
£
The situation was not too bad in the winter of 1941.
Denmark and the Netherlands had sufficient livestock. xhey
did face a shortage of bread grains before the 1941 harvest.
Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, -‘•taly, Switzerland and the
Danube countries were not expecteo to have critical shortages
5. Editorial in NYT,*0ct. 13, 19^0, IV, p. 5.
6. Frederick P. Barkeley, NYT
,
Feb. 2, 1941.
** NYT will henceforth be used for New YorX Times.
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during the year. Soviet Russia, self-sufficient in food-
stuffs, had as yet experienced no change in the war. The
British supplies were rationed, out adequate.
By the winter of 194-2, however, hunger was rampant.
Diplomats reported that all Europe was hungry, though in
that year actual starvation was confined, notaoly to G-reece
and parts of Poland. But malnutrition and disease were
prevalent everywhere. Throughout Europe fats and cereal
grains were lacking. Such commodities as coffee, tea and
chocolate were completely unknown. Germany was the best fed.
The Germans received enough food to live on a subsistence
level. In Italy the condition was not as good as in Ger-
many. There had been some ration reduction, but no starva-
tion. Occupied trance was receiving sufficient supplies,
but fuel was scant. There was a great deal or hunger in
Unoccupied .trance, but starvation was rare. The situation
was 'very bad in Poland, with a spread of disease and in-
tense suffering. Denmark, with no hunger, was still pro-
ducing a lessening surplus. In Norway, there was hunger,
but no starvation. The same was true in r inland, where the
Germans had been sending some supplies to keep her fighting.
All food supplies were rationed in oweden. In Greece, there
was almost a complete lack of iood. Six to eight hundred
died daily. The situation was "critical" in Czechoslovakia.
In Yugoslavia, it was comparable to Greece, with starvation
imminent. Widespread hunger was prevalent in opain, but
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the blockade had been somewhat relaxed there.
It was claimed that the German food ration was more
than twice that of German- occupied territory ana almost
double the Italian rations, due to imports from the occu-
pied countries; But even the Germans were forced to reduce
their rations in the spring of 1942. The bread allowance
was cut from five pounds a week to 4 pounds, six ounces;
fats from 9 1/2 to 7 1/4 ounces; and meat from 14 to 10
1/2 ounces. However, that did not apply to children, mem-
bers of the armed forces, and self-sufficient workers, who
altogether comprised 00# of the populations, a month later
the Germans were forced to ration potatoes, at five pounds
a week per person.
At the same time, the British, better ofi than even
the Germans, were rationed as follows:
Meat, a little over 1 pound a week with the bone.
Prewar: 1 3/4 pounds.
Pats: 3 ounces weekly. Prewar: 10 1/2.
Bacon and Ham: 4 ounces, r rewar: 5 1/2.
Cheese: 3 ounces. Prewar: 2.7-
Tea: 2 ounces. Prewar: 2.6.
Jams, marmalade, syrups: 1 pound every 4 weeks, the
same as prewar.
Eggs: not rationed. 2-5 a month. Prev/ar:l5«
Milk: 2 1/2 pints a week, except those holding priori-
ties- -expectant mothers and children. Prewar:
2/5 pint daily.
The food situation continued to grow worse durin_ the
summer of 1942. Bevere frosts had ruined 3,000,000 acres
of crops during the winter, according to the German radio.
7- NYT
,
Feb. 15, 1942. 3. Ibid., neo. 5, 1942. 9. imYI , Marcn
29,~T^42, p. 3. 10. NYT, April 23, 1942. 11. NYT, Harch
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How accurate that source is we do. not know, but it is estab-
lished that severe losses did occur. Rations all over
Europe were reduced. By fall the condition was very bad
indeed. In October, an Inter-Allied Information Committee
furnished us with a new set of data. Belgium was living on
bread and turnips. Their meat ration was 15 grams (1/2
ounce) a day. They had no potato. The French received
100 to 120 grams of meat a week, 50-100 grams of butter, and
no potatoes or tea. In Czechoslovakia, supplies allowed
300 grams of meat a month, compared with 500 in October
1939* The bread ration had been cut l/3 since 1939* Greece
had been receiving some grain from overseas relief, *-eat
was scarce in the Netherlands, rats used as a coffee sub-
stitute were extracted from chestnuts andacorns. In Norway,
the Germans had ordered the slaughter of 200,000 head or
cattle, l/7 of the prewar stock, to provide meat for the
Reich. They had also confiscated a large stock 01 whole
meat. Starvation was present in Poland. ihe people were
living chiefly on potatoes. There were long bread queues
z 3in Yugoslavia, with fooci prices high.
PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES
It is clear that there was widespread need in Europe,
but what was being done about it? ..as there any attempt at
all to provide relief?
The United States, as usual, was slow at awakening to
13. NYT
,
Oct. 7, 1942, p. 5-
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the desire to alleviate the situation in Europe. Typi-
cally isolationist, we believe, in minding our own business
and letting others mind theirs. A Gallup Poll of August,
1940, revealed that the nation was decidedly opposed to
sending food to victims of Germany. The blockade, the
people believed, should not be lifted. If the food did
reach the occupied countries, it would only go to Ger-
many. The conditions of war, moreover, would be too great
a risk for the ships. The question asked: 'If there is
starvation in France, Holland and Belgium this Winter,
should the United states try to send food to those coun-
tries in our ships?" of those polled replied that we
should send food, whereas 6 2% answered in the negative.
Fortunately for the rest of the world the United States
was destined to change its mind, four years later, in 1944,
another poll was taken. 'Should the United states send
food by neutral Swedish ships to the children of -ranee,
Belgium, Holland and other countries now occupied by Ger-
man troops?'* 65$ of the polled replied in the affirmative.
HERBERT HOOVER
Herbert Hoover, the former president of the United
States and the relief administrator after World War I, was
a powerful factor in the reshaping of United states opinion
regarding the relief of Europe. In the fall of 1940 he
conducted a one-man campaign to try to get some relief
14.HYI, sept. 1, 1940, p. 9 . 15 . NYT , *eb. Id, 1944, p.
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carried on. On September 3, 1940, he insisted that America
had the role of remaining neutral so that she could feed the
world/ At the same time, he estimated that 430,000,000
worth of supplies would be necessary to preserve Finland
and Poland from famine and pestilence that winter.
On the fifth of October, fifteen prominent persons,
mostly educators and clergymen, announced opposition to the
feeding of Europe. They contended that the blockade was
inaispensaole to the defence of democracies, ana relief
would do more damage than good. A day later, Hoover made
his rejoinder. It was not a situation, he claimed, of
America's feeding Europe, father, the Belgians, Dutch,
Norwegians, and Poles wanted to import food, using their
own money, with an international organization protecting
their supplies and supervising the operation. Borne third
party would have to make the agreement with the British and
the Germans so that the supplies might get through the
blockade
.
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON FOOD FOR THE FIVE SMALL DEMOCRACIES
On the 10th of October, 1940, the formation of a Nation-
al Committee on Food for the rive small Democracies was
announced, with Hoover as the honorary chairman. -ts pur-
pose was to "raise a voice on behalf of Finland, Norway,
Holland, Belgium and Central Poland, : "and to urge that
16. NYT, Sept. 3, 1940, o.l.
13. NYT
.
Oct. 7, 1940. p.i.
17- NYT, Oct. 6, 1940, p.l.
19 • N?T, Oct. 8, 1940, p. 44.
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agreements be made be tween Germany and Britain with a neutral
organization in order that relief might be distributed.
The Committee was set up merely as a group to carry on
propaganda, trusting to the regular governmental channels
to conduct the necessary negotiations.
A battle than followed among leaders all over the
country, Many supported the Hoover Food Plan. Many with
equal vehemence denounced it. But the movement spread.
More and more committees were formed to advance his idea.
By January, 194-1, there were 600 subcommittees of the Na-
tional Committee. In February there was a report tnat
students were seekin to organize a national student com-
mittee to cooperate with the National committee.
Secretary of State Hull, on December 11, 1940, at a
press conference, had suggested that a private approacn
be made to the Germans. In January, as a part of Hoover's
program, a commission toured Belgium, the Netherlands and
Germany to study the food situation; The Commission was
headed oy Frederick K. Stephens, who collaborated in Hoover’s
World War Belgian relief work. Three German officials
accompanied the tour. On the 27th of January Hoover report-
ed that a cable from his investigators in Belgium indicated
that country faced imminent starvation because the major
food supplies necessary to maintain any Belgian ration were
to be nonexistent in a month. At that time the daily ra-
20. NYT, Feb. 20, 1941, p. o. 21. NY
I
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Jan. 23, 1941, p. b*
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tion per person in Belgium consisted or "about one-hair
pound of bread, two ounces or fats and meats, one anu one-
half ounces of sugar, about one and one- tenth pounds oi
potatoes and half an ounce of beans ana peas. The total
food value of this ration /was, about one-hall or the ration
in England and Germany
.
n2
-
2
'Even this ration, however, was no
longer effective, for that amount of food simply was nor
Obtainable. The actual ration amounted to only 1/3 of
that in Britain and Germany. The minimum imports required
before the August harvests would have been 650,000 tons of
breadstuff's, 157,000 tons of fats and meats, 130,000 tons
of beans, peas and a large amount of potatoes. Their basic
stocks were to give out by February 15* there were no
supplies in continental Europe except in Russia, and those
were not obtainable. Their only hope was the United States.
A relief organization modeled on the German was operating
many soup kitchens for the poor. However, it was not a lack
of money, but of the food itself, that made the situation
so serious.
According to a report of the 11th of February, the
Hoover Relief Committee did persuade Germany to senu a
little grain to Belgium. But "an economic expert of the
German High command . insisted that Germany had no intention
of devoting so much of her food reserves to relief that tne
Nazi war effort would suffer in any way."'
22.NYT, Jan.28, 1941,p.3. 23 * NYT, Feb. 2 , 1941, j.24.
24.NYT.Feb. 12, 1941, p. 14.
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On the 16th, Hoover disclosed "that a plan has been
submitted to the British and German Governments for super-
vised feeding of 3,000,000 Belgians as a test for possible
extension to other occupied European countries:
1. That an initial experiment be made in Belgium to
test whether the people there can be saved without
military advantage to either side.
2. That all feeding be done through soup kitchens so
that there would be no question of feeding Germans.
3. That at the start 1,000,000 adults ana 2,000,000
children be cared for with 50,000 tons of food a
month.
4. That the German Government agree not to requisition
native food.
5. That ooth governments give free passage to relief'
ships
.
6. That the whole operation be supervised by some
neutral body.
"Recalling that during the last war relief was given
to 10,000,000 persons in Belgium and iorthern trance with-
out military benefit or loss to eith side, Mr. Hoover con-
tended that the present proposal would not result in any
gain of food supplies for Germany."'^
j ^
The German Government was willing to cooperate, out,
the British were cold to the plan, and officials stated
that the British position remained unchanged-- trier e would oe
no relaxing of the blockade. On the ninth of March that
position was substnatiated when the British announcea that
they would refuse to lift the blockade as that would post-
phone the day of victory and the restoration of the con-
quered peoples to physical and spiritual freedom. 1-77
25-}3YT,Feb.l7
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1941., pp. 1,6. 26. NY I, Oct . 29 , 1941, p. 22
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Hoover replied, insisting that his plan would not inter-
fere with the war effort. The plan, he claimed, could be
withdrawn if the Germans were to violate the guarantees.
In the meantime, Belgium did receive several carloads
of wheat from Russia.
Hoover continued undaunted. In October, 194-1, he
made a new plea to the United States Government. Germany
went "a long way 1 ' last winter, he insisted, hut Britain had
refused to cooperate. He pointed out that the British had
already relaxed their blockade in a number of ways-- ’'to
permit food to go to 40,000 British prisoners of war in
Germany, where it was distributed by the German Government;
to permit food to pass to Swedish ports and to permit the
Turkish Government to ship food for relief in Greece.
Why should they not consent to a wholesale program of re-
lief for the occupied countries? But still he made no
progress.
Over a year later, in February, 194-3, Hoover revised
his Feed-Europe Plan. He suggested that food be obtained
from South America for ^azi- occupied Europe, carried in
Swedish ships, financed by funds of the ^overnments-in-
Sxile, and distributed under the supervision of neutral
governments, so that neither the United Nations nor the
Axis would gain in any way. A Temporary Committee on Food
-
for Europe’s Children adopted such a resolution.
28.NYT, Oct. 20, 1941. 29. NYT, Feb. 21, 1943, p. 23-
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Hoover had a great deal of difficulty ootaining Con-
gressional approval for his relief plans, resolutions
urging the State Department to work out such a plan were
placed before Congress in the summer of 1941, but no action
was taken. Two years later, official opinion had changed.
In October, 1943, a Senate subcommittee asked Hoover to
devise a plan to feed Europe’s starving millions immediately.
On the 15th of February, 1944
,
the Senate adopted a resolu-
tion urging the United States Government through the Secre-
tary of State "to work out as quicmly as possible, in coop-
eration with the British, Swedish, Swiss and other Govern-
ments, 11 the setting up of relief for the people of the Axis-
occupied countries in Europe. ihe House passed a similar
resolution on the 17th of April.
By that time, however, the liberation of Europe was
nearing, and UNRRA soon would be operating. But before
we explore that field, it will be necessary to backtrack
a little to review what voluntary relief was successfully
carried out.
VOLUNTARY RELIEF
The Red Cross provides the most outstanding example of
the many voluntary relief agencies which helped to allevi-
ate the suffering so prevalent in Europe. As early as the
eighth of January, 1941, Norman h. Davis, the chairman of
the American Red Cross, announced plans for sensing food
30.NYT, Oct.7, 1943, p. 12. 31 • NYT, Feo. 16, 1944, p. 34.
32. NYT, April 18,1944, ,. 5 .
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and medicine to unoccupied France and to Spain, after it was
announced in London that at the personal request of Roose-
velt, one shipload of supplies Y/ould he allowed to pass
through the blockade. Supplies were purchased out of the
<150,000,000 fund voted to the Red Cross by Congress for
relief abroad. It was not in the form of a loan, but as
an outright gift'. That first ship reached Marseilles early
in March. A second ship left u ersey City on the 17th of
March. As a result of a personal appeal of Roosevelt to
Churchill, the British, after observing how the two cr.rgoes
were handled and. disposed of, permitted periodic sailings
- 4
to the unoccupied zone of France.
In June, 1941, it was reported that the American Red
Cross was to arrange for distribution of relief cargoes
among 70,000 needy refugees who had reached Sire from
Britain and Northern Ireland.
By August, 1943, the Red Cross had distributed to
more than 32,500,000 persons in 30 countries supplies with
a total value of <*>74,361,810, of wnich ^54,078,501 was
supplied by the Government.
RELIEF IN GREECE
Voluntary relief was carried out most successfully in
Greece. By the early winter of 1942, conditions were De-
coming intoleraDle there. Authenticated reports Drought to
Turkey by Greek refugees claimed that violent Communist
33.NYT, Jan. 9, 1941, p. 7 . 34. NYT, March 13,1941. 35 .uYT , June
3 , 19^1 . 16. NYT. Aug . 7 , 1343 , p . 12. ______
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feeling was spreading throughout the country, ''coincident
with the famine and plague that ’had raised the death toll
in Athens and Piraeus to more than 1,500 persons daily. . . .
Cholera, typhus, typhoid, pneumonia and starvation were
>7
sweeping all Greece. . . .Food prices were astronomical.
"
By the 14th of January, the spread of starvation in
Greece had led the British Cabinet to lift tne olockade in
c
order to allow some food to enter the country. A few days
later the Turks made plans to send two food ships a week to
Greece. Starvation continued, however, and Dy the sixth of
February had reached the rural areas. Food prices were fan-
tastic. There was no meat, virtually no fish. The people
subsisted on he^bs from the fields. Deaths had reached
2,000 daily. Of 50,000 tons of food permitted oy the British
Ministry of Economic Warfare in August, only 6,000 tons had
been delivered due to a shortage of ships.
On the 14th came a report from official sources at
Ankara that Swedish steamers under charter to the British
Government were loading two cargoes of foodstuffs, medicine
and clothing to rush to Greece. The vessels, on their
return voyages, carried Greek children to South Africa ana
India, where they were cared for by the International Red
Cross and British relief authorities.
On March 7, 1942, the State Department revealed that
37- BYT, Jan. 12, 1942, p. 2. 58.NYT. Jan. 15. 1942, p. 7- 39 BYT
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the American and British governments had authorized the
shipment of 2,300 long tons of flour from the Unitea States
to Greece.
The supplies that were thus rushed to Greece were dis-
tributed by the International Red Cross. Throughout the
summer of 1942 relief supplies arrived, and by December,
reports of death from starvation had ceased. By that time
distribution to all parts of Greece were supervised oy a
Swiss- Swedish Commission on the spot. The International
Red Cross had chartered eight ships for the traffic, and
''they sailed unmolested from Canada to Greece under agreement
with both the United Nations and the Axis powers. ‘
The overall situation in Europe had by this time become
so desperate that official action on the part of the united
States became essential, and the Office of foreign Relief
and Rehabilitation Operations was set up late in 1942. But
before we study that, it might be well to examine a few-
other aspects of the united States food policy. For a
discussion of that I have aevoted the next chapter.
42. NYT, March 7, 1942, p. 4.
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CHAPTER III GOVERNMENTAL FOOD POLICY
LEND LEASE
The United States was able to supply foodstuffs for
her fighting Allies through the use of Lend-Lease. The
Lend-Lease Bill was passed on the eighth of March, 1941.
It authorized the President to '“manufacture ’or otherwise
procure’ defense articles, defined to mean practically
everything, including agricultural commodities, and to
’sell, transfer title to, lease, lend or otherwise dispose
of them’ to the government of any foreign country, tne
defense of which he deems vital to the defense of the united
States .
“
To the end of 1943, lend-lease food shipments totalled
$2, 090, 000, 000V Total lendlease food shipments in 1944
amounted to 7,272,000,000 pounds?
THE COMBINED BOARDS
In ^arch, 1942, Roosevelt and Beaverbrook made plans
for two intergovernmental committees, the Combined Produc-
tion and Resources Board and the Combined .food Board. The
creation of the two boards was announced on June 9 by a
joint statement of Roosevelt and Churchill. "The Food
Board, headed jointly by Secretary of Agriculture, Claude
R. Wickard and R. H. Brand, Chief of the British Food
l.NYT, March 9,1941. 2.NYT, March 12, 1944, p. 1. 3- BYT, Jan.
13.1945. p. 3.
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Mission, was given authority to pool the entire food re-
sources of G-reat Britain and the United States so as to in-
sure ample food for all the fighting men and civilians of
the United nations. " Problems of food management would
first be studied by committees on which the interests of
the other United Nations, as well as America and urreat
Britain, would be represented.
On the 29th of' October, 1943, the Combined food Board
was expanded and Canada was admitted. Secretary <*ickard,
who had been the American co-chairman from its inception,
was made “neutral chairman", and Marvin Jones, the v<ar
- ood Administrator, was appointed as the American voting
member. The Canadian member was J. G. Gardiner, the Cana-
dian Minister of Agriculture.
A Combined Raw Materials Board was later created.
In January, 1945, the three boards were continued to
the end of the war with Japan. The Combined rood Board
has now been superseded by the International emergency rood
c
Council.
OFFICE OF FOREIGN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OPERATIONS
Late in 1942 the United -tates Government began to
realize that the situation in lurope was assuming sucxh
proportions that some form of relief would be essential,
lest the peace that her armies were trying so hard to gain
4.NYT , June 13,1942, .1. 5 -NYT, Aug. 22, 1942, p. 17. o.ulT,
Oct. 30, 1943, p. 12. 7»NYT» Jan.20, 1945, p«5* 6. See Chap. X.
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should, already be lost. In November, 1942, the President,
gave S. R. Stettinius, Jr., of the Lend-^ease Administration,
instructions' 1 to supply weapons, food and clothing to the
armed forces and citizens of North African areas occupied
by the United Nations.”
At the same time, an office was set up 'to direct the
feeding, clothing and rehabilitation of countries which are
friendly to or occupied by the United Nations.” The Direct-
or of the Office was to work on a world-wiae scale. He
would have no domestic food responsibilities as those were
to be deleg&ed to a separate food administration. His task
would be primarily one of making plans and determining
policy for the huge task which woulu confront the United
Nations in rebuilding the world after victory was won.
Vv'ith the Office of foreign Relief and RehaDili tation
Operations engaged in charting policy, actual administra-
tion was to be done by the Lend-Lease Administration, under
E.R. Stettinius, Jr., and the Board of Economic Warfare,
headed by Vice President Wallace.
Herbert E. Lehman was appointed as the Director ol
foreign rtelief and Rehabilitation Operations on the 21st of
November, ne resigned as governor of New York on December
3, and was sworn into his new position of December 4. At
first, his office was an enterprise of the United States
alone, although it was to cooperate with Allied govern-
9. NYT, Nov. 21, 1942, p. 1.
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merits. However, plans were made almost from the very be-
ginning to enlarge it into an international undertaking.
The office was put under the jurisdiction of the State
Department, which supervise its policies ana its activities.
The various expenditures growing out of these policies were
to he supplied by the Lend-Lease Administration. There
was a broad field, however, for the personal initiative
and administration of Mr. Lehman.
OFFRO’s organization was kept small. Rather than en-
larging his own office, Lehman used the availaole facilities
of existing organizations in order to avoid duplication of
effort
.
There were three steps to its general plan:
1. To extend all facilities for the planting of crops.
2. To supply raw materials for such industries in the
conquered countries as may have survived, thus per-
mitting the populations to produce goods and reset
the foundations of their industrial economy.
3 . 10 stock the shelves or tradesmen, so that there
will oe commodities for purchase after years of the
leanest xind of existence.
After the first crop has been garnered and the
factories resume, the work of physical rehabilitation
will begin- -on roads, towns, etc. J3y that time, the
people can begin to help themselves. Lehman wanted
above all to give to the people. . . the opportunity
to restore themselves and to pay in time for the
material aid they would require.
In December, 1942, the State department set up an Office
of Foreign Territories to collaborate with Lehman’s nelief
and Rehabilitation Operations.
As an outline of general policy, Roosevelt said in a
10. NYT, Dec . 16, 1942, p. 17 .
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press conference that relief was to be administered for
humanitarian reasons, and not from the standpoint of Amer-
i 5
ica's own interest. Lehman himself, in a speech at Albany,
insisted that the United states in the postwar period was to
be a "good neighbor" and not a Santa olaus. "Help other
nations help themselves, to get them oack on their feet
economically and socially, to put them back on a trading
basis, producing goods for themselves and the rest oi the
world, to help them give employment under decent conditions,
•
' 3
and because they will aid themselves, they will aid us."
In December, 194-2, there was enough wheat to feed
Europe for a year, 1,000,000,000 bushels, at Herbert H.
Lehman's disposal in the United States and Canadian ware-
houses. His first task was to make stock piles of other
foods to supplement the wheat. That was to be a difficult
task. Huge stockpiles of sugar in Cuba, coffee in Brazil
and Colombia and corn in Argentina were drained for distri-
oution abroad. The United States had enough cotton in
warehouses to clothe Europe for twelve months or more and
tobacco enough. But the milk outlook was serous. 160,000,
000 pounds of milk were needed at home and abroad. Only
110,000,000 were expected. And the Europeans wanted eggs
and vitamized foods.
In January long range buying for OFRRO was started to
replace emergency wherever possible. Lehman estimatea tnat
12. NYT, Nov. 25, 194-2, p. 23* 13* Quoted in NYT , Dec. 22,
1942, p. 14. 14. NYT, Dec. 7, 1942.
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oy June 30 he would have accumulated $250,000,000 to ^300,
000,000 worth of foodstuffs, about $100,000,000 worth of
clothing, textiles ana kindred supplies and. about $20,000,003
to $40,000,000 worth of medical supplies, seeds, and some
repair parts for agricultural rehabilitation. More than
400,000,000 or $500,000,000 was needed.
Although Lehman's main emphasis was to De put upon
food, he did cooperate with the United states Puolic Health
Service in developing a medical program to help alleviate
the widespread tuberculosis existing in Europe as a price
of malnutrition.
In April, accompanied by his special assistant, Hugh
Jackson, Lehman went to London. He was to undertake no
negotiations for joint United Nations belief and ^ehabilita-
tion. That task was to oe left to the State .department.
His task was to procure "all the information availaole on
problems connected with the relief of victims of war in
areas liberated from Axis control. ' In London he consulted
with the Leitn-Ross Committee on Post-War Requirements and
with representatives of the British Foreign office. Upon
his return he disclosed that the groundwork had oeen laid
for close cooperation oetween the military ana civilian
relief agents. "In the period immediately after the lioer-
ation of occupied territory. . . distribution would have to
be under the control of military authorities." The plans
15- IYT, Fab. 7, 1943,p. 14. 16. HYT , April 4,1943, p.l.
17. See below.
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for “extending relief to occupied lands were being made unaer
the principles of lend-lease. '
The first big test for OFRRO came in North Africa.
There were two divisions to the relief work in that region.
In Morocco and Algeria, where there was plenty of money,
OFRRO, under Fred Hoehler, supplied milk daily for 100,000
needy children, distributed clothing and supplies, helped to
feed the inmates of refugee camps and put them in employment
after their release. In Tunisia, the Army set up a Tuni-
sian detachment',' on which OFRRO was represented, to plan for
j
civilian welfare. The French provided local personnel.
Plans were made to provide supplies for some 600,000 to
700,000 civilians in Tunisia. Relief there was done on a
commercial rather than a direct-contribution oasis.
“Relief stores provide outlets for food and cloth-
ing in North Africa with the handling of goods in native
hands under the supervision of American personnel. In
addition, a relief rationing system has been created for
the orderly distribution of supplies to those who have
sufficient money to buy them.
'Grift relief has been employed for refugees with-
out funds, while milk is being provided for Arab chilu-
ren. J-t is occasionally supplemented oy rice or other
foods.
“The needs of Jewish refugees in Tunisia are
served by four centers where they receive health in-
spection and milk, sugar, rice and clothing for the
children and the ill. At the same Lime, these refu-
gees are being gradually evacuated to their homes or to
other places where they can live.
"Long-range plans include the restoration of the
fishing ani olive industries. Agricultural prospects
13.NYT, April 22, 1943, p. 12. 19.NYT, May 9, 1943, p. 19-
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are reported to be so good that it is Delieved that
provision of food from Allied sources for an extended
period is unlikely.
!, The relief situation in the rest of North Africa
is Decoming stabilized, while political refugees in
Algeria and trench Morocco have all been liberated
from camps and are employed in military labor acti-
vities and civilian occupations. Rest camps have
been provided for ill and disabled refugees .
"
By the summer of 194-3 agricultural rehabilitation in
North Africa had reached such a point that it was expected
to produce surpluses of grain, dried beans and peas^, and
temporary surpluses during harvesting of perishables, which
could be made available for use by the Allie- military
forces
.
The total relief staff for North Africa was only 22
persons, including three physicians of the united States
Public Health Service.
In June, Lehman disclosed plans to feed x taly upon
her break from Germany. Other occupied countries were to
receive relief when military authorities believed it could
be handled without weakening the blockade.
OFFRO was never intended to replace voluntary relief
agencies, but merely to supplement them. Lehman always
emphasized that it was more vital than ever that voluntary
organizations rendering essential services be maintained.
In August OFRRO began to encounter considerable diffi-
culty in obtaining food. When the Jar £ ood Administration
20. Fred K. Hoehler, Chief of missions in North Africa. NY
I
,
June 27, 1943, p. 29 • 21. NYT, July 16, 1943*
22. NYT, June 13, 1943, p.l. 23- NYT, Feb. 19, 1943, p. 16.
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had first made allocations to OFFRO, it thought that the
agency would operate at once. But in the meantime the
Combined Chiefs of Staff had made a decision that the armies
should take care of relief feeding in the li Derated areas
for the first six months, at least. The Army was already
carrying on relief operations in Sicily, as a result of that
controversy, the <«ar Food Administration informed OFRRO
that it could not "set aside the food reserves asxed oy the
relief agency without cutting civilian consumption in this
country or allocations to the British or Russians." That
proved to be a great handicap for OFFRO. But before its
problem had become too acute the office had oeen merged into
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis tration,
an organ of all the United Nations. However, before we
make an appraisal of UNRRA, we must move to Europe to see
what the war- torn countries there were doing in the field
of relief.
INTER-ALLIED COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR REQUIREMENTS
On the 24th of September, 1941, the British Lovernment
had called representatives of the Allied governments to a
meeting at Saint James Palace. The Inter-Allied Committee
on Post-War Requirements was created there, with Leith-
Ross of Great Britain as its chairman'". All the European
allies except Russia were represented. lor eighteen months,
through subcommittees, the group worked "on such proolems
24.NYT, Aug. 15, 1943, p. 1. 25- UNRRA, Organ. , Alms .Progres s,
op. cit.
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as the minimum requirements of all the occupied countries
for food, clothing, medicine, seeds, tools and raw materials
for the first six months after the war ends. The Russians,
while not participating, were kept informed of each new
development.
"
Its purpose was to determine needs. It had no power
or funds with which to purchase surpluses. J-t did have
;,
some success in discouraging allies v/ith funds, like Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, from competing in the world mar-
kets for goods in which shortages existed." The scope
of the Inter-Allied Committee was limited to Europe and
therefore was not as broad as Lehman's organization, since
his Jurisdiction extended to the far East, and to the Axis
countries themselves after victory.
The Food Requirements drawn up by this committee came
to be used as a basis for the plans made by UNRRA upon its
establishment late in 1943. According to estimates maae
by the exiled governments of occupied lands for the Allied
Post-War Requirements Committee in June, 1943, the occupied
countries would need 45,355,000 tons of foodstuffs, raw
materials and "prime necessities" in the first six months
of peace. That would require 23,435,000 tons of shipping.
The needs were broken down as follows: Foodstuffs: 7,332,000
tons; drugs and hospital supplies, 39,000 tons; coal and
coke: 11,150,000 tons. Food needs were based on the lowest
rate of nutritional value for maintaining health--2, 000
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calories per day. The occupied countrie: included were
Belgium, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, France, Gre ce, the
Netherlands, Poland and Yugoslavia. No requirements had yet
been received from Russia or from enemy and enemy-controlled
countries. It was also estimated that there would be
16,000,000 displaced persons in Europe.
lhe needs by country were as follows:
France 7,474,000 tons
Poland 3,366,000
Belgium-Luxembourg 3,093,000
The Netherlands 2,969,000
Norway 1 , 384 ,000
Czechoslovakia 1,311,000
Greece 1,707,000
Yugoslavia 1,131,000
CONDITIONS IN 1943
By 1943, conditions in Europe were becoming more and
more desperate. Poland was probaoly worse off than any
other country. 'Food control was deliberately used by tlie
Germans to exterminate the intellectual and professional
classes and to enslave the masses. An adult received
about 3,25 pounds of bread a week, 3*5 ounces of' flour, about
the same amount of meat and fats, 3-4 ounces of sugar and a
few pounds of potatoes. All this came to no more than 300
calories a day instead of the minimum of' 2,400 set by the
League of Nations. in the black market of Warsaw a pound
of black bread cost
,
1 . 50 ; a pound of meat <$6 . 50 ; a pound
of bacon 38 . 50 ; an egg 50^; a pound of butter $9 ; a pint
27. NYT, Nov. 25, 1943, p. 31.
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of milk $1.25; a pound of potatoes 50^. And it was on the
black market that the Jews were almost wholly dependent.
Hence their calories amohted to only 400 a day--half ol
the inadequate Polish allowance. 1
In Holland, the people were receiving less than
1,500 calories. In September 19^-2 their fat was 7 and
their protein 43,t below whe League minimum. There were
marked deficiencies in minerals and vitamins. The morta-
lity rate had increased from 9% in 1940 to IJfo in 1941.
There was much disease.
In May, Mr. Lehman reported that milk production in
Europe had already gone down by more than a third and meat
production by nearly a half, ^eduction in breeding ani-
mals was such that recovery to post-war levels would Lake
many years and the lack of draft animals would hinder
cultivation of the first crops.
At least 9,000,000 men, women and children had been
transferred from their homes to Axis concentration camps
or to scattered industrial production units. fn Norway,
Denmark, the Low Countries and coastal areas of Trance and
j-taly and in the Balkans he estimated that there would
be at least 70,000,000 who would be in dire necessity the
moment they were freed from the Axis yoke. In the interior
of Europe ana in the Orient millions more would be found.
23. Committee on Food Habits of the National research
Council. BYT
,
April 11, 1943, IV, p. 12.
29. NYT
,
May 6, 1943, p. 20.
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It was becoming obvious that some form of international
relief was urgent. An estimate of neeas had be n made.
Supplies were then availaole in donor countries. But an
international organization was needed and personnel se-
lected on an international basis. That need led to the
establishment of the United Nations relief and Hehaoili-
tation Administration, for a discussion of which I have
devoted Part II.
Ii
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PART II
UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER IV FOUNDING AND SCOPE
THE AGREEMENT
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adrainis ora-
tion was first planned early in 1943* In May the United
States State Department began to draw up a draft agreement,
holding discussions with the British, Soviet and Chinese
governments. The United Stai.es ana Great Britain disagreed
on some of the basic principles of the proposed agreement.
The British contended that any allocation of Bri tish-Amer-
ican food should be done by the Combined food Board, of
which at that time the members were only the united States
and Great Britain. The United States, nowever, insisted
that the Board should be superseded or its membership en-
larged .
Roosevelt likewise conferred with Majority and Minority
leaders of the House and Senate regarding the proposed in-
ternational agency. The agreement was to be in the form of
an executive agreement, but Congressional support Y/ould ue
required to provide funds needed before the organization
could become effective.
On the 10th of June, the State Department suomitted
ids draft agreement lo the governments of all the United
nations and the Associated countries;’- A conference was to
be held during the summer in order to set up the new organ-
l.NYT, June ID, 1943, p. 28. 2. NYT , June 11, 1943, p. 9*
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ization; but it had to be postphoned Decause of the protests
of many of the small nations, who wanted more voice and less
loss of sovereignty in the proposed UNRRA. After further
consultations, the State Department sent out a revised draft
on September 23, to 39 nations and the french committee of
National Liberation, in addition to Great Britain, the Soviet
Union and China, whose approval had already been obtained.
In keeping with the demands of the smaller nations, some of
the power of the central committee, representing the "Big
Four", was transferred to the council, which was to represent
all the member Governments of the UNRRA. The draft was to
become effective as soon as the nations had signed it, unless
they were to attach reservations to it.
By this time, the informal approval of tne Democratic
and Repuolican members of the Senate Committee on foreign
Relations and the house Committee on Foreign Affairs had been
obtained. Soon afterward, Congress gave its formal bene-
diction to UNRRA in the ^onnally and the Fulbright resolutions.
THE ATLANTIC CITY MEETING
On the ninth of November, 1943, representatives of forty-
four nations met in the East Room of the White nouse at noon
to sign the UNRRA agreement.
On the 10th of November the Council opened its first
session at the Hotal Claridge in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of otate, was appointed as
3.NYT, Sept . 24, 1943, 4 . NYT , Nov. 10, 1943, p. 1.
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the United States Council member, with Francis B. Sayre,
special assistant to the Secretary of State, as an alternate.
They were accompanied by a number of advisers and assistants.
Acheson, as temporary chairman, called the session to order,
on the 11th he was unanimously elected as permanent chairman
for the session. The three vice chairmen were the delegates
from Australia, the Netherlands and Mexico. English was
made the official language of the council, although the final
acts were published in French also. i'he preliminary meetings
were opened to the press, but the committee meetings were
private.
The Council divided itself into four main ad hoc com-
mittees, the Committee on Organization and Administration,
the Committee on Deneral Policy, the Committee on finance
and Supplies and the Committee on Belief and Rehabilitation
Policies. A fifth Committee on Ad tioc committees was set
up to coordinate the work of the four main committees.
On the 13th the committees began their closed sessions.
Ambassador Andrei A. Dromyko, in the aosence of the head of
the Russian delegation, who had been delayed because of storms
at sea, presided at the Committee on G-neral Policy. Colonel
John J. Llewellin of England headed the subcommittee on the
scope of UNRLA's activities. Jean Monnel, Commissioner Gen-
eral for Supply and Reconstruction of the French Committee
of National Liberation, presided at the first meeting of the
5. First Session of the Council of the UNRRA, Nov. 13-Dec. 1,
19^3» Selected documents. Dept, of State Pub. 2040, Conf. Series
53. Y<ash: Gov't Printing Off.. 1944., p.i. 6. NYT
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Committee on Finance and Supplies. Dean Acneson .of the
United States wan the head or the subcommittee on financing
arrangements for supplies and services. L. B. Pearson, of
Canada, served as the chairman of the subcommittee ro set up
procedures for meeting deficits in supplies that the libera-
ted. areas would have to import. The committee on relief
and rehabilitation policies was called to order by Dr. T. F.
Isian, China. Paul-henri Spaak, Belgium, led the committee
on organization and administration.
On the 15 th the council invited four intergovernmental
oodies to send two ooservers each to the meeting-- the econ-
omic section of the League of nations at Princeton, New
Jersey; the International Labor Office at Montreal; the
Unitea Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture
7
at Washington. ; and the '-'ivil Affairs Committee of the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff at Washington.
The reports of the committees were made to the plenary
session of the entire Council. The final session met on the
first of Decemoer.
THE SCOPE AND POLICY OF UNRRA
The Preanile to the Agreement reveals the scope of UNRRA:
Being determined that immediately upon the libera-
tion of any area by the armed forces of the United Na-
tions or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy the
population thereof shall receive aid and relief from
their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in
the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the
. NYT,Nov. 14 , I943, p. 43.
19S3, p. 12.
8 . See Chapter XII. 9 -NYT, Nov . lb,
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health of the people, and. that preparation and arrange-
ments shall De made for the return of prisoners and
exiles to their homes and for assistance in the re-
sumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial
production and the restoration of essential services. /tJ
There were four classes of supplies and services that
UNRRA was authorized to furnish:
(1) Relief supplies. Essential consumer goods to
meet immediate needs, such as food, fuel, clothing,
shelter, medical supplies.
(2) Relief Services. Such as health and welfare, assist-
ance in caring for and maintaining records of persons
found in any areas under tne control of any of the
United Nations who by reason of war have been displaced
from their homes and in agreement with the appropriate
Governments, military authorities or other agencies, in
securing their repatriation or return, and such tech-
nical services as may be necessary for these purposes.
(3) Rehabilitation Supplies and Services, materials
( such as seeds, fertilizers, raw materials, fishing
equipment and spare parts) needed to enaole a recipi-
ent country to produce and transport relief supplies
for its own and other liberated territories and such
technical services as may oe necessary for these pur-
poses.
(4) Rehabilitation of Public Utilties and Services. oo
far as they can be repaire or restored to meet immedi-
ate needs, such as light, water, sanitation, power,
transport, temporary storage, communications and assist-
ance in procuring material equipment for the rehabili-
tation of educational institutions. 7
UNRRA activities were to " oe carried on with the con-
sent of the Government or authority exercising administrative
authority in a given area, . . . were to oe limited to
'immediate relief and rehabilitation and were not to extend
into the longer range field of economic rec ons truction and
. . . were to be coordinated with other intergovernmental
10. Documents from First Session, op. cit., p. 7*
11. Resolution 1 . NYT, Nov. 23, 19*0 » P* 5»
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agencies so as not to interfere with the winning of the war,
and so as to assure iair and equitable distrioution to and
12,
among the various liberated areas . 1
It was originally expected that the role of UNRRA would
be limited in most European countries to health, welfare
and repatriation of displaced persons. UNRRA was to provide
supplies and services to those countries which lackea tor-
eign exchange. Those with sufricient resources were to
finance their own relief. However, repatriation, health
and welfare services could be carried on in any one of the
liberated United Nations when requested.
Relief immediately after liberation was to be handled
by the military authorities for the civilian populations.
Uhen the six months military period came to an end, the
responsibility for relief would fall upon the national gov-
ernment of that area. It was up to that government to de-
cide whether or not to ask UNRRA for relief. “The Army
rather than UNRRA Was to decide with which Government deal-
ings 'werej to be carried on in countries where the source of
authority was a matter of dispute. Even repatriation was
to oe handled first by the Army.
There were two classifications of countries originally
excluded from UNRRAs aid: countries actually under enemy
control and countries which had neve oeen under enemy
control. India, however, pleaded desperately for UNRRA aid
12. Agreement of suDcommittee on scope of UNRRA* s activities.
dYT, Nov. 22, 194-3, p.9 • 13 • NYT , July 16, 1944, p. 9-
l£7NYT, July 16,1944, p. 9.
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"because of the terrible famine which afflicted, her. At the
Montreal Council meeting in September, 1944, the council
authorized UNRRA "to operate in United Nations areas which
are of importance to the military operations of the unitea
Nations, and which are stricken by famine or disease." In
such cases, the director general was to inform the central
committee immediately, although he could act first.
The first Council also accepted, a Chinese proposal that
rehabilitation expenditures snould include material equipment
for educational institutions that had been looteu or des-
troyed by the invaders.
According to the policies of UNRRA, liberated nations'
retained the right to the restitution of property looted by
the Nazis or the Japanese. UNRRA was to ‘be able to move
in and seize surplus stocks that the Nazis had looted from
all parts of Europe and to use them for relief and rehabilita-
tion purposes in liberated areas. However, ii the relief
organization distriouted machinery, cattle or other property
previously stolen by the enemy from a particular country, the
government of the latter reserved its right to recover the
equivalent of the stolen goods in kind."
Aid could be extended to enemy countries, but certain
conditions were attached at Atlantic City:
1. The sovereign power in the ex- enemy country cofcerned
must make a request for assistance, approved by
the military authority in control.
15.NYT, Sept. 22, 1944. 16. HYT, Nov. 2 , 194 -3 ., 5 .
17*NYT, Nov. 23, 1943, p. 56.
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2. The request must oe approved by a majority vote of
the UNRRA Council at a regular meeting of that organ-
ization.
3. The relief extended under these conditions shall be
given under the condition that the government re-
ceiving aid assumes the cost.
In enemy countries, only measures which might be in
the interests of the United Nations could be carried out,
such as the care of displaced persons or the prevention of
disease. In accordance with those provisions, the Montreal
Session of the Council in September, 1944, voted to provide
a program of ‘‘limited aid" to Italy of $50,000,000, amount-
ing to only welfare services for children and mothers and
care of displaced persons; and aid for allied nationals,
German Jews and other anti-Nazis found in enemy territory
and control of epidemics therein-;
In August, 1945, however, at a meeting in London, the
Council votea to send full scale relief to "taly and Austria,
both ex- enemy countries.
The fourth Council meeting at Atlantic City in March,
1946, extended even further the scope of UNRRA by author-
izing it to care for 2,000 Austrian Jews who had been in-
eligible because they had never been displaced or deported".
The same council meeting adopted another resolution
whcih formed an important aspect of the policy o, the organ-
ization--the Wood resolution, sponsored oy C. Tyler Wood,
a United States alternate to the council meeting. The
18. NYT, Sept. 9, 1944, p. 4. 19* Vera M. Dean, UNRRA*A Step
Toward Reconstruction," Foreign Policy Reports , XIX (Jan.l,
1944), p. 266. 20. NYT , Sept .23, 1944, p.o. 21.NYT,Marcn
27, 1946, p. 14.
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resolution was a statement of principle ''that occupying,
armies should refrain from requisition>>land and consuming
indigenous supplies that could oe usee for the reliei of
nations they liberate.' 1 ^ it was a direct thrust at Russia,
which had been accused of removing the means of production
from countries receiving aid, so that they were unaole to
produce goods themselves, and thereby extending aid indef-
initely .
Thus UNRRA had been established. The first United Ra-
tions organization had come into existence, in the words of
Franklin D. Roosevelt at the signing of the UNRRA’ s Agree-
ment :
As in most of the difficult and complex things in life,
nations will learn to work together only by actually
working together. Why not? The nations have common
objectives. It is, therefore, with a lift of hope
that we loox on the signing of this agreement by all of
the United Nations as a means of joining them together-
still more firralyr3
But our task has hardly begun. We must move on to
invistigate what this new agency was like, how it was or-
ganized, how it worked, what it accomplished. Let’s analyze
its structure first. To that purpose I have devoted Chap-
ter V.
22. NYT
,
March 27, 1946, p. 1. 23. fifty Facts about
UNRRA. Washington: Bureau o: Budget, 1946. p. 34.
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CHAPTER V THE STRUCTURE OF UNRRA
A. THE COUNCIL
The United Nations Relief' and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration is composed of two parts, the Council and Adminis-
tration. Every member of UNRRA had one representative on
the Council. Decisions were made by a simple majority vote.
The council was authorized to meet not less than twice a
year.
MEMBERSHIP
UNRRA originally had 44 members. Denmark was admitted
at Montreal in September, 194-4. It the London meeting,
August, 1945, the Ukrainian and White Russian (Byelorussian)
Soviet Socialist Republics were invited to join. Turkey
was admitted in 1946 at the fourth session of the council
in Atlantic City. The complete list of 43 members is as
follows":
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Byelorussian SSR
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt-
El Salvador
Ethiopia
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
1 . Resolutions on Policy, _ ohth Session 01 the Council, 1946.
p.3* 2. 'UNRRA* s Record of Service, 1 United nations bulletin ,
I, (Nov. 13, 1946) , p. 47.

India
Iran
Iran
Liberia
Luxembourg
Mexico
The N etherland
s
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Panama
Paraguay
&
Peru
The Philippines
Poland
Turkey
Ukrainian SSR
Union of South Africa
Unitea Kingdom
United States
USSR
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Only four members of the United Nations are not memoers
of UN'RRAt Argentina, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, ana Syria.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL
The Council is the policy forming ooay of the UNRRA. It
was to hold meetings twice a year. 10 speak for it during
the intervals between meetings, a Central Committee was set
up, originally consisting of representatives of the Big Four-
China, USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. In
London in 1945 the Central Committee was enlarge c to include
Canada and France'. In Atlantic City the following March, it
was enlarged once again to include one receiving country,
Yugoslavia, and two of the lesser powers, Australia and Brazil'.
The decisions of the Central Committee were subject to
later reconsideration by the council.
At its first session the Council set up four standing
committees, the Committee on Financial Control, the committee
on Supplies, and two regional committees, for Europe and for
the iar Last.
The Committee on financial Control was appointed to ad-
3« NYT
,
Aug . 25, 194-5 > P* 9 • 4.NYT,March 23, 1946, p. 4.
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vise the Director G-enera and. the Council on financial matters
It consisted of representatives of China, Greece, Mexico,
Norway, South Africa, Russia, Great Britain and the United
States. The United States delegate was tne cnairman, with
the two vice-chairraenships falling to the Union oi Soutn
Africa and Greece.
The Committee on Supplies was to advise ihe Council, tne
Central Committee and the Director General on general policies
regarding the provision, financing and transport of supplies.
The main supplier nations ere represented-- tne United States,
Great Britain, Russia, China, Brazil, Trance, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Australia, and New Zealand. Canada held the chair-
manship, while Russia ana the French Committee or national
Liberation hela the vice- chai rmenships
.
A small subcommittee, drawn from ootn these committees,
was authorized to coordinate the activities of the committees
on supply ana financial control, ... to auvise the director-
general what governments are in a position to pay for the
relief goods they receive from UNRRA." The subcommittee
was to have five members, at least three of whom would oe
from the committee on supplies.
The regional committees were to meet within their re-
spective areas and recommend to the Council and tne Central
Committee problems relating to requirements, supplies, etc.,
5 •NYT , No -' . . .
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The committee for Europe ha. its offices in London. It
represented the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Brazil,
Canada, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the French Committee for
National Liberation, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia. It was to replace
the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-,*ar Requirements. The
chairman of the committee was the council member from Great
Britain. The vice-chairmen v, ere from Russia and Norway.
The committee on the Far Last had its provision offices
in Washington, but were moved to China after the fall of
Japan. The committee represented the United States, Great
Britain, China, Australia, “ew Zealand., the Netherlands,
France, India and the Philippine Islands. China held the
chairmanship, and the Netherlands and Australia the two vice-
chairmensni ps
.
Standing technical committees on Agriculture, Displaced
Persons, wealth. Industrial Rehabilitation and welfare were
also set up at Atlantic City. On these, each member govern-
/s
raent could name a representative.
MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL
The Council of UNRRA has held six sessions, as follows:
1. Atlantic City, November 10 to Decemoer 1,1943.
2. Montreal, September 16 to 26,1944.
3. London, August 7, 1945.
10. UNRRA, Or
. , Aim ,Pro . , oo.cit.
,
p. 6. 11. NYT , Nov. 24, 1943,
p.ll. 12. See Chap. III. 13. NYT, Nov. 25, 1943, p. 31.
14. NYT, Dec. 1,194 ,p.7. 15 • NYT , Nov. 27 , 194 , ... J.
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4. Atlantic City, March 15 to 29, 1946.
5. Geneva, August 3 to 16, 194 o.
6. Washington, December 19, 1946.
The important decisions oT the Council meetings have
been included under their corresponding subject matters
throughout the text or this work.
3. THE ADMINISTRATION
The executive powers of the UNRRA are vested in the
Director Gneral. Upon the stablishment of UNRRA, the first
session of the Council unanimously electee Aleroert H. neh-
man, the former Director of OFRRO, to be the Direcor General.
He served until the 12th of March, 1946, when he was forced
to resign because of ill health, leaving an admirable record
of service behind him. The Atlantic City Council Meeting
in March, 1946, gave him the titular position of "permanent
and honorary chairman of the Council, '' and elected F'iorello
H. LaG-uardia as his successor. The first council meeting
had voted a salary of ^15,003 a year to the Director General,
but both Lehman and La Guardi a served without pay. In
December, 1946, at the last session of the Council, La
Guardia turned over to his successor, Major General Lowell
Tv. Rooks, the task of winding up UNRRA operations.
The headquarters Organization can best be presented in
/?
outline form:
16. NYT
,
March 29, 1946, p. a-. 17 . . ;YT , - ’ch 22, 1946,
p. 1; April 15, 1946, p. 4. 13 UNRRA , 0rg . , Aims ,P rog . , op.
cit.
,
p.
..
.
.
. i
.
. .
.
Director Gffteral
A. Advisers:
1. General Counsel
2. Diplomatic Adviser
3. Financial Adviser
A. Director or Public Information
. Senior Deputy Director General
A. Deputy Director General in Charge of trie Secre-
tariat
1
Committee Division
2.
Reports
3
.
Library
A.Historical Records
B. Deputy Director General for Regional Liaison
C. Deputy Director General for Liaison with The
American Republics
D. Deputy Director- General, Bureau of finance ana
Admi ni s trat i on
1. Office of the Treasurer
a. Division of Accounts
b. Division of Internal Audit
c. Budget Division
d. Division of Finance
2. Division of Administrative Services
3. Division of Administrative Analysis
A. Division of Personnel and T aining (in-
cludes Training Center)
E. Deputy Director General, Bureau of Areas
1. Central and Eastern European Division
2. Southern European Division
3* Northern and ;v -stern European Division
A. Far East Division
5. Staff Services Division
6. Areas Coordination Division
7 . Camps Division
3. Distribution Division
F. Deputy Director General, Bureau of Supply
1. Staff Branches
a. Procurement- Coordination
b. Requirements and Allocations Coordina-
tion
c. Contributed Supplies
d. Ocean Shipping
e. Statistical Records and Reports
2. Commodity (Line) Divisions
a. Food
0 . Clothing, Textiles, and Footwear
c. Medical and Sanitation Supplies
d. Agricultural Rehabilitation
e. Industrial Rehabilitation
G. Director, Health Division
1. Epidemic Control Section
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2. Nursing Services Section
3. Medical Services and Supply Section
4. Sanitation Services Section
5 * Nutrition Section
6. Field Operations and Medical Recruiting
Section
H. Director, Welfare Division
1. Studies Branch
I. Director, Displaced Persons Division
The Headquarters for UNRRA is located at Washington,
D.C. Tne European Regional Office is in London, ana the
China Mission Headquarters in Shanghai, ' ith a liaison
office in Nanking. The Southwest Pacific A r-ea Office is in
Sydney. There was an office in Cairo to direct the activi-
ties in the Middle East, including the Middle East Refugee
Camps. "Offices caring for liaison and the procurement of
supplies have also been set up in a number of other countries,
including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
India -
,
Iren, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Para-
guay, Peru, Southern Rhodesia, the Union of South Africa,
Uruguay, and Venezuela."
PERSONNEL
Council Resolution To. 37 provided that UNRRA should
have a "truly international civil service. . . selected upon
the basis of individual competence, character and integrity,
without discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, national-
ity or creed, and recruiter, upon as wide a geopgraphic basis
as is possible, compatible with efficient administration.""'
19* Fifty Facts
,
op. cit-, p. 3*
Dean, loc. cit., p. 269*
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When the organization 1 as first set up a ide variety
of workers were needed to supervise the assemblage and dis-
tribution of clothing and food, food experts, a actors, nur-
ses, medical technicians, publ c health . orkers, linguists,
economists, and those versed in geography, history, sociol-
ogy and anthropology. Lenman was given a "carte olanche"
order for personnel matters. He appointed Col. Joseph P.
Harris, the former chairman of the Board of Selection of
the School of Military G-overnment at Charlottesville, Va.
,
'
as the Director of UNRRA personnel.
A basic policy pursue by UNRRA was bo make use of
persons already on the ground in areas where relief would be
necessary. Use was to be made of the regular civil services
of the member Governments, those in the armed forces and
recruited workers.
In the middle of 1946 UNRRA had approximately 10,000
workers from 43 nations. More than one half of the staff
was dealing with displaced persons in Germany and Austria.
The Heads of Missions represented a number of various nation-
alities. In most cases, the Deputy Head of Mission was of a
different nationality from that of the Head of Mission.
Upon joining the organization, employees were required
to take an oath "that they will adhere to the ideal of inter-
national service and will abstain from any act of discrim-
ination on account of race, nationality, creed or political
21.NYT, Feb. 27, 1944. 22. Fifty Facts , op. cit . , p. •z •
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In July, 194-4, the UNRRA established a trainin center
in the Unite States for UNRRA personnel. It was a six
weeks course, followed by a supplementary course for those
able to remain before they were called to their duties over-
seas. During 1944 the enrollment averaged 125'. The cur-
riculum was handled on an area basis, with a study of re-
gions, languages, instrumentalities, people and operational
programs. The first program was to prepare workers for
service in the Balkans. Next came a program for a European
Field Reserve, with more emphasis on field planning and
field operation. There was also a program of orientation
for 35 Chinese technical experts, "selected oy their Govern-
ment to prepare themselves for ork in rehabilitation in
China by studying modern techniques in the fields of medi-
cine, flood control, agriculture and welfare." A program
was carried out in Cairo fo^ the Balkan staff mobilized in
that region. There was training in England for the staff
recru.ite the-e. And for the Headquarters staff itself,
there was an in-service training program. On March 10,
1947, came the announcement of the closing of the UNRRA
, .
*
i
training program*:
Because UNRRA was organized so rapidly and since it
was an emergency program, it was inevitable that some mis-
takes should have been made. It suffered several difficul-
ties from the incompetence of some of its personnel. Many
23
»
UNRRA, Or,- .
,
Aims, Prog
.
,oj. cit., . 22. 24. I Did.
25 . NYI
,
March 11, 1947
.
.,
'
. .
.. .
'
.
.
.
• t, . ;
.
.
.
i > • •
seemed to have joined the organ! nation because tney expected
to have a free joy ride to Europe, and were completely in-
capable of coping v»ith the suffering and misery which con-
fronted them. For example, Leo
-J. Kargalin, the chief' of
UNRRA’ s information bureau in Europe, stated tnat 600 UNRRA
employees had been dismissed in the last few months of 194-5
for incompetence".
v
But on the whole the majority of UNRRA
workers performed their services in an excellent manner.
FINANCING UNRRA
It was the Americans who proposed the plan which was
accepted at Atlantic City for financing the operations of
UNRRA. According to Council Resolution No. 14, section 4,
"each member government whose home territory has not been
occupied by the enemy shall make a contribution for parti-
cipation in the work of the Administration, approximately
equivalent to 1% of the national income of the country for
the yea 1^ ending June 30, 1943, as determined by the member
government. Contributing nations need not pay more than
10% of their total quota in gold or foreign exchange. The
rest could be contributed in kind. It was provided that
Lehman might "ask each member Government, in a position to
do so, to make immediate advance payments in the amounts
necessary to meet immediate administrative expenses" to be
credited to each nation’s total contribution. Invaded
countries were thereby freed from contributing to the
26. NYT .Nov.50t 1945 iP« 11. 27. Quote, in Dean, loc. cit., p.
269. 28.NYT,Nov.22, 1943, p . 9
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operating expenses of UNRRA under the 1% clause, out ere
urged to contribute toward administrative expenses. However,
''although the invaded countries.- . . 1 ere not assigned quotas
under the 1% clause, it % a s„ recommended that those that
were able to contribute to the work o I UNRRA outside their
own territory should do so in addition to their annual
contributions for allocated administrative expenses."
Rich countries, as France, Belgium the Netherlands,
and Norway, were expected to pay for their relief supplies
to the extent that they were able to do so. "Have-not" na-
tions could get food, clothing and other relief ana rehaoili-
tation goods whether as gifts or by paying local currency.
As far as possible, all UNRRA expenses within a liberated
area ere to be borne by the government of that area and
were to be paid in local currency made available by that
government or derived from the sale of supplies. .Vi thin
a given area, relief goods were to be sola to those able to
pay for them, and distributed free to those without funds.
The Director General was to submit an administrative
budget and program of operations to the biannual Council
sessions. He was to select fiscal agents in consultation
with member governments, and require careful accounting.
An annual audit would be conducted by the council.
At the London session in 1945, since UNRRA was running
out of funds, the Council voted to ask the member nations
tD c ntribute a second .11 of their 194-3 national incomes'.
29. NYT, Aug. 25, 1945, p. 9-
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As we have seen, the military authorities were to handle
relief for the first six months after lioeration, out sup-
plies procured Dy or on behalf of the military authorities
vfere "deemed to ce a contribution to the Administration^
resources under the Financial Plan only men such supplies
were made available for distribution in liberated areas
upon the termination of' the military relief period."
No final figures on total payments made to UNRRA are
as yet available. 7'e shall have to v ait until UNR 's end
to obtain such data. Complete figures up to February 23,
1946, have been published. Of the total $3, 659, 590, 110
that was contributed "as of Novemoer 21, 1946, $11,250,277
in operating expenses and $806,624 in administrative con-
tributions remained unpaid."
In Novemoer, 1943, the United States Treasury Depart-
ment figure of $135,600,000,000 was authoritatively given
as the national income of this country for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1943. Thus the U.S. quota for UNRRA, 1% of
that amount, would be $1,356,000,000 if approved by Congress.
Roosevelt first asked Congress for a bill authorizing
appropriations on Novemoer 15, 1943. The bill was finally
signed by the president on the 29th of March, 1fc£, 1944,
authorizing an appropriation of $1,350,000,000. Congress
would have to enact, separate legislation to actually appro-
30. Report of the Director General to the Council, DGrR-1.
Washington: 1944. 31-See Table I. 32. "Accomplishments of
Committee on UNRRA rt
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Table I
CONTRIBUTIONS TO UKRRA
(As of February 23,194-6)
Country Total Paid or Made In
Contributions Available Process
Non-invaded countries (making
trative contributions):
both operating and adminis-
Australia $ 76,800,000 $ 38,400,000 $ 38,400,000
Bolivia 95,238 31,746 63,492
Brazil 30,000, 000 20,000,000 10,000,000
Canada 138,736,733 108,108,107 30
,
630,631
Chile 2,153,312 0 2
,
153,312
Colombia 2,338,312 1
,
219,907 1,168,405
Costa Rica 400,000 33,968 311,032
Cuba
Dominican
6,035,000 1,235,000 4,300, 000
Rep. 1,400, 000 1,400,000 0
Ecuador 150, 000 0 150,000
Egypt 4,255,833 70,000 4,135,333
El Salvador 128,750 3,750 120, 000
Guatemala 3,750 3,750 0
Haiti 48,750 43,750 0
Honduras 103,500 58,750 49,750
Iceland 1,402,806 1,402,306 0
India 24,042,072 24, 042,072 0
Iran 325,100 0 325,100
Irao 218, 250 17,500 200,750
Liberia 13,750 18,750 0
Mexico 3,601, 500 1, 148,000 2,453,500
Ne ,r ' Zealand 16,952,000 8,476,000 3
,
476, 000
Nicaragua 128,750 128,750 0
Panama 408,750 142,033 266,667
Paraguay 38,44-9 13,649 19,300
Peru 1,000,000 931,250 18,750
U. of So . Africa 18,135, 000 5 , 137,500 12,997,500
Un. Kingdom 624,650, 000 624,650,000 0
U.S. 2, 700
,
000, 000 2,100,000,000 600
,
000,000
Uruguay 520,000 505,000 15, 000
Venezuela 1,017,500 684, 166 333,334
Invaded countries (making administrative contributions only)
Belgium 175, 000 175,000 0
China 375,000 875,000 0
Czechoslovakia 175,000 175,000 0
Denmark 13,750 13,750 0
Ethiopia 3,750 3,750 0
(Continued on next page)
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Table I (Cont.)
France
Greece
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Philippines
Poland
U.S.S.R.
Yugoslavia
Total
700,000 $
87.500
8.750
262,500
52.500
3.750
175,000
1
,
750,000
122,500
700,000 $
87,500
8,750
262,500
52,500
8,750
175,000
1
,
750, 000
_122jl500
659,590,110 12,942,451,254 $ 717,133,356
New York Times, March 18 1946
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priate the money
V
On May 4, 1944, Roosevelt askea Congress for an initial
appropriation of $450,000,000 for UNRRA. "in addition, he
asked Congress to authorize transfer of supplies, services
and funds available under the Lend-Lease Act in a further
amount of $350,000,000. Such contributions would be credited
toward our total commitment. . . . This initial appropriation
included $4,000,000 representing the United States’ share of
UNRRA' s administrative expenses for its first year of oper-
ation. The bill became lav; on the last day of June, 1944.
The rest of the $1,350,000,000 authorization, amounting
to -550,000,000 was not appropriated for some time. By the
time the Council held its meeting in London in August, 1945,
UNRRA mas approaching severe financial straits. Its money
was nearly exhausted. Many nations had oeen slow at making
their appropriations . Since the United States was the
largest contributor (nearly 75/a of the total), her delay
was causing considerable embarrassment
.
Furthermore, even
if all promises were fulfilled, there would still be in-
sufficient funds. Bo the Council voted once again to asm
the member nations to contribute another lb of their 1943
national incomes.
In accordance with that, Truman, in September, 1945,
asked Congress for a grant of $1,350,000,000 in addition
to the $550 , 000,000 already authorized but as yet unappro-
ve*
iated. He repeated his plea on the 13th of November, stating
34.
/
30/44, 0 .X6 . 35- 4YT, 5/5/44 ,
p
.
5
. 36. MYT, 7/1/44. p. 6
37.HYT 9/9/45. p . T ,
t <
• L V2
,
,
. : , -•
. <
. - ^ t
.
,
. t
that the UNRRA program was to oe extended to Austria and in
a limited degree to the .'hi te Russia and the Ukraine, in
accordance with the Moscow and Potsdam agreements. Congress
finally passed the bill appropriating <£550, 000, 000 to com-
plete the initial authorization on December 11, 1945. And
on the 13th Truman signed the bill authorizing the second
$1, 350, 000, 000. The first <£750,000,000 v. as appropriated
early in 1946. On May 14, Congress appropriated <£135, 000, 00 Ot
And finally on July 23, 1946, Truman signed a bill appro-
priating the final ><465, 000, 000, bringing the total U.3.
contributions to $2, 700, 000, 000. This last oill contained
"a section permitting the Secretary of State to deny the
use of funds in any country which he finds do not permit
'a reasonable number* of accredited press representatives
to report on the agency’ s operations v. ithout censorship
restrictions, '^another thrust at Russia.
MISSIONS
Much of the work of UNRRA is done through the medium
of missions. There are two kinds of UNRRA missions:
1. The Special or Observers' mission, which is temp-
orary, with limited objectives.
2. The Country Mission, headed by a Chief of Mission,
who acts in liaison ith the corresponding military
officer but administers the work ana controls the
activities of the mission personnel.
Special Missions have included ex loratory missions to
Brazil, China, the Latin American Republics, Australia and
38. Te t of Truman's less age to Congress on UNRRA, NYT, Nov. 14,
,
M
. $9. NYT, Bee. 12. 1945, p. 9* 40 . NYT , Dec . lo , lAe-3 , p • 1 •
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New Zealand, Italy, Ethiopia, In^ia and the Middle East, among
others. Their purpose was "to determine the supply and
service reo^uirement 3 of a li Derated country or to explore
sources of a supplying country."
The Director Generals themselves have undertaken a
number of missions to gain firsthand knowledge of UNRRA's
work. In the Spring of 1944 Lehman toured the Middle East.
In November and December, 1944, he paid a seven week visit
to London. In the summer of 1943, Lehman toured Greece,
Italy, France, England, Yugoslavia, Chechoslovakia, Germany
and Poland. And in the summer of 1946 La Guardi a made an
inspection trip.
COOPERATION WITH OTHERS
UI'IRRA was not intended to serve as the sole agency ad-
ministering relief in the countries devastated by the war.
Voluntary agencies were urged to continue their work. In
1944, "the President's War Relief Gontrol Board sponsored
a meeting between UNRRA and voluntary relief agencies re-
commended or registered by the board, for the purpose of
creating interorganizational teams to work under the agency. '
A similar program was carried out between the UNRRA office
in London and the Council of British societies for Relief
abroad. In September, 1943, the American Council of Volun-
tary Agencies for Foreign Service was set up to integrate
i/ y
voluntary relief'.
44. ibid., p. 27. 43 • NYT , July 19,1945, p.12. 46. NYT, July 15,
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voluntary contributions, untilUNRRA also accepted
September 3, 1946, nen the organization was beginning to
close up. In September, UNRRA issued a statement that it had
received 'contributions of various commodities valued at
145, 431, 955, and voluntary cash contributions of ^1,347,332,
exclusive of the proceeds of the U.S. Emergency Food Collec-
tion, estimated at about ^3, 000, 000 in cash and more
than ^1, 000,000 in canned food."
We have completed our survey of the structure of UNRRA.
Let U3 move on to find out a little about its principle
fields o. operation. What functions does UNRRA perform?
49. Figures of' Major Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, Acting Director
General. NYT, Sept. 4, 1946, p. 4.
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CHAP TER VI PRINCIPLE FIELDS OF OPERATION
UNRRA has seven principle fields of operation--Food,
Clothing, Health, Displaced Persons, Agricultural Rehabili-
tation, Industrial Rehabilitation and Welfare.
FOOD
One of UNRRA 1 s main purposes has been to provide the
needy of Europe and the Far East with the food relief which
they needed at the conclusion to hostilities to enable them
to resume a normal life and to restore their health. The
value of shipments of food through September 30, 1946, to-
talled $985,753,000 or 7,014,234 tons.
CLOTHING
UNRRA also undertook to provide the needy with the
essentials of clothing. Up to September 30, 1946, UNRRA
had shipped 1350,351,000 worth of clothing, textiles and
footwear to liberated areas, amounting to 431,807 tons.
HEALTH
"UNRRA provides medical officers and technical experts
to assist eligible, requesting governments in the fields of
sanitation, nursing, hospital management, nutrition and pub-
lic health, including the control of malaria, tuberculosis,
typhus, and other diseases."'
1. Ninth Report to Congress on Operation of UNRRA. Wash. ‘Gov't
Printing Off., 1946. pp.27,30. 2. Fifty Facts , op. ci
t
.
,
p. 31 »
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Dr*. Wilbur A. Sa yer of Ne York, director for nin years
of' the Rockefeller Foundations’ International Health Division,
has served as the director of UNRRA’ s health division. Hiss
Lillian J. Johnston of White Plains, He a York, Commissioned
as Nurse officer in the U.S. Fuulic Health Service, '/as
appointed in 194-5 as the chief nurse of the health division.
Her duties were responsibility for the qualification stand-
ards to be used in the recruitment of all American and Cana-
dian nurses for UNRRA, assist the European regional office
to obtain competent French and other European nurses, and
maintain contact with other organizations relative to nursing
on an international scale.
UNRRA 1 s health division has heen deeply concerned 'r ith
preventive medicine. The Montreal session adopted "resolu-
tions approving drafts of emergency, international sanitary
conventions to prevent the spread of epidemic diseases dur-
ing the mass return of millions of ’displaced* persons. . . .
"The emergency conventions are called the International
Sanitary Convention, 194-4, and the I nternational Sanitary
Convention for Aerial Navigation, 1944. They amend the In-
ternational Sanitary Convention of 1926, which covered mari-
time movements, and the International Sanitary Convention
for Aerial Navigation, 1933* Movement across land frontiers
are also covered in the emergency conventions.
"
The drafts of the two conventions ere suomitted to
member Governments for comment, after which the UNRRA health
3. Dr. W. A. Sawyer
,
in NYT, June 26, 1945, p. 16. 4 . NYT , Sept . 25
,
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division prepared the final drafts for signature. The con-
ventions were to be administered oy the Director General dur-
ing the emergency period, until the International Office of
Public Health could resume full operations.
The Emergency Conventions required "all signatory Gov-
ernments to report all epidemic diseases to UNRRA. It ..as
expected that assembly centers /would 7 oe set up where 'dis-
placed* persons would be vaccinated ana put through other
medical procedures after oeing registered and identified."'
At the Atlantic City Council Meeting in March, 1946,
"it was voted to extend the international sanitary agreements
until a new UNO health organization could be established.
Should UNRRA end before that time, however, this work of
gathering and publishing international health information
would go bo the health office of bhe old League of Nations
in Paris .
"
The Resolution (No. 83 ) read as follows: Resolved
:
1. That the Council recommends to all member govern-
ments no signatory to the International Sanitary
Convention, 194-+, and the International Sanitary
Convention for Aerial Navigation, 1944, that as
promptly as possible they sign protocol- embodying
the provisions of the draft protocols circulated
extending the said Sanitary Conventions, and
2. That the Council authorizes the Director General, at
the time when the said protocols come into force, to
undertake the functions set out therein until such
time as the Council C ntral Committee shall de-
termine that such functions shall be terminated/
3. The International Office of Puolic Health was created by an
agreement signed at Rome on Dec. $, 1907* It coula no longer
be maintained after the fall of France. See Chapter XI
.
6.
NYT .March 24,1946, p. 16.
7. Resolutions ofn Policy, Fourth Session of the Council, p. 4.
..
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Twice each month UNRRA has published, an Epidemic logical
Inf ormation Bulletin
,
viaely read bv doctors ana public
health authorities.
In May, 194-5, Majo v - General Warren Draper, Deputy
Surgeon General of the United States Public health Service
and Chief of Allied Supreme Headquarters’ military govern-
ment public health branch, said that the health of Europe
was better than was generally supposed, and was even approach-
ing peace time norms. He quoted the fol.07.ing mortality
statistics by the French national Institute of Public Health:’
Table II
MORTALITY IN FRANCE, BELGIUM AND UNITED STATES
Mortality (All Causes) per 1,303 Population:
U .3. rate--10f
France Belgium
1939 15.5 13.7
1940 13 .
6
lo . 1
1941 17.3 l4.o
1942 16 .
4
14.7
1943 16.9 12.4
1944 15 • 4* . . .
Infant Mortality per 1,000 births:
France Belgium U . 3
1939 63 73 • •
1940 92 ap- • •
1941 73 as 46
1942 71 38 dl
1943 75 67 40
1944 62 . 1* • • • •
*Paris only.
In November, 1945, Dr. G. Stuart, chief of the Epidemic
Control Branch of the Health Division of the UNRRA, submitted
,
.
. y - lets , op. cit. , . . . . £T , . a , 1 , p . 8
.
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a report. "Outbreaks of disease in Europe have oeen checked
so well that no communicable disease is sufficiently pre-
valent there as to constitute a menace to international
health.
"
Smallpox- -Largely vaccinated out of Europe and prevalent
only in Italy.
Louse-Borne Typhus--Virtually eliminated from American
and British occupied zones, where DDT quickly
overcame serious outbreaks last spring. Black
spots are eastern and southern Slovakia, northern
Hungary, Croatia, Carpathian Russia, Poland,
Rumania, Bessarabia, and Bucovina. Less serious
conditions are reported from Bulgaria and Greece.
The disease can be held in check by an intensive
program of DDT dusting.
Bubonic Pl ague--Onlu in Malta, though the threat to
other parts continues so long as areas in the
Suez Canal, North Africa and Palestine remain
plague- i nfe s ted
.
Dip therl a--! ncidence still high in several western
European countries, especially Germany.
Typhoid Fever- -Greatly increased in many countries.
Incidence in Germany is thirty times the normal
rate in September.
Tuberculosis - -Number of cases greatly increased in many
continental countries.
Syphilis--3 to 9 fold increase reported in most countries
and a 20-fold increase in Germany. Progress made
in 20 years of V.D. control has oeen virtually
wiped oout by war years in Europe.
Malaria--The leading cause of illness in much of the
Mediterranean basin, it has assumed epidemic pro-
portions in Greece. Plans for spraying marshland
areas with DDT from specially equippeo. planes, how-
ever, are expected to cut the ris !xs of malaria or
eliminate it entirely in Greece within a year ."
Up to September 30, 1946, UNRRA had shipped to
liberated areas a total of $57,146,900 worth of medical and
sanitation supplies, or 69,113 tons.
10.
NYT, Nov. 27, 1945, p. 7-
11. Dr. G. Stuart’s Report. NYT
,
Nov. 26, 1945, p. 7»
12. Ninth Report to Congress, pp. 27,30.
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DISPLACED PERSONS
In 1944 there were four groups of stateless persons
who would have to be handled by some intergovernmental
agency
:
1. From World War I--500,000.
2. From the inter-war years— 120, 000.
3 . Uprooted by Axis dictator and still within reach of
help- -200, 000.
4. Potential wanderers who were still under the shadow
of the swastika.
The scope of the problem is best revealed by an exam-
ination of Figure 5 . It was estimated that there would oe
between 20 and 30 million displaced persons after the war.
In Africa the difficulty of handling refugees was less-
ened by the establishment of mixed commissions, made up of
American, British and French representatives. Each of the
internment camps in North Africa, outside of Tunisia, had
such a commission. By August 22, 1944, UNRRA camps in
North Africa and Syria housed approximately 40,000 refugees,
principally from Yugoslavia and Greece.'
Repatriation of displaced persons was discussed oy the
first UNRRA session in 1943. It was planned that the work
and recommendations of the advisory committee of the Inter-
Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements would be absorbed
by UNRRA. "The committee’s policy of repatriation of all
peoples, which with the establishment of UNRRA became its
recommendation to the agency, is this:
13 . NYT
,
Feb. 6, 1944, p. 26. 14. Report of Dr. Joseph P.
Schwartz, Chairman of the European executive council of the
Joint Distribution Committee. NYT, April 20, 1943, p. 4.
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1. To collect and disseminate in the proper quarters
information on the numbers, location and conditions
of displaced populations.
2. To issue preliminary instructions to civilian dis-
placed persons through the radio or by other means.
3 . To obtain agreement on a unified system of health
certificates and preliminary identity papers for
displaced persons in transit.
4. To send missions authorized to take the necessary
measures to countries in which alien displaced popu-
lations are or are believed to be situates.
5 . To negotiate with the authorities in such countries
or in the countries of origin of displaced populations.
6. To arrange with any European international transport
authority and with authorities in countries of transit
for the transport of displaced populations.
7 . To arrange with UNRRA for the requirements of dis-
placed persons, including food, clothing, temporary
housing and medical supplies.
The Council agreed that UNRRA was to work with the
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, an organization
which was concerned with ‘long-term refugees, ' while UNRRA
would handle "short term" refugees. UNRRA would provide
food, clothing and medical supplies, and deal with such prob-
lems as education and repatriation. The Intergovernmental
Committee, on the other hand, was more concerned with such
problems as nationality status, identity papers, travel
documents, employment, etc.
The Council suocommittee on repatriation of displaceu
persons adopted an amendment that UNRRA should not return
any G-erraans who had been forcibly settled in the homes of
Jews and other natives of occupied countries to their homes
without the prior consent of the government concerned. The
subcommittee adopted another report authorizing aid to
15.NYT, Aug. 22, 1944, p. 13. 16. See Cnapter III.
17. NYT, Oct. 17, 1943, o. 30. 13. NYT , Nov. 22, 1943, p-9-
19. NYT, Nov. 25, 1943, p. 31-
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refugees who were driven out of their native countries oy
2 OHitler before tne war.
In the Middle East, UNRRA worked in close cooperation
with the Middle East Relief and Refugee Association in the
handling of refugees. The MERRA, a division of the British
Ministry of State, was established in June, 194-2, with
headquarters at Cairo. In January, 1944, it was announced
by MERRA '‘that 33,000 Poles and at least 12,000 G-reeks had
come under its jurisdiction since the winter of 1942, when
the first group of Greek refugees came from Aegean islands
through Turkey to Syria. . . .
“The MERRA had enjoyed close cooperation from the Greek
and Polish Governments in transferring refugees. Important
assistance has been given by the Egyptian, Iranian, Syrian,
Lebanese and Turkish Governments. Also assisting nave been
the Polish, Greek and American Red Cross in addition to the
Egyptian Red Crescent. 1 '
Early in the spring of 1944 the MERRA was absorbed oy
UNRRA. On the 14th of March, 1945, Cairo ceased to oe the
headquarters of UNRRA* s Balkan Mission, which was superseded
by the smaller Middle East Mission to deal with the care and
repatriation of refugees still there. The Balkan sections
moved into the respective countries to work there.
On the 28th of July, 1944, the European committee of
the UNRRA sent to all the Allied Governments a draft multi-
20. NTT, Nov. 27, 1943, p. 7* 21. HYT , Jan. 15, 1944, p.4.
22.NYT, Feb. 27, 1944, p. 8. 23- NYT, March lb, 1945, p.7.
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lateral agreement to govern the repatriation of the 20 or
30 million displaced persons in Europe. Tne multilateral
proposal was drafted Dy the technical suocommittee on dis-
placed persons, and will await the signature of all the
United Nations affected. The agreement was not accepted
that year. The prouelm was so complicated a one that no
solution was easy. Even the method of approach was contested.
Russia and Czechoslovakia preferred that the refugee situa-
tion be handled by bilateral rather than multilateral agree-
ments .
'
Under the clauses of the proposed agreement, the United
Nations would consent:
1. To urge the displaced not to seek their own way oack
home.
2. To treat them on the same footing as their own nation-
als in the matter of repatriation, food and medical
care.
3 . To register them on UNRRA registration forms and pro-
vide them with other identification documents.
4. To give them shelter and, if necessary, work.
5 . To grant freedom of transit to convoys of the home-
ward bound through their territories.
b. To canalize and regulate at the front,eirs the unorg-
anized return of the displaced.
7 . To admit approved UNRRA missions.
According to Thomas Cooley, the deputy director of
UNRRA* s displaced persons division:
Negotiations are under way to supplement the pro-
posals with unilateral agreements between UNRRA and
individual countries giving detailed methods of cooper-
ation between military authorities, UNRRA and these
nations.
Health considerations alone. . . would preclude an
every-nation-for-itself as well as an every-person- f or-
himself return of expatriates.
24.NYT, Sept. 22, 1944, p.7. 2q . NYT , July 29, 1944, 0 . 5 .
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Among other reasons. . . why this problem is one
for United Nations handling were: Necessity for some of
the returning persons to cross several corners; estao-
lishment of priorities in returns so that skilled work-
ers can go where they are most. needed out not at the ex-
pense of crippling an assembly center where their work
is valuable; the guarding against favoritism or arbi-
trary discrimination in returns/**
At Montreal, in September, 1944, the Council authorized
UNRRA to return to their homes enemy nationals who had been
’intruded" into Allied territory and to handle repatriation
of displaced persons who had made their way to non-invaded
countries of the United Nations. UNRRA was to deal with
groups, and not with individuals. Assistance was to be
given only to those actually in need.
The biggest refugee problem was in G-ermany. in February,
1945, UNRRA made an agreement with Eisenhower under which
UNRRA teams were to help the Allied military authorities in
the care of displaced persons. Here, too, as in the fur-
nishing of food and relief supplies, UNRRA was to be subor-
dinated to the Allied armies rather than to serve indepen-
dently as the representative of all the United Nations. In
other areas, too, UNRRA was being sidestepped. In Yugo-
slavia and Greece, it was claimed that the army was using
relief for political purposes. Russia made plans to attend
to the repatriation of her own displaced nationals. France
in 1944 refused to ask for UNRRA help in the handling of
refugees because of sensitiveness regarding the non-recog-
nition of the Provisional Government. Yet she lacked sup-
26 .NYT , Aug . 16, 1944, p. 9. 27.NYT, Sept. 25, 1944, p. 11.
28. John Mac Cormac, editorial, NYT
,
Feb. 3, 1945, p. 3.
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plies, shelter and transportation to handle the proDlem
herself
.
In February, 1945, 2,000 UNRRA representatives went to
France on standby orders for moving into Germany to handle
70
the displaced persons. UNRRA Assembly centers were to be
established at points in occupied Germany, ana displaced
persons were to be brought to them for identification and
questioning. They would undergo medical examinations to
prevent the spread of disease. After the program oegan,
many of the workers were recruited from among the displacea
persons themselves^. 1 In April it was announced that especi-
ally qualified U.S. military personnel could oe released
from active duty for employment in the displaced persons
work of UNRRA 5/
-'
The rapid gains of the Army in Germany found UNRRA
quite unprepared. In April, 73 assembly centers had been
established, but 450 were needed. One reason for the delay
was the holding up of equipment on docks in the united King-
dom'.' But by the 20th of May, more than 500 assembly centers
were established in Germany, France and Belgium.
By the end of September the number of displaced persons
in Germany had been reduced from 6,500,000 to 1,330,000.
The following had been repatriated: French 1,510,000;
USSR 2,000,000; Netherlander s, 270,000; Belgians and Luxem-
bourgers 300,000; Czechs 135,000; Yugoslavs 204,000; Ital-
29-NYT, Oct. 13, 1944, p.7. 30.NYT> Feb. 11, 1945, p.7*
31. NYT, Feb. 13, 1945, p.3« 32. Lehman, in NYT, April 17,1945,
p.17. 35* NYT, April 22, 1945, p . 27. 34. NYT, April 23, 1945, p. 3.
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ians 525,000. There were still remaining in 900 camps:
325,000 Poles, 90,000 Hungarians and 30,000 Jews.
By December, 1945, there were still 750,000 persons
in G-ermany awaiting repatriation, curing the winter UNRRA
opened an imployment program for them. Covering all UNRRA
assembly centers and camps, it was to "include training
projects to restore lost skills and to provide trades for
youth through instruction in machine shops, shoe repair
shops, sewing rooms and in carpentry and ood-work classrooms.
At Atlantic City, in March, 1946, the Council maintained
the principle that UNRRA has a right to care for displaced
persons without the consent of their governments, as insisted
upon by the United States and Great Britain and in opposition
to the stand taken by Russia. The Council, however, aid set
up procedures to facilitate repatriation as demanded by
Russia and her orbit. The Administration was directed to:
(A) remove any handicaps to repatriation in the assem-
bly centers;
(B) make available maximum facilities and personnel
for repatriation;
(C) to complete registration of displaced persons ana
compile data on their skills and employment quali-
fications to be reported to repatriation ana reset-
tlement agencies.
(D) to make reports every two months to the Central
Committee on the problems and progress of repatria-
tion;
(S) to ascertain which of the displaced persons receiv-
ing UNRRA aid wish to be repatriated.
In October, 1946, it was announced by the Intergovern-
mental Committee on Refugees that fifteen nations haa signed
35. NTT, Sept. 29, 1945, p. 3.
37 .NYT, March 29, 1946, p.4.
36.NYT, Dec. 4, 1945, p. 13-

an agreement by which the world’s displaced persons would
be eligible on January 15 for a ''travel document ', carrying
many advantages of a passport. It will "give its owner the
right to return to the country in which it was issued at
any time during its validity. ' That provision was necessary
for many refugees had been reluctant to leave their present
haven to seek for a permanent home.
There were many political questions involved in the
refugee proolem. UNRRA was accused of sheltering persons
known to be undf'riendly to existing regimes in their native
countries. x t was contended that the Zionists were foster-
ing an attitude of not wanting to go back to native lands.
The very complexity of the whole proolem made it a difficult
one to solve. No answer has yet been found. More recent
events in the refugee situation have been reviewed in Chap-
ter XI
.
AGRICULTURAL REHAB I LI TATI ON
Besides merely providing temporary relief, in the
form of food and clothing, and temporary service for health,
welfare and displaced persons, UNRRA hau the additional task
of rehabilitating the devastated countries of the world.
Long range reconstruction was outside the scope of UNRRA.
But it was necessary to devote some energy to ouilaing up
the basic economy of the occupied lands. Lehman always in-
sisted that the oasic policy of UNRRA was to "help others
33. NYT, Oct. 19, 1946, p. 9 .
ial c u .-:/! J.
.
*
•
.
•
'
,
-
'
.
(•
r
IIhelp themselves." That meant that soil had to be fertilized,
agricultural machinery and seeds had to be obtained, trained
technicians were necessary to help the farmers in producing
ample harvests so that eventually they might meet their own
needs. Up to September 30, 1946, $132,828,000 had oeen de-
voted to agricultural rehabilitation, or 1,722,363 tons.
INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION
The scope of UNRRA' s industrial rehabilitation program
may best be presented by an excerpt from an UNRRA report
published in September, 1946:
".
. . as of the close of the last quarter, June
30
,
a total of $230,000,000 in machinery and materials
for industrial rehabilitation had been shipped overseas,
as compared with $734,532,000 in food, $306,252,000 in
clothing and footwear, $134,654,000 in agriculture
rehabilitation supplies, $66, 527,000 in medical and
sanitation supplies and 138, 504, 000 in unclassified
military surpluses. . . .
"By categories, UNRRA has sent in its industrial
rehabilitation program 359,037 long tons of transporta-
tion and telecommunication equipment valued at $145,
355,267; 7,338 tons of puolic utilities equipment,
valued at $2,079,031; 15,556 tons of ouilding industry
supplies and equipment, valued at $8,573,091; 6,259
tons of mining and quarrying equipment, valued at
$3,517,537.
"Also equipment for the machine-repair industry,
12,357 long tons, valued at $15,191,960; fuels and
lubricants, 3,664,921 long tons, valued at $51,796,700;
miscellaneous consumer goods, 5421 long tons, valued at
*1,907,264; materials, chemicals and engineering stores,
261,752 long tons; valued at o43,501,975; other un-
specified shipments, 12,975 long tons, valued at
$7,042,026.
"By countries, Poland lea in the amount of in-
dustrial supplies received, 62, 444, 000 worth. Yugo-
slavia came second with shipments totaling *p 2 ,o91 , 000 .
39* Ninth Report to Congress, pp. 27,30.
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China, which has had. port-clearance troubles, was third
with a #49,634,000 total; CzechoslovaKia, fourth, with
a $36,973,000, and Italy fifth with #32,913,000.
"Other countries received industrial supplies to
the following values: Greece, $24,230,000; the Ukraine,
$6,361,000; White Russia, #4,222,000; Albania, #2,143,
000; Austria, $1,734,000. A scatering of small countries
received amounts ranging in value from $5,000 for
San Marino to $221,000 for Finland. "
Up to September 30
,
1946, $350,045,000 worth of indus-
trial rehabilitation supplies had been shipped overseas, or
6,905,129 tons.
WELFARE
On the 30th of January, 1944, Lehman appointed Miss
Mary Agnes Craig McGeach as Chief of the Welfare Division of
UNRRA. ^ According to Miss McGeachy:
There are a number of things the enemy has left
us as problems: disrupted transportation, upset pro-
duction, economic resources drained, let his chief aim
was not really to ruin material things which he might
possibly be able to use for himself. e wanted to
destroy people and disorganize human relationships. To
disband an orphanage and send the nuns away was a
typical triumph in such disorganizing.
In addition to the overall problem of relief, we
will have other special things to do. One is to take
care of the mothers and babies. Another is to fit
again into community living young people, homeless,
fugitive, even unidenti fied.^
"Welfare services are designed to meet the needs
of handicapped people unable to make their own way.
Some of these, such as the sick, disabled or unem-
ployed, are unable to buy needed supplies; others, such
as homeless or orphaned children, pregnant women,
nursing mothers, and aged or physically handicapped
persons need special help for their particular condi-
40. Quoted in NYT, Sept. 6 , 1946, p. 23* 41. Ninth Report to Cong.,
pp.27,30. 42. NYT, Jan. 31 , 1944, p. 14. 43-NYT, April 15,
1944, p. 3.
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tions. UNRRA welfare officers attached to country
missions perform a wide variety of services, ranging
from help in the distribution of food, clothihg, and
household supplies, to assistance in regard to emergency
housing, children' s nurseries, and occupational train-
ing. UNRRA has supplied equipment for milk kitchens,
day nurseries, children's hostels, and child welfare
centers .
“
UNRRA was to cooperate with private welfare agencies and
with the welfare agencies of the government in the area to
receive relief. “Through the President’s War Relief Control
Board, Miss McGeachy was put in touch with the American
Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, organised
. . . by societies interested in foreign service. . . .
This group set up a committee to work with UNRRA in setting
up professional standards for personnel. 1 ' *
In March, 1946, UNRRA released a report, on aid to
children. In Poland there were 500,000 homeless children;
Yugoslavia, 500,000; G-reece, 50,000 to 60,000; Albania, 4,000;
Czechoslovakia, no total report, but more than 50,ooo in
eastern Slovakia alone. UNRRA sent them basic supplies of
food, clothing, shoes, beds and blankets. A camping program
was established.
The ’war caused stunted growth, scabies from a lack of
soap, and tuberculosis. ‘405 of 70,000 school children
tested in Prague were found to have lung disorders. G-reek
incidence increased by 4£ times. ... In Italy and Yugo-
slavia the rate doubled.'' 1
A Central Tracing Bureau was set up by Miss Dorothy de
44. Fifty Facts
,
op. cit., p. 3 9* 45. NYT, April 15, 1944,
p. 8. 46. NYT , March 10, 1946, p. 16.
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la Pole in New York City. A staff of more tnan 100, using 20
languages, handled 5,000 inquiries a day, tracing the iden-
tity of children.
We have now completed our survey of the seven fields
of operation of UNRRA. Let us go on to analyze the step
hy step procedure oy which need3 are met.
. > i
*
.
:
<•
-
. /. ?'o o n rr.ts £c,
IS /V /?/r 4.
(See. rV-^/e. /is)
WORLD
MERCATOR S PROJECTION
EQUATORIAL SCALE IN MILES
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
GreenwichLongitude Greenwich Longitude
NYSTROM SERIES OF DESK MAPS r'AnunimiT nu A I Mv/PTDn li 8. I l-l I Ar'ir
I

/ 0 .2-
CHAPTER VII HOv NEEDS ARE MET
PROCEDURE IN DETERMINING NEEDS
Early in the life of UNRRA, estimates of needs 7/ere be-
ing worked out " by taking the normal population and produc-
tion of a given area, along with its normal imports, and
correcting the totals in the light of information as to
shifts in population by the Nazis, executions and deaths from
privation, and destruction of transport and production facil-
ities . "
After actual liberation the task became a little more
' simple. "The Bureau of Supply goes on an exploratory errand
among all claimants, surveys the needs of each and reports
to the Program Planning Branch of UNRRA. The Division of
Country Programs then works out the lists, which as submit-
ted to the Central Committee. A subcommittee works over
these making such changes as it deems best, and the Central
Committee makes the ultimate decisions." 3’
There are four steps in the determination of needs:
1. UNRRA sets up a standard of relief ana rehaoili tation
supplies to be met for the people in all liberated
lands
.
2. The local resources of each country are considered.
3. It is determined how much the local resources fall
short of the standard.
4. The claims of countries v/here the standards are not
met have priority.'3
At Montreal, the Council resolved that the Director Gen-
1.NYT-, April 6, 1944, p. 12. 2. Arthur Krock, editorial,
NYT, Sept. 10, 1946, p. 6. 3
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eral should give "special weight and urgency" to the needs
of countries which have suffered the most damage as a result
of the war and who have carried on the most "active" resist-
ance to the enemy. This provision was the result of a com-
4
promise with Russia.
THE COMBINED BOARDS
The relation of UNRRA with the Combined Boards, which
recommend allocations of goods in short supply among the
various claimant groups for liberated areas, the military,
lend-lease and mutual aid, UNRRA and Allied governments with
foreign exchange assets, is governed oy Council resolution Is
It will be an essential part of the functions of the
Administration to secure a fair distribution of goods
which are in short supply and of shipping services to
and among the various areas liberated or to be liberated.
For this purpose the Administration must have full
knowledge of all the relief and rehabilitation import
requirements of such areas, whatever arrangements may
be contemplated for procurement or finance. Therefore,
member governments shall keep the administration fully
informed of their requirements and programs of intended
purchases. The irector General may present to the
intergovernmental allocating agencies such recommendations
or objections as he may deem necessary to obtain a
fair distribution to and among ooth liberated and to oe
liberated areas. The Director General will present be-
fore the intergovernmental allocating agencies the over-
all requirements for relief and rehabilitation of all
areas liberated and to be liberated in order to permit
a global consideration of these needs with all other
needs. He may also present the particular requirements
of any country for which the assistance of the Adminis-
tration has been requested. It is anticipated that the
Director General and, where necessary, the Chairman of
the Committee on Supplies, will be fully consulted by
the intergovernmental allocating agencies when any matter
touching the interests of the Administration is under
discussion.
4.1.YT, Sept. 25, 19 4-4 » p . 11. 5. See Chap. III. 6 . UNRRA, Oh- . , Aims ,
Prog . , op . cit . ,
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Figure 4 (From UNRRA, Organization, Aims, Progress.
ton: 1944.
)
/of
Washing-
IMPORTANT RELIEF AND REHABILITATION NEEDS ARE MET BY
Military Liberated UNRRA Other
Countries Sources
During per- having foreign with voluntary agencies*
ioa of mil- exchange assets funds and private contribu-
itary con- with supplies supplies tions
trol with for which they contributed neutral nonmember
supplies pay by member governments with
acquired governments--- money, supplies,
by Allied services
military
authorities
J
*To provide liberated member governments lacking
necessary foreign exchange with supplies and ser-
vices they could not otherwise acquire.
^Voluntary agencies work in cooperation with UNRRA
in areas where UNRRA is operating, in accordance
with agreement between UNRRA and the agencies.
HOW UNRRA ASSEMBLES SUPPLIES
UNRRA receives from lib-
erated countries estimates
of their relief supply
needs
.
On the basis of these
estimates UNRRA presents
over-all estimates of
total supply requirements
for relief and rehabili-
tation to
The Combined Boards
which are concerned with world stocks of commod-
ities in short supply and grant allocations to
claimant groups including military, Lend Lease,
self-financing liberated countries and UNRRA
j
for relief and rehabilitation supplies.
Supplies allocated to UNRRA are procured through
Procurement Agencies
of Supplying Countries
such as Foreign Econo-
mic Administration in
the United States.
Supplies procured by UNRRA will be shipped in space
allocated by appropriate intergovernmental agencies.
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The activities of the Administration in cringing
assistance to the victims of war will be so conducted
that they do not impede the effective prosecution of the
war. The prosecution of the war demands tnat scarce
supplies and shipping tonnage shall be carefully con-
trolled and allocated in order to assure not only that
the supplies and shipping requirements of the armed
forces are fully met, but also that a fair distribution
of supplies is made between the civil populations of
the various areas having due regard to their actual
or potential contrioution to the war effort. It will
therefore be essential. . . that demands upon supplies
and shipping presented by the Administration snould be
coordinated with other demands through the use of the
existing intergovernmental agencies concerned with the
allocation of supplies and shipping.
. . . the Director General. . . will make use
wherever possible of the established national agencies
concerned with the procurement, a andling, storage, and
transport of supplies.
Resolution 17 stipulated that all countries, even those
who possessed foreign exchange and thus didn't require UNRRA
aid, were to suomit estimates of their requirements to the
Combined Boards, keeping the UNRRA informed, in order that
supplies would be distributed according to the greatest
need.
PROCUREMENT OF SUPPLIES
In September, 1943, President Roosevelt announced the
creation of the Office of Foreign Economic Administration to
centralize the activities formerly carried on by the Offices
of Lend-Lease Administration, Foreign Relief and Rehabili-
tation and Economic Warfare. J->eo T. Crowley, the Cirector
of the Office of Economic Warfare, became the Foreign Econ-
7. Journal Second Session, op. cit.,p. 154. 3. Ibid. ,p. 166.
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omic Administrator.
"By Executive Order 9453, dated July 6, 1944, trie Pres-
ident directed the l oreign Economic Administrator to exercise
the authority which had been vested, by the Congress in tne
President regarding UNRRA. At the same time, the President
addressee a letter to the P oreign Economic Administrator
directing him, at UNRRA’ s request, to provide supplies and
services for the relief of' the victims of war in accordance
with the UNRRA agreement, Council Resolutions, and the ap-
plicable laws of the United States, so long as such requests
do not unduly dislocate the other supply programs with which
FSA is concerned. 1
"All food made available to Rilled representatives
comes under the WFA allocation procedure, under which the
total food supplies of the United States are divided among
the civilians, armed forces, allies and other groups."
Thus in the United States, purchases for UNRRA were
made through the Foreign Economic Administration, the De-
partment of Agriculture and Treasury Procurement. In Canada
such purchases were made through the Mutual Aid Board; in
England, through the Ministry of Food; and in Brazil, tnrough
a three-man ad hoc commission.
In September, 1945, the UNRRA functions of the Foreign
Economic Administration were transferred to the State Depart-
ment, and the Foreign Economic Administration was aoolishea.
9 •NYT, Sept . 16, 1943, p. 1. 10. First Report to Congress, p. 13 .
11.NET, Jan. 24, 1944, p. 5. 12 . UNRRA, Org
f
Aims, Prog
.
, op.cit.
,
p.17*
13. NYT. Sent. 25. 1945 . pp. 1. 17 : Sept .27 . 1945
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One source of supply for the United States was tne
military surpluses remaining at the end of hostilities.
UNRRA was aole to obtain prior lien upon such stockpiles.
The supply situation was always bery tight, ana was one
of the biggest problems that UNRRA confronted. In tne spring
of 1945, President Truman sent Judge Samuel II Rosenman to
Europe on a relief mission. Upon his return, Truman imple-
mented his recommendations for civilian relief to liberated
countries of northwest Europe by directing four Government
agencies to grant priorities for supplies for relief--the
War Production Board, the War Food Administration, the
Solid Fuels Administration and the Foreign Shipment Committee.
In December, 1944, Richard Law, the British Minister
of State, and a small group of British shipping and supply
experts visited the United States to discuss with the Secre-
tary of State Stettinius and other officials of the State
Department and UNRRA, “to see whether the flow of relief
supplies to Northwest Europe, Italy and ureece can ue in-
creased without interfering with the military supply schedule
agreed upon by“ Roosevelt and Churchill and the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.
from May to July, 1945, three members from the House
Committee on Agriculture toured the Unitea Kingdom, France,
Germany, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Sweden. Their find-
ings urged that the United States shoul unify the military
14.NYT, Aug. 17, 1945
,
p« 3. 15.NYT.May 25, 1945, p. 9-
..
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and civilian authority regarding food and that she should
join the FAO.
It was always difficult to get supplies without cutting
into the needs of the United States, doth civilian and mili-
tary. But, in the words of Lehman, “the supplies that flow-
through UNRRA' s pipeline, in short, represent the margin
between life and death for the peoples of these nations--
but, the margin that alone can forestall what otherwise
will be inevitable human suffering and econoraicand political
Table IV depicts for us from what countries and in
what amounts supplies for UNRRA have oeen procured.
PAYMENT FOR SUPPLIES
Supplies were to be sold to the countries with foreign
exchange to pay for them.
LThen a member government considers that is is not
in a position to pay for supplies and services, it sub-
mits a statement of its financial situation to an ap-
propriate subcommittee of the Council’s Committee on
Supplies, the function of which is to advise regarding
that country's ability to meet its relief and rehacil-
itation costs in suitable means of foreign exchange.
In the case of the Greek Government, for example, such
a subcommittee was established, and it advised the
Director General that Greece should be given relief and
rehabilitation assistance for a limited period without
payment in foreign exchange, subject to further examina-
tion of Greece's foreign exchange at a later date." /?
Countries unable to pay would give to UNRRA the proceeds
from the sale -of supplies. In some cases local exchange was
accepted. The country receiving aid paid the costs of dis-
16.NYT, July 11, 194-5, p.l; for FAO, see Chap. XII. l'(
.
Lehman,
Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept.
12 . 1945 . 18.UNRRA, Qrg^ZAlmS-, Prog . , o p . cit .- • • • —
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Table IV*
Value of Supplies Procured by UNRRA by Country of Procurement,
Cumulative Through September 30, 1946. (InU.S. dollar
equivalents)
Argentina 21,706,508 Nicaragua 339,209
Australia 74,451,986 Norway 5,553,505
Austria 600,000 Paraguay 1,028,743
Belgian Congo 523,940 Peru 1,310,475
Belgium 1,406,330 Philippines 3,242,279
Brazil 23,558,292 Poland 1
,
050,000
Canada 209,689,317 Sweden 960,512
Chile 6,233,434 Switzerland 303,346
Colombia 138,750 U.of So. Africa 93,036
Costa Rica 33,356 United Kingdom 16,291,693
Cuba 5,065,007 United States 501,717,030
Czechoslovakia 509,312 Uruguay 2
,
313,341,125
Denmark 15,209,411 Venezuela 1,357,417
Dominican Repub. 883,398 Not specified 317,643
Dutch Guiana 181,300 by country 02,815,299
France 102,000 South America 1
,
200,000
French Indo-China 3,273,713 Middle East 4,600,000
French North Afr. 3 , 200,000 Other 57,015,299
Germany 11
,
616,750 Other than 12, 344,049
Greenland 549,711 member gov'ts
.
-5,365,933
Guatemala 17,232 Misc. credits ^
Haiti 19,300
I celand 2,412,722
India 22,739,524 TOTAL #3, 368,899,310
I ran 384,000
Italy 1,033,534
Liberia 255,533
Mexico 6,041,794
New Zealand 16,317,485
Newfoundland 13,353,738
* len o rt_
t
o Cong
r
ess on Operat ion s of UNRRA (Washington:
Government Printing Office, September 30,1946), pp. 32 , 33 .
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tributing the supplies within the country.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES
Council Resolution No. 7 governed the distrioution of
relief supplies. Supplies were ‘'at no time' 1 to be used "as
a political weapon, and no discrimination shall oe made in
the distribution of relief supplies because of race, creed
or political belief."
"In general ' the responsibility for distribution should
be borne "by the government or recognized national authority
whcih exercises administrative authority in that area."
UNRRA was to have obervers there, however. Distribution
should be so conducted "that all classes of the population,
irrespective of' their purchasing power, shall receive their
equitable shares of essentail commodities" and snould take
/ V
place under effective rationing and price controls. That
regulation was an attempt to avoid black markets, but there
have been several rumors, chiefly from Yugoslavia and Cnina,
that UNRRA goods were' found on the black market. Insufficient
reliaole data is yet available to prove that point.
The United States strongly objected to the fact that
several of the countries in Eastern Europe clamped a tight
censorship upon all UNRRA activity there. So, the last
United States appropriation to UNRRA specified that "a
reason ble number" of accredited press representatives must
be permitted to report on the agency's operations without
19. Dean, loc. cit., p. 263.
.(
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censorship restrictions.
In reply to that the Soviet Charge d* Affaires wrote to
the State Department that "representatives of the American
press and radio in the territories of the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic and the By elo-Russian Soviet Socialist
Republic should be guided oy the rules in effect in all the
territory of the USSR and for that reason the establishment
of any special rules regulating the activities of representa-
tives of the American press and radio. . . is not contemplated
.
In spite of the Soviet objection, however, it does
seem as if freedom of the press is a reasonable qualification
for the granting of American dollars.
We have now seen how UNRRA was founded, how it is
organized, its fields o_ operation and how needs are met.
But the organization was establishe for a purpose. Exact-
ly what has UNRRA accomplished?
20. See Chapter V.
21.
NYT, June 25,1946, p. 15 .
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Figure 5y**
44 Member Governments
UNRRA
may receive requests for
1 Relief Relief Rehaoili tation Supplies
Supplies Services and Services
food displaced Such as seeds, fertilizers,
clothing persons raw materials, fishing
medical health equipment, machinery and
items
etc
.
welfare spare parts, transport and
appropriate technical
services
.
from
Civilian Government authorities of liberated, areas*
^During military period in countries unable to pay for
supplies UNRRA personnel in liaison with military authorities
survey actual needs and on that basis submit estimates of
renuirements.
THERE REQUESTS ARE MET THROUGH
UNRRA
by Supplies Secured From
Uninvaded Countries and from some Liberated Countries.
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES
is carried out in liberated areas by local or national
authorities pursuant to UNRRA principle of equitable dis-
tribution to all classes regardless of race, religion or
politics. Proceeds of sales of supplies by member govern-
ments of liberated areas will become available to UNRRA
in local currencies for further relief and rehabilitation
work
.
**UNRRA, Organization, Aims, Progress, ( V.ashington: 1944)
,
p. 19 .
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CHAPTER VIII ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF UNRRA
THE MILITARY PERIOD
In order not to interfere with the conduct of hostili-
ties, it was planned that the Army should administer civil-
ian relief in the liberated areas for the first six months
after invasion. After that time the responsibility for
relief would fall upon the local government of the area, which
then could invite the aid of UxNRRA if such aid were needed.
In July, 1944, it was becoming clear that the Army planned to
administer relief in France and western Europe, saving UNRRA
funds for Poland, Greece and the Balkans, which lacked for-
eign funds, and for the transfer of displaced persons and
the improvement of public health.
The transition period was difficult. Often there was
considerable delay in effecting the transfer from the Army to
UNRRA. But by January, 1946, Truman was able to announce:
“Improvements in the European economy during 1945
have made it possible for our military authorities to
relinquish to governments of all liberated areas, or
to the UNRRA, the responsibility for the provision of
food and other civilian relief supplies. The Army’s
responsibilities in Europe extend now only to our zones
of occupation in Germany and Austria and to two small
areas in northern Italy. ‘'-O'
1. John MacCormac, editorial in NYT, July 2, 1944, IV, p.5*
2. Truman, Text of Message on the State of the Union ana
Transmitting the Budget. NYT, Jan. 22, 1946., p. 16.
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TERRITORIES RECEIVING- RELIEF
On the first of April, 1945, UNRRA assumed relief
responsibility in Greece. On the 15th it was extended to
Yugoslavia. After VE Day, all the liberated countries in
Europe could receive aid. In the third quarter of 194-5, the
Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repuolics were
admitted to UNRRA, and became eligible for aid. Full scale
aid was agreed upon for Italy, Austria, Korea and Formosa.
In 1946, relief was given to -Albania, Austria, Byelo-
russian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia,
the Dodecanese, Greece, Italy, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Repuolic and Yugoslavia. Limited emergency aid
was extended to Finland, Hungary and the Philippines. Korea
and Formosa were receiving assistance. A special program
was conducted in Ethiopia, chiefly medical, welfare and
transport assistance. In Germany and Austira, the UNRRA
cared for the displaced persons.
"While UNRRA concentrates primarily on aiding those
countrie s which lack foreign exchange, it is empowered to
ship emergency supplies wherever they may be required to
tide a region over an immediate difficulty. On this oasis,
UNRRA in 1945 sent emergency supplies to areas in Normandy
which had been particularly devastated as a result of the
Allied invasion. Emergency supplies of food and medicines
have also gone to the hard-hit areas of Luzon in the Philip-
3. "UNRRA's Record of bervice," United Nations mlletin , I
(Nov. 13, 1946), p. 42.
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pines. Some $2, 500, 000, 000 worth of goods are oeing shipped
in 19^6 to Finland to assist areas devastated by the Nazis,
and $4,000,000 are going to Hungary.''
1. Greece.
"After assisting the military in Greece, UNRRA took
over all Greek relief operations on April 1, 194-5." Earlier
than that, in May, 1944, the MERRA^was absorbed by the
UNRRA. "The MERRA organization. . . would take over general
responsibility for Balkan relief and would work as an in-
tegral part of the world-wide UNRRA setup.
The deliveries to Greece consisted mainly of foodstuffs
and coal. "Other supplies included trucks, livestock, and
eleven airplanes especially equipped for dusting mosquito
breeding grounds with DDT. The UNRRA bread ration has been
responsible for about half of the daily calory consumption
of the Greek population." UNRRA also fought malaria and
tuberculosis, repaire the inland transportation system
and the major public utilities, especially in the Athens-
's
Piraeus area.'
3y September 30, 1946, $309,656,000 worth of supplies,
2,487,071 tons, had been shipped to Greece.
2. Yugoslavia.
In Yugoslavia, UNRRA took over April 15, 1945* Before
supplies could be sent in, the ports had to be repaired.
By September 30, 1946, $337,444,000 worth of supplies had
4. Fifty Facts , op.clt. t p.3. 5 • I bid
. ,
p. 19 . o.See Chap. VI.
7. NYT .April 7, 19 44, p. 3 . 3. Fifty Facts , op. cit . , p. 19
.
9. See Table V.
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Table V*
Estimated Value and Tonnage of Shipments to Liberated Areas
from all Sources by Country of Destination, Cumulative
Through September 30,1946.
Country of Destination F. A. S. value* *
(In thousands
of U.S. dollars)
Tonnage
Albania $ 16,955 93,363
Austria 34, 306 602,004
Byelorussian S.S.R. 46 , 193 114,534
China 227,203 1,270,985
Czechoslovakia 207,664 1,233,682
Dodecanese Islands 3,5-39 27,612
Ethiopia 110 307
Finland 2,139 5,453
Greece 309,656 2,437,071
Hungary 2,349 5,914
Italy 247,976 6,506,391
Korea • • • •
Philiooines 2,856 20,061
Poland 332,514 1,342,423
Republic of San
Marino
30
.140,603
202
Ukrainian S.S.R. .337,444 ,
, 333,152
Yugoslavia
.
32,333 - 2,072,193
Special projects and '
emergency programs:--:
107,990
Total $2,045,035 16,723,342
Ninth Report to Congress on Operations of UNRRA (Washington
Government Printing Office, September 30, 1946) , pp. 26, 23-29
.
Includes Displaced Persons China, Displaced Persons Ger-
many, Drives for Contributed Clothing and Food, MERRA and
North Africa Camps, Northwest Europe Emergency Program.
***Freightat shipside.
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been sent to Yugoslavia, or 2,072,193 tons. Relief foods
reached 7,000,000 Yugoslavians, and constituted the prin-
cipal part of' the diet for 3,003,000. Trucks, locomotives
and railroad cars were sent. Millions were vaccinated
against typhus. Medical supplies and hospital oeas were
distri outed.
3. Dodecanese Islands.
"During December, 1945, UNRRA received a program of
requirements for the Dodecanese Islands from the British
Military Administration. . . . UNRRA has assumed financial
responsibility for providing relief, out shipping diffi-
culties have made it necessary for the British Military
Administration to continue their own shipments until the
end of March 1946.''
By September 30, 1946, $3,589,000 or 27,612 tons of
upplies had been shipped.
4. Hungary.
"In January, 1946, UNRRA's Central Committee authorized
a limited program of aid to Hungary, following a recommend-
ation by the Allied Control Commission there." The cost
of the program was not to excee^d
i 4 , 000,000. Emergency
relief supplies were provided for persons in extreme need,
or children and expectant and nursing mothers, and supplies
for the medical and sanitation program. By Septemoer 30,
,
- u , _ . tiAd sAtppCdL i*
194o, $ 2,349,000 or 3,914 uOns oi supplies,, to Hungary.
10. See Table V. 11. Fifty Facts, o .cit.,p.l9« 12. Ibid., p.
27. 13. Ibid.
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Albania.
An agreement was signed with Albania on the first of
August, 1945*’ By September 30, 1946, $16,955,000 or 93,363
tons of supplies had been shipped.
6. Finland.
A program of $2,500,000 was planned for Finland, to in-
clude food, clothing, household equipment, and some building
materials and trucks^ By September 30, 1946, $2,189,000
or 5,458 tons had been shipped.
7. Czechoslovakia.
"A formal operating agreement was signed with the
Czechoslovak government in February, 1945 * 1 The chief prob-
lem was her distance from ports and the need for transporta-
tion over long overland routes^ By September 30, 1946,
$207,664,000 worth or 1,233,682 tons had been shipped. In
turn, Czechoslovakia presented to her neighboring countries
a gift of thousands of tons of sugar from her 1945 beet
harvest
.
8. Poland.
"A formal agreement establishing an operating mission
was signed between the Polich government and UNRRA in 6ept-
ember, 1945.” Sven before that, however, UNRRA had been
shipping supplies to Poland. A lack of port facilities and
the disruption of internal transport kept imports to a mini-
mum for the first few months. Up to September 30, 1946,
14. Ibid
. ,
p . 23 • 15. 1 bid.
,
p. 27.
17 • I bid
. ,
p . 20.
16.1 bid.
,
p . 20
.
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1332,514,000, or 1,842,423 tons of supplies had been sent
into Poland.
9. Russia.
In London, in August, 1945, the Byelorussian (White
Russian) Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian ooviet
Socialist Republic were elected to membership in the Council,
and thus oecame eligiole for UNRRA aid.
Byelorussian SSR requested aid of $61, 000,. 000. Shipment
of supplies, mostly food, began prior to the signing of the
formal agreement on December 18, 1945* The mission head-
/<f y
quarters wTas at Minsk.
The Ukrainian SSR requested aid of $189,000,000, mostly
in food. The headquarters for this mission was in Kiev.
By September 30, 1946, $46,198,000 or 114,534 tons had
been shipped to Byelorussian SSR, and $140,603,000 or 333,152
tons to the Ukraine.
10. Austria.
"In November, 1945, an UNRRA exploratory delegation
went to Austria to work out an initial program of supply
requirements for a period extending from March through Decem-
ber, 1946. This working party cooperated with the Austrian
authorities and the Allied Council. Simultaneously, UNRRA
took steps to meet an emergency request from the Allied
Council for the shipment of supplies during January and
February .
"
13. Ibid. ,p. 20. 19 • I bid
. ,
p . 23 • 20. 1 bid.
,
p. 24.
.• i
.
,
<
.
.
'
.
•
,
•
- j jI. -
.
,
.
In April, 1946, it was announced that "as a result of
an 1.1th hour compromise between the UNRRA and American ano.
British Armies and the State Department, the UNRRA will begin
to feed. Austria this month after all. An agreement with the
Austrian Government will be signed in a day or two, it is
expected, under which the UNRRA will be finane '41 //and materi-
ally responsible for supplying Austria with what she needs."
/
The armies were to turn over to UNRRA supplies for ninety
days
.
In Atlantic City in the spring of 1946 UNRRA adopted
Resolution 91 forbidding the diversion of indigenous pro-
ducts out of a country supplied by the UNRRA'?*' Russia had
been accused of draining supplies out of Austria.
By September 30, 1946, UNRRA had sent to Austria
|84, 806,000 worth of supplies, or 602,004 tons.
11. Italy.
"Major General Sdgerton American member of the Civil
Affairs Committee said that the food problem in Italy was
difficult because grain shipments from northern Italy 'were
blocked, the distribution system collapsed with the fall of
the Fascist regime, transportation facilities were des-
troyed by the retreating Nazis, prices rose so high that
some food items went beyond the reach of the poor, and lack
of port facilities and shortage of ships interfered with
relief operations." J
21.NYT, April 2,
23.NYT,3ept.20,
1946, p.4.
1944, p. 10 .
22.NYT, Aug. Ip, 1946. 5ee Chap. IV.
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There were also many refugees landing in Italy, most of
them from Yugoslavia. Others were from Poland, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, France and G-reece, and were in camps in Italy
where they were being cared for by the military!'
Conditions in Italy were desperate. In September, 1944,
the official rations ere only 1,000 calories a day. North
of Rome the people were getting only 700 a day! That was a
far cry from the 2
,
000-2,6000 minimum needed for health.
Diseases were increasing.
But Italy, being an ex- enemy country, was ineligiole
for aid according to the original UNRRA agreement. Something
had to be done, ho ever. Aid would prevent chaos from devel-
oping behind the Allied lines and thus facilitate the early
winning of the war. Likewise, it would check the outbreak
of an epidemic. And it would also tend to avert a break-
down of government and a birth of anarchy.
So at Montreal in September, 1944, the Council adopted
a resolution extending "limited aid ' 1 to Italy. "The scope
of UNRRA operations in Italy, aside from epidemic control
and care of Yugoslavs now in Italy, wa limited to the care
and return to their homes of 'displaced’ Italians whom the
war /hadg forced into overcrowded cities, welfare services
for children and expectant mothers, and medical and sanitary
aid and supplies.
"I t .was' provided that tne military commend 'or the
appropriate authority' in I taly £shouldJ exercise such control
24.NYT, Au .
. 3, 1944, p. 13. 25.NYT,Sept.24, 134 -4 , p. 31 .
. ]
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over UNRRA's operation as /as deemed necessary. . . . Lehman
y, as directed to confer »vitn the Council’ s financial committee
from time to time as to the aoility of Italy to pay for its
own relief, and Council authorization 5. as required for any
UNRRA expenditure in exc ss of $50,000,000.
"The agency's aid to Italy, it fvvas provided, was not to
constitute a precedent for operations in other enemy or ex-
enemy territory.
"Food and clothing for general Italian relief /were7 still
the responsibility of the occupying military authorities."
The formal agreement was signed on March 9, 194-5, oy
Premier Ivanoe Sonomi and Spurgeon M. Keeny, Chief of the
UNRRA mission to Italy. "UNRRA /would} function separately
from ENDS I , the distributing agency representing the Vatican,
the Italian Red Cross and the Italian Government, out certain
hey personnel might oe active in both. . . .
"In line with UNRRA policy elsewhere, the Italian Gov-
ernment was to! match UNRRA's i 50, 000, 0 30 with an equivalent.
. . . That meant that the Italian budget feas tcD provide for
storage, transportation and distribution costs. ‘
"The $50,000,000. . . .jar a s9 budgeted over. . . one year
in the hope that an average of 15,000 tons of supplies could
oe Drought in monthly."
"The program >as' devised to give 1,700,000 children and
300,300 mothers an average of 750 calories of additional food
dsily. n~?
26. NYT, Sept. 23, 1944, p. 6. 27 • NYT, Marc h 10
,
19 45 , p . 10
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In London, August, 194-5, it was decided that full-scale
aid should be given to Italy during 194-6. UNRRA took over
from the military authorities on l*ay}uary 1. By March, 194-6,
UNRRA had eight regional offices, in Rome, Milan, Naples,
-> c-
Florence, Grenoa, Padua, Sicily, and Sardinia.
By September 30, 1946, UNRRA had shipped $247,976,000
worth, or 6,506,391 tons of supplies to Italy.
12. Repuolic of San Marino.
"An agreement was signed with the Repuolic of San Marino
for providing medical and sanitary aid," as well as aid to
displaced persons, mothers and children".' By September 30,
1946, $30,000 worth and 202 tons had been shipped.
13. Ethiopia.
A special program was conducted in Ethiopia, chiefly
medical, welfare and transport assistance. By September 30,
1946, thevalue of the 307 tons of shipments was $110,000.
14. Western Europe.
In 7/estern Europe the chief task for UNRRA has oeen
cooperating with the armed services in the care of displaced
persons-'.^ The Western Powers possessed sufficient foreign
exchange to finance their own relief supplies.
On February 26, 1945, however, "emergency relief to
specially suffering areas in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, tne
Netherlands and Norway by the UNRRA was authorized. . . by
a unanimous vote of the. . .Central Committee." UNRRA before
- BYT, March 1, 1946, p. 3. 29
.
Fifty F cts, op.cit., p.24.
30. See Chapter VI
.
31-NYT, Feo. 27, 1945, p.3.
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had been confined to non-paying countries.
15* The Far East.
The program for the Far East was planned at a meeting
of the Far Eastern Committee in Australia in February, 1945.
Estimates of needs were drawn up and a program for rehabili-
tation was devised. In view of the immense task of recon-
struction in the Far East, it was decided that UNRRA rehaoi.1-
itation aid should be limited to minor industries. The
Commitee resolved:
First, that in general terms industrial rehaoili-
tation should not go beyond its pre-war capacity.
Second, that in the relief period, in so far as
procurement of items in short supply is required, re-
habilitation is undertaken only to the extent that will
make possible the operation of enterprises essential
fo relief and rehabilitation, or to the extent which
does not deprive enterprises essential for relief and
rehabilitation of necessary supplies, and:
Third, that priority shoulo. be given to programs
most likely to contribute at an early date to r lief and
rehabilitation, among which are, in certain areas, clear-
ly small-scale and cottage industries, and to programs
for which all necessary provisions, inducting skilled
labor, can be made, and:
Fourth, that the potentialities of lioerated areas
for providing relief and rehaoilitation supplies to
other areas should be used to secure the maximum inter-
change of any surplus supplies.'7'2-
a. China.
The sudden end of the war with Japan found UNRRA quite
unprepared for the immense task of relief anu rehabilitation
confronting it in China. There was consideraole dealy and
confusion in getting the operations started.
The headquarters for the China Mission was in Shanghai,
32. NTT
,
Fab. 18, 1945, p.J.
..
s
C
. .. .' '
with a liaison office in Nanking. There are fifteen regional
offices. UNRRA cooperates with the Chinese National Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration, a government agency.
High priority was given "on the corridor extending from
Hankow to Liuchow and Canton, where the destruction was
greatest as a result of the 1944 offensive in which the
Japanese attempted to knock China out of the war. High
priority also has been given to rehabilitating China’s
scattered transportation system and to getting the Yellow
River back on its true course by repairing the dikes blown
up in 1933. By this means, an estimated 2,000,000 acres can
be reclaimed, capable of producing 200,000,000 bushels of
wheat annually
.
(<
UNRRA also checked an outbreak of cholera in Chungking
in 1945.
’’Formosa constitutes one of the administrative districts
for the China relief operations . " ’‘'Relief for Formosa was
authorized at the London Council Meeting in August, 1945*
Up to September 30, 1946, UNRRA supplies to China,
1,270,935 tons, amounted to $227,203,000.
b. Korea.
A limited program was approved for Korea in Lennon in
1943. No figures as yet are available on the extent of the
aid.
c. Philippines.
33* Fifty Facts, op. cit,, p.24. 34 . I oid.
,
p.23.
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Table VI*
Estimated Value of Shipments to Liberated Areas from all
Sources by Major Commodity, Cumulative Through September
30
,
1946 .
Major commodity F.A.S. value** Tonnage
Food 1935,753
Clothing, textiles,
footwear 350,851
Medical & sanitation 57,146
Agric. rehabilitation 182,823
Indus, rehabilitation 350,045
Unclassified*** 113,412
7,014,234
431, 807
69,113
1,722,363
6,905,129
530,69o
Total $2, 045 , 035 16,723,342
* Ninth Report to Congress on Operations of UNRRA
(Washington: Government Printing Office, September 30,
1946), pp. 27, 30-31.
**Freightat shipside value, in thousands of U.S. dollar
equivalents
.
***Value of military supplies taken over by UNRRA upon
assumption of responsibility or delivered to countries
during the period of UNRRA responsibility.
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Table VII*
Estimated UNRRA shipments program through December 31,1946,
in Thousand Tons.
Cloth. Medi. Un-
Text
.
Sc Agric . Indust. class -
Food Shoes Sanit . Rehao . Rahab. fied Total
Greece 1, 306 27 9 237 * 693 727 3,049
Yugoslavia 1,084 73 20 161 695 352 2,335
Albania 67 3 2 17 42 25 156
Poland 306 30 27 336 493 • • • 1,792
Czechoslovakia 608 40 24 267 404 • • • 1,343
I taly 1, 344 105 14 410 7,233 • • • 9,611
Austria 365 4 1 164 47 177 753
White Russia 72 6 1 44 22 • • • 145
Ukraine 209 19 2 41 112 • • • 333
China 1,094 155 37 P58 904 • • • 2,751
Other orograms 57 90 CD 6 4 34 196
Total 7,512 7)02 142 2,341 10,657 1, 315 22,509
* New York Times
.
October 28, 1946, p.3. In December, the
expiring dates for UNRRA were advanced to March 31 for
Europe and June 30 for China.
Table VIII**
Shipments Program Through December 31, 194-6 in Million
Dollars. (Value, freight at shipside.)
Greece 164.0 35.0 10.3 50.3 40.9 57.0 353.0
Yugoslavia 139.6 75.9 21.6 40.0 109.4 43.0 429.5
Albania 5.5 5.4 1.9 6.6 7.1 20.0 28.5
Poland 180.5 84
.
5
30.0 30.0 99.0 • • • • 474.
0
Czechoslovakia 107.0 29.5 26.5 33.4 73.6 • • • • 270.0
Italy 195.7 55.9 16.0 29. r5 127.4 .5 425.0
Austria 54.0 2.0 1.5 19.1 9.0 31.7 117.3
White Russia 28.9 7.4 1.2 5.7 17.8 • • • • 61.0
Ukrraine 100.2 21.7 2.3 17.4 46.9 • • * 1 139 • 0
China 131.5 95-9 41.3 30.0 18b. 3 • • • • 535.0
Other programs 14.3 23.0 2.5 1.0 2.5 15.1 53.3
Total 1, 121.2 45672 15576 353.5 719.9 149.3 2,755Tb
** New York Times, October 28, 1946, p. 3* For headings of
columns, see Table VJJ above.
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No full-scale aid was given to the Philip ines. Pood
and medical supplies were sent to Luzon. The total sent up
to September 30, 1946, was 20,061 tons, at ^2, 356 , 000.
PROGRESS
An examination of Tables IV, V, and VI will reveal
the total UNRRA program up to September 30, 1946. Tables
VII and VIII i ill reveal the program planned to the end of
UNRRA operations.
"The great volume of supply handled oy UNRRA and the
steady acceleration of the operations, is shown oy the
following cumulative statistics of supplies shipped overseas:"
End of 1st quarter, 1945 37,000 long tons
End of 2nd quarter, 1945 1,101,000 long tons
End of 3rd quarter, 1945 2,126,000 long tons
End of 4th quarter, 1943 4,032,000 long tons
End of 1st quarter, 1946 3,252,000 long tons
End of 2nd quarter, 1946 12,833,000 long tons
End of 3rd quarter, 194o( estimate ) 16,633,000 long tons
"By the end of its operations, UNRRA will have delivered
about $3 , 500 , 000,000 worth of supplies (including freight).
This is more than three times the value of relief after
World War I and includes, besides relief commodities, over
$1,000,000,000 for equipment and supplies to rehaDilitate
the countries' economies, an aspect woefully neglecte.. after
the last war. " ^
How United States exports under UNRRA compared with
total U.S. food exports may be seen in Table IX.
354'UNRRA's Record of Service", loc. cit.,p.44. The first,
year of UNRRA' s life was largely devoted to organization.
36. La Guardia, Report, to the Secretary General of the UN. loin
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Table IX:*
Figures on 1945-46 Food Exports( a) • (in thousands of' long tons)
Wheat, Other Fats, Dairy Other
Flour grains Oils Pro- foods
(grain (grain(prod. ducts
Destination Total equiv. )eauiv)wt
)
Meat
Total Food exports 157700 10,336 1,411 356 614 764 3,219
EuroDe--Total 11,647 7,454 655 268 538 669 2,013
UNRRA ( b)
U. 5. Military
,
3,951 2,624 227 73 238 311 423
civilian feeding2,351
France and French
1,535 64 13 16 43 630
North Africa 1,959 1,403 80 61 60 47 303
Belgium 779 541 74 19 43 33 64
Netherlands 394 304 17 11 27 21 14
Norway 63 12 30 4 1 0 21
Unit. Kingdom 1, 036 306 26 69 99 196 390
USSR 123 36 11 3 46 5 17
Other Europe 936 683 126 10 3 13 96
Far East- -Total 1,400 879 346 4 5 29 137
UNRRA
U.S. Military, civ-
164 127 37c 0 0 ( g) 0
ilian feeding 573 427 120 0 0 0 26
Philippines 315 160 73 1 1 23 52
India
Netherlands
300 164 84 0 0 6 46
East Indies
Latin American
43 1 27 3 4 (6) 13
Republics 1,384 936 243 52 10 14 129
Other exports 2,269 1,067 167 32 11 52 940
(a) Excludes shipments to U.S. Territores except for wheat
and flour amounting to approximately 4 million bushels
wheat equivalent.
(b) Kay include some food for UNRRA in the Far East.
(c) May include a small quantity of rice for UNRRA in Europe,
(g) Less than 500 tons.
* Report to Truman by Secretary of Agriculture Anderson,
New York Time s, July 13, 194b, p. 28.
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UNRRA'S END
The London Council Meeting in August, 1945, set Decem-
ber 31, 1946, as the time limit for UNRRA's activities in
Europe, and March 31, 1947, for the Far East. During the
last Council Meeting in .Yahington, in December, 194o, the
time limit for shipments was extnded to March 31, 1947, for
Europe and June 30, 1947, for the Far East. This ninety-
day extension was necessary due to delays caused by strike
obstacles in this country. Refugee functions in Europe will
end June 30.
On the 13th of December, 1946, La Guardia turned over
to his successor, Major General Lovell /» . Rooks, the joo of
shipping the remaining $626,000,000 worth of relief goods.
The Council passed a resolution that, "in view of the desira-
bility of bringing approved programs to an early conclusion,
such programs shall not be altered oy the Central Committee
except when circumstances clearly warrant such action.
The Council provided that if goods were not shipped in
the time limit allowed, UNRRA is authorized:
“(a) To make arrangements with the supply Governments
' to the extent that such Governments are prepared
to do so’ to assign uncompleted contracts to re-
ceiving Governments;
"(b) If such arrangements are unattainable, to complete,
'subject to any limitation applicable to the con-
tributions of each country,
’
procurement and ship-
ment as soon as possible after the time limit
expires . "^7
On the 7th of February, 1947, Rooks set up a ^*35,000,000
37 • NYT > Dec. 14, 1946., p. 3 .
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tide over relief fund for the neediest nations: Austria,
$20,000,000; Poland, $11,000,000 and G-reece, $4,000,000.
"This emergency action as taken by the UNRRA Central
Committee at the urging of the State Department. . . when
it became evident that 'desperate nations can’t oe relieved
by unilateral aid in time to help the situation. '
"
The sources of the money are as follows*
'(1) A $25,000,000 cut sack in non-food items, such as
agricultural and industrial machinery.
"(2) The taking of $4,000,000 from what was left of a
reserve set up for contingencies
.
"(3) By trying to persuade Czechoslovakia, which has
'outstripped all other countries receiving UNRRA
aid in the degree of recovery achieved, ' to add
$6,000,000 of sugar and potatoes to the $2,000,000
of those commodities she already has sent to
Poland, Austria and Yugoslavia.
On the 13th of l.'arch came a further announcement that
UNRRA was curtailing its program. Orders amounting to
$41,000,000 had been cancelled, due to increased shipping
and other costs. Purchases in this country were to be
limited to food. China would be the country most affected,
since her relief program was supposed to extend for three
20
more months'.
So UNRRA's life is almost at an end. Is it possible
to appraise its value? Only the backward glance of history
will be able to do that with the proper perspective. UNRRA
has accomplished a great deal. Part II has revealed ..hat
she has accomplished. But much more remains to be done.
For a survey of that we must turn to Parc III.
... 39- Chi l : t i a n ..c. .ic— .. oni ur , arcn
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But first, let us pause for just a moment to enumerate
a fe oi the obstacles ..hie 1 have confronted UNRRA. At the
Montreal meeting, a number o_ delaying factors /,'ere listed:
1. They could not go in while the enemy was still there.
2. After the enemy was driven back they had to adjust
to military necessities which were flatly put:
"just enough relief to prevent unrest and disease
which would hamper military operations."
3. Agreements had to oe negotiated with countries to
receive supplies; including the numoer of observers
UNRRA would send in and under what terms, each
receiving country jealously guarding its sovereignty.
UNRRA couldn't grant relief until a Government re-
quested it.
4. The time for cessation of military control nad to be
fixed
.
3. In feoruary, March and April 1945 . . ., wnen not
a word was being said about lack of supplies, and
some high-ranking Government officials were even
talking surpluses, UNRRA could not get ships.
6. By June, when ships were available, suddenly supplies
were not there--yet it would have been folly to
have stored supplies with storage space at such a
terrific premium and spoilage such a threat.' 1
Obtaining supplies was one of the most difficult tasks
UNRRA faced. During the war there was a food shortage all
over the world. To provide supplies for UNRRA -nevitably
meant a tightening of the belt for the civilians of the
supplying countries. As one example of the difficulty,
"in the. . . third quarter of 1945, UNRRA asked the 7<FA. . •
for 11,810 tons of condensed milk and got l/lO that amount;
for 7,464 tons of meat and got none; for 30,374 tons of hog
back and got none; for 35,516 tons of lard and got 2,900
tons; for* 2,943 tons of margarine and got none; for 34,446
tons of sugar and got none."
’
40.NYT, Sept. 9, 1945, p. 17 . 41.NYT, Sept. 10, 1945, p. 11.
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Lack of even internal transportation and. lack ol port
facilities were major obstacles for UNRRA. The lack of funds
was a serious difficulty. The nations seemed to oe invari-
ably slow at making their appropriations. Until it had funds,
UNRRA could not acquire stockpiles. In many places, relief
became a political factor. In some places, there was a
tendency for UNRRA supplies to move into the black market.
Hastitlv trained personnel were often incapable. These are
only a few of the factors which confronted the emergency
organization.
UNRRA is over, out relief and rehaoilitation is hardly
at an end. How great a need still exists? What will fill
that need? For an answer to those questions, we must press
our inquiry still further.
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PART III
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE

CHAPTER IX THE NEED STILL EXISTS
LACK OF SUPPLIES 1945-46
According to the office of foreign agricultural relations
of the United States Department of Agriculture, the food
supply in Europe one year before the end of the war was
estimated to be 85-905 of the pre-war level. But there
were about 60,000,000 non-privilege urban residents in the
low-income brackets, including old people, white collar
workers and some manual laborers, whose energy intake had
been reduced shockingly. As against the 5,000 calories
recommended daily by the National Research Council, each of
these persons receiver.
:
Netherlands 1,300
Norway 1,600
France 1,500
Belgium 1,500
Germany 2,000
The 1942 death rate in Belgium, France and the Nether-
lands was 125 higher than in 1933
•
In December, 1944, Roosevelt reporter that the Germans
had drained 12,900,000 tons of food out of occupied Europe
in the year ended March 31, while shipping only 1,500,000
tons to those countries. There had been a 50 ^ increase of
tuberculosis in France, and a l/3 increase in the Netherlands.
Not including Russia there ere 1,000,000 cases jf diphtheria
in Europe in 1943 with a mortality rate of almost 5%• There
l.NYT, July 3, 1944, p. 14.
5=
2. Report to Congress, NYT, Dec. 6 , 1944,
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was a 20 0% rise over the number of cases in pre- ar Europe.
Typhus cases increased nearly JDOrt during the war up to
1943 .
By the summer of 1945 the food situation in Europe had
become so bad that an emergency conference was hela in London
to discuss the critical food supply problem. France, Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Great Britain,
Canada, the United States, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia ana
Greece were represented. As a result of their deliberations
it became more and more clear that the world would continue
to be on short rations for several years. Their misgivings
were to be realized'^
In October, another survey of the Office of Foreign
Agricultural delations estimated that the total world food
output for 1945 was about 3"£ less than the pre-war 1935-39
average. However, an allowance was to be made 1 or the net
increase in world population during the war years, bringing
the per capita world production down to about 10% f
By February, the extent of the shortage was becoming
clearer. In a statement on the world food crisis, Truman
said:
'Although this country enjoyed a near- record pro-
duction of food and a record crop of ‘ heat, the wheat
crops of Europe and North Africa and the rice crops of
the Far East have proved to be much shorter than anti-
cipated; in fact some area., have experienced the short-
est crops in fifty years oecause of extreme drought and
th disruption of war.
3« NYT , June 7, 1945; June 13, 194/, p. 6 . 4.NYT, Oct . 1, 1943 , p • 3.
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”7< e in tills country hive .oeen consuming about 3,300
calories per person per day. In contrast, more than
123 million people in Europe 1 ill have to subsist on
less than 2,000 calores a day; 28 million ..ill get less
than 1,500 calories a day and, in some parts of Europe,
.large groups ill receive as little as 1, 000 calories.
Truman went on to say that the world food production per
capita in 194-5 was about 12% oelow prewar production, devi-
ating slightly from the i.0% quoted above from the Office of
Foreign Agricultural Relations. In Europe the production
had oeen about t below normal, and almost as much in Japan.
In the Philippines, production had declined still more than
in Japan. In India and the Far East, production was 15 %
belov normal, due to droughts and the war.6
In March the Department of Agriculture reported that
in 194-5 the world had reaped the smallest wheat c- op since
1929, and began 194-6 with a decrease of 5,500,000 head of
hogs compared with the year before. The world wheat pro-
duction in 194-5 was 5,200,000,000 ousnels, Q/0 under 1944-.
The drop in Europe was 1,035,000,000 bushels, 364 under pre-
war levels.'
The Combined Food Board reported to the UNRRA’s March
Council meeting that the existing supply of food was 40% off
requirements. During the first half of 194-6, the wheat and
wheat substitute requirements amounted to 20,000,000 tons.
The available supplies were only 12,000,000. Requirements
for rice were 5,000,000 tons, but only 2,500,000 were avail-
able:'
5. Text of Truman’s Statement
.
NYT . Feb. 7, 194-6, p.l . 5. NYT ,
3,19 , .1. 7. NYT, March 11,19^6^.6. 8. NYT, March 17,1946,
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Because the world famine had become so acute, iYi&t many
began to argue that the United States had abandoned rationing
too soon in keeping with her responsibilities to other parts
of the world. In spite of the agitation, however, no new
rationing program was established, but a voluntary conserva-
tion program was outlined by President Truman:
1. Conservation of food, especially bread.
2. No wheat to be used in direct production of alcohol
and beer.
3. Wheat flour extraction rate raised to QO%.
4. The Department of Agriculture to control exports of
wheat and flour to facilitate movement to the destina
tions of greatest need.
5. "Nec^essary steps were to De taken during this calen-
day year to export 375,000 tons of fats and oilsis,
1.6 billion pounds of meat, of which one billion
pounds is to be made available during the first
half of 1946, and to increase the exports of dairy
products, particularly cheese and evaporate.', milk."
The United States had a grain export commitment of
four hundred million bushels for the first six months of 194o
All during the spring it seemed that she must default on her
promise. The grain simply was not available. But the in-
tensive conservation campaign led by the President paid its
dividends. By June 30, 401 million bushels had oeen sent
overseas. By including the amounts actually at the ports,
the figure of 417,000,000 bushels had been reached. The
American people could well be proud of that achievement.'
Some of the reasons for the food shortage in the winter
of 1946 are portray ec in Figure 7*
9. Truman's Statement 01 the ,,orld Fooa Crisis, IYT
,
Teo. 7,
1946, p. 15- 10. NYT , July 13, 1946, p. 28.
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"United States
Canada
Australia ft-
New Zealand
§ Denmark
^Sweden
>S [United Kingdom ¥ ft"
£ Netherlands ¥ ¥ ¥ ft— _
l Norway ¥ ¥
Switzerland ¥
^Luxembourg ¥ ¥ ft-
France ¥ ¥ ¥ ft— ft*
Czechoslovakia ¥ ¥ ft—
Bulgaria / ¥ ft- ft- ft* -
o*
Belgium ¥ ¥
Yugoslavia ¥ ¥ ft— •- ft- —
Rumania ¥ ¥ ft- ft- ft- ft-
K Finland ¥ ft- ft-
q
Hungary ¥ ¥ ft— ft» ^ ^ ^
Russia ¥ ¥ ft— ft- ft—
Indo-China s ¥ ft— —
—
Siam ¥ ¥ j—
^Greece ¥ ¥ ft- A-
/China ¥ ¥ ft-—* ft-
Malaya ¥ ¥ ft-
Italy ¥ ft— ft* A—
Austria ¥ ¥ ft— ft- ft— ft.
- s.
Germany ¥ ¥ —
-
— — — —
* Korea ¥ ft.
.V India ft—
Burma ¥ ¥ ft.
K
- ft k
(Java ft—
VJ
Philippines ¥ ¥ ft— ft—
,
Japan ¥ ¥ — ft- ^
Spain x , ft— ft-
Poland ¥ ¥ ft—
>
ft— -- ft- ft- ft-
\Portugal 4-
*5 Latin America
Africa ft-
Greenland, Alaska, Middle East, Netherlands East Indies, etc
* "The Food Scandal' 1
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HOOVER REPORT- -19 46
On the first of March, 1946, the United States Govern-
ment set up a Famine Emergency Committee, with Herbert
Hoover as its honorary chairman. Its purpose was to as& the
citizens of the United States voluntarily to reduce con-
sumption of wheat and wheat products by 25.^ and to save
meat, oils and fats. Later in the month Hoover left for
Europe with a committee of experts to investigate food con-
ditions'. Two months later he toured Central and South;:
America for the same purpose.
Country by country, the conditions which he found
equalled his worst expectations, corroborating the gloomy
reports which had been streaming from Europe all winter.
Everywhere food prices were high, new ration cuts had been
installed, supplies were wholly inadequate. On the 17th of
May he delivered his full report before the Chicago Famine
Emergency Committee: "Hunger, 1 he said, " hangs over the
homes of more than 300,000,000 people^-- over one- third oi
the people of the earth."
According to Hoover, an average of 2,200 calories a
day is a minimum for health. Americans, British, Canadians,
Australians, Sv;edes, Argentinians, and most of the western
Hemisphere peoples consume more than 2,900 calories a day.
If these 300,000,000 people receive no more relief, he
claimed, 100,000,000 of them would receive no more than
2,000 calories a day. Another 100,000,000 would have 1,300
ll.NYT. March Id, 1946, p.l.
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calories. 150,000,000 would, receive 1,500; 150,000,000--
I, 200; and 300,000,000 ' ould receive less tnan 900 calories.
Hoover estimated that the grain requirements for nations
who would need overseas supplies from January 1, 194o, to
the fall harvest would oe 26,000,000 tons. The availaole
supplies were only 15
,
000,000 tons, leaving a gap of
II, 000,000 or 43%• 3y revising needs according to a lower
caloric figure, 1,500 to 1,300, the gap became 3 , 600,000
tons. That gap represented "the whole amount necessary to
save 40,000,000 people.' 1
Hoover discovered an annual infant mortality rate of
two hundred per 1,000 among children under one year in many
cities. There were 20 to 30 million physically subnormal
children on the continent. Both the children ana the very
future of civilization were suffering/'
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC COMMITTER FOR EUROF
E
The same gloomy situation was indicated by a report
of the Emergency Economic Committee -for Europe, an inter-
governmental body under the chairmanship of Philip Noel-
Baler of Great Britain. In February, 19 4o, the committee
published the following findings:
(A) About 100,000,000 people in the following groups
will probably oe receiving an average total diet
of 1,500 calories per person per day or less:
(I) The non-farm population of Austria ( 743 oi
total Austrian population).
12.NYT, May li, 1946, p. 10. 13- Members: 3elgium, Den-
mark, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, iurkey,
the United kingdom and the United ~>tatos.
."
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(II) The farm population of tobacco-growing regions
in Bulgaria [9%)
•
(III) German residents in Czechoslovakia (in so far
as they do not qualify for Czechoslovak citi-
zenship) ( 16 ) .
(IV) The non-farm population of eastern Slovakia( 3%)
.
(V) The non-farm population of Finland {^-3%) •
(VI) The non-farm population of Germany { 15%) •
(VII) The non-farm population of Hungary; especially
Budapest {50%).
(VIII) The non-farm population of Italy {59%)
•
(IX) The non-farm population of Rumania {30%).
(X) The non-farm population. of Spain ( 436)
.
(B) A further 40,000,000 people .ill probably be re-
ceiving an average diet oi over 1,500 but less than
2,000 calories including:
(I) The non-farm population of France {65%)
•
(II) Th non-farm population of Bohemia, Moravia
ana western Slovakia { 50%).
(Ill) The non-farm population of Gr eece (47 C)
.
(IV) Farm and non-farm population of certain dis-
tricts of Yugoslavia ( 33 6 )
.
(C) An average of a bare 2,000 calories per day. . . for
non-farm populations of Luxembourg and possibly
Portugal. Somewhat higher diets still under 2,500
calories may oe anticipated for the non-farm popu-
lations of Belgium, Bulgaria, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland (with certain groups at lower levels)
and Yugoslavia.
(D) Average diets of over 2,500 calories will oe avail-
able only for the non- farm population of Denmark,
Sweden, Switzerland, ana the United Kingdom ana
farm population of all countries except where other-
wise noted above.'
No information was available on Albania, Sire, Turkey
and the USSR.
From April 3 to the 6th, in London, the Emergency
Economic Committee for Europe sponsored an emergency con-
ference representing the European governments and the major
international organizations concerned with foods to review
Europe' s fooa problem. New conservation methods were urged."
14. KYI , Feb. 7. 1946, p. 1. 15.NYT, March 12, 1946, p. 7*
16. NYT, April 6, 1946, p. 5.
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WORLD FOOD SHORTAGE 1946-47
In November, 1946, the Department of Agriculture an-
nounced that world food production for 1946-47 was to be
7$ higher than last year, and slightly more than prewar.
However, supplies were 5% below prewar due to population
increases. The wheat production in 1946 approached the pre-
war average of 5,900,000,000 bushels. Over 5,500,000,000
bushels of corn were produced. Not so much meat as last year
could be exported. There was less milk; and dairy products.
30,000,000 short tons raw value or 10$ more than in 1945-46
of sugar had been produced, 13$ less than the 1935-39 aver-
age. 10$ more rice than the 6,300,000,000 bushels for 1945-
46, or 90-95$ of the prewar average, was produced.
Food was still short, however. According to Highby,
there are six reasons for the grain shortage:
1.
Much of the increased total production in 1946^
of all grains was in areas which are not important in the
movement of grain in international trade--for example,
Spain, Turkey, Central Russia, China and so forth.
2. The increase was confined to a large extent to
coarse grains, especially corn and oats, use of which
for direct human food is limited.
3. Bad harvesting weather and poor threshing re-
sults, notably in western Europe, have reduced many crop
estimates from earlier indications.
4. End- of- season stocks in both exporting and im-
porting were so reduced as to moke some replenishing
necessary this season, a circumstance which has had its
effect both upon export availabilities and import re-
quirements.
5. Continued reduced rice crops in the Orient and
17.NYT, Nov. 4, 1946, p. 27.
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shortages ol‘ other foods and feeds tuffs have made grain
requirements abnormally large.
6. Although a substantial part of the world in-
crease in grain production in 1946 is accounted for by
the record wheat and corn crops and the near- record
oats crop in the United States, thic country is unable,
due to limitations of rail transport, port loading cap-
acity, and the great loss of shipments resulting from the
series of maritime an other strikes during late 1946,
to export all its grain surplus.'*
This year grain exports have oeen a little better. On
the 23th of February Truman announced that the United States
goal of 400,000,000 oushels for the 1946-47 season would be
\°S
met by April 30, two months ahead of schedule.
But the outlook is still grim. An FAQ3 report of March
17
,
1947, prophesied that "despite forecasts of a record
1947 wheat harvest in thic country, the world shortage may
continue into 1948 .
"
XK
Famine conditions still exist in Europe. It seems un-
necessary to repeat the details. The reader must be aware
by this time of how severe the actual conditions are. Map
3 offers a visual impression of the extent of the existing
need.
POST-UNRRA NEEDS
By a resolution adopted December 11, 1946, the General
Assembly of the United Nations set up a ten-member committee
directed to study "the minimum import requirements of the
essentials of life, particulary food and supplies for agri-
13. L. Ingemann Highoy, "World Distribution of Grain Exports,"
Department 01 State Bulletin, XVI (February 16,1 47). P«
19 ‘Statement on Grain Exports
. NYT, March 1,19A7« 20. Chap. III.
21.Ban«or Daily News, March 13, 1947-
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cultural production, of countries which the committee oe-
lieves might require assistance in the prevention of suffering
or of economic retrogression which threatens the supply of
tnese basic essentials." The committee was directed to
take into consideration the means availaole to each country
to finance the imports required. The sums estimated as
required according to Table X represent the net deficit
after deducting the value of stocks left over from the
UNRRA's European program, availaole proceeds of exports,
foreign credits and so forth.
"Actually, ^according to the report^ the six countries
who still require relief will need a total of §2,024,500,000
this year to provide the imports necessary to supply their
minimum needs for food, medicines, shoes and clothing,
livestock and farm equipments, and the supplies of fuel
and raw materials required to maintain their economies.
Three- fourths of this amount, however, will oe supplied
by exist in.: sources of foreign exchange." That orings the
total requirements down to ^583,000,000.
Insufficient information was available at the time when
the committee reported on the relief requirements of China,
Korea and Albania. Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Philippines
ana Ethiopia can finance their own relief needs and require
no assistance. Therefore, the countries who still need aid
are Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia.
22. b¥T, Jan. 30, 1947.
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Table X • Post-UNRRA Needs*
Minimum import requirements, financial resources avail-
able and relief assistance required for 1947. From the
report of the Special Committee on Relief Needs after
Termination of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilita-
tion Administration. (Figures in Millions of dollars)
Hun- Po- Yugo-
Aust. Greece gary Italy land slavia
A. Minimum Import
Requirements
1. Food- total | 98.7 0 89.5 $ 12.2 #255-0 195.
9
1 80 .
9
a.LesstUNRRA ship-
ments in 1947 6.7 0 1.2 64.4 21.8 5.1
b.Food( less a
.
)
92.9 89.0 11.0 190.6 173.2 75.8
2.
Fertilizer and
pesticides
3.
Draft power &
6.3 5.1 12.5 7.5 3.5
farm machy. 1.0 1.3 11.0 3.4 13.0 4.5
4. Livestock ... 2.0 1.1 8.0 3.0
5 . Textiles&Leather 37.1 23.3 26.0 176.5 98.3 59.9
6. Medical supplies 5.9 5.1 1.0 15.9 16.0 12.4
7
.
Coal
8.
Petroleum, oil Sr
30.0 16.1 135.0 • • « # 7.7
lubricants
9. Raw materials and
2.0 10.9 53.0 50.0 8.0 10.5
durable goods, re-
pair&maintenance 78.8 4.7 271.0 113.6 57.7
19. Miscellaneous 3.7 3.9 2.0 13.4 6.6 3.4
11. Total 255.3 $201.5 fll9.0 3913.5 #449.7 $22974
12.UNRRA shipments
in 1947( other
thanla)
6.8 12.2 1.3 72.7 26.8 35.7
13 . Net import re-
ouirements( I tern
llless 12) $248.5 1139.3 $117.2 $852.9 $422.9 •193.7
B. Resources for Fin-
ancing Minimum Import
Program
14. Exports- total 115.0 65 .O 75.0 475 .
0
294.0 129.5
a. Less • exports not
applicable. 10.0 .... • • • • 20.0 25.0 10.0
b.Net 105.0 65 .O 75.0 45 - . 0 269.0 119.5
15 . Credits • • • • •••• • • • • 111.0 14.0 • • • •
16 . Other .... 40.
0
2.0 130.0 • • • • 6.0
17. Total
C. Relief assistance
$105.0 $105.0 $77.9 *746.0 $283.9 3125.5
Reouired(13 less 17 ) 143.5 84.3 40.2 106.9 139.9 68.2
New York Times
,
January 39, 1947.

THE FAR EAST
By February 14, a report on the Far East had been pre-
pared by the Secretariat or the Unite.. Nations and handed to
the temporary Subcommission on the Economic Reconstruction
of Devastated Areasr
According to the report, 9,000,000 of China's inhabi-
tants were killed in the war and millions more were wounded
or starved to death. 40,000,000 dwelling places were needed.
''Industrially, China lost 90 % of her machine and light metal
plants and 70% of the capacity of her coal, electric power,
iron and steel plants. Eighty percent of Chinese shippin
and bridges were wiped out during the war."
Throughout the Far East, in Indo-China, Malaya, Siam,
Papua, Ne v G-uinea, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies,
and Java, the picture is everywhere the same--one of corn-
plete devastation and bitter need.
HOOVER REPORT-- 1947
In the winter of 1947, Herbert Hoover undertook another
tour to Europe. This time it was an Economic Mission to
Germany and Austria on the personal request of President
Truman. Everywhere he found the same grim conditions he
has revealed so many times before.
The cost of supplies for the combined Eritish and Am-
erican zones in Germany for the six months from January
1 to July 1, 1947, including the supplies already shipped
23. See Chapter X. 24. NYT, Feb. 15, 1947, p. 4.
G(
for that period, Hoover estimated to be:
Cereals (Wheat equivalent), 2,505,000 tons. .#238,000,000
Other foods, 720,000 tons 54,030,000
Fertilizers 17,500,000
Seeds 12,500,000
Petroleum products (civil population). . . . 12, OOP, OOP
Total .' $334,000,000
The United States share, one-half of that amount, would
be §192 , 000 , 000 .
His estimate of the supplies and costs neeaea for the
fiscal year 1947-43:
Cereals (in terms of wheat) for 1,550
calories level, 2,735,000 tons .... |278 , 500 , 0Q0
Cereals for "normal consumers" emergency
supplemental feeding, 192,000 tons . . 19
,
200,000
Child feeding program ( includes special
foods), 130,000 tons 35
,
000,000
Other foods, 450,000 tons 75,000,300
Fertilizers (available) 45,000,000
Seeds 27,000,000
petroleum products for civil copulation . . 25 , OOP , 000
Total. / 504,700,000
Cost of ration increase to 1,300 calories on
or about October, 1947 62,300,000
Total 4507,000,000
of which the United States share w ould oe ;2 33, 500, 000“.’
Estimated relief needs for Austria from the end of UNRRA
to July, 1948, Hoover set at 7 155, 000, 000'.
It must, by this time, oe clear that the need for relief
is by no means yet at an end. 1 3 anything being done to
meet the continuing need? Let us devote the next chapter
to a discussion of present international policies.
25 . Hoover, The president's Economic Mission to Germany and
Austria, Report 1, "German Agriculture and Food Requirements",
aYT, Feb. 23, 1947, . 14. 26. Hoover, Report on Austrian
Agricultural and Food Requirements, HYT, March 11, 1947, p. 12.
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CHAPTER X PRESENT INTERNATIONAL POLICIES
In this chapter we shall survey briefly the direction
that the relief policies of the United Nations and the United
States seem to be taking. Chapter XI will outline for us
the new agencies that have been created to carry on UNRRA’s
health, welfare and refugee functions . Finally, in Chapter
XII, we shall find ne' evidence of international collaboration
in food and agriculture.
Economic reconstruction of devastated areas is outside
the province of this paper. Since our primary emphasis is
food, it has been impossible to carry on into the future all
the activities upon which UNRRA has made only a beginning.
Let me merely indicate that a Temporary Subcommission on
the Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas has been
appointee, by the United Nations Economic and Social Council
in an effort to coordinate the recons truction of war- torn
lands. The World Bank likewise is an attempt to collaborate
internationally on the problems of reconstruction. The
Bank has already received applications for nine loans, f^om
Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece, -ran,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland/
In considering international policies regarding food
relief, let us first examine the International Emergency
Food Council.
1. NYT, March 26, 1947, p. 3
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INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY FOOD COUNCIL
On the 30th of June, 1946, the Combined Food Board 2
was terminated by a joint statement of Canada, the United
States and the United Kingdom. It was superseded by the
International Emergency Food Council, which was created ten
days before by nineteen nations, with Dr. Dennia A. Fitz-
Gerald, a career roan in the United States Department of
</
Agriculture, as its secretary general.
The IEFC has a central committee, representing Austria,
Canada, China, France, India, Denmark, the United Kingdom,
the United States ana Brazil, with Secretary of Agriculture
Anderson as its chairman.
The IEFC carries on the work conducted oy the Combined
Food Board during the war in an effort to distrioute scarce
food supplies to the areas of greatest need. According to
one of its resolutions:
(1) its member governments shall notify the Council
promptly of the relevant provisions of any special
arrangements determining the quantities of Lmporta and
exports, including bilateral trade and barter agree-
ments, in so far as they relate to commodities within
the purview of the Council; and
(2) its commodity committees, in developing recom-
mendations for international distribution, shall take
into account the total resou ces available to each
country and while giving due consideration to the move-
ment of commodities provided for in such special ar-
rangements shall not regard the existence of such
special arrangements as in any way hindering them from
putting forward recommendations designed to ensure the
most effective use of food resources during the present
emergency.*
2. See Chapters III and VII. 3 •Members: Argentina( unofficial)
,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark, France,
Greece, India, the Netherlands, Ne- Zealand, Norv. a
,
Slam, Turkey
,
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The ISFC is expecte.
,
to end Decern oer 31, 194 J.
THE UNITED NATIONS
But let us move over to Lade Success to see what the
United Nations has been doing in the matter of' relief.
Long before the end of UNRRA, on February 1, 1946, the
Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted a resolu-
tion submitted by the Economic and Social Council entrusting
the Secretary G-eneral to make arrangements with the UNRRA
to receive regular reports on its work, in order to facili-
tate the final stages of UNRRA.
The United Nations was slow, however, at actually as-
suring continuation of the functions of UNRRA. The 1947
food problem came before the Assembly in December. It was
then that the basic policy was laid down. No longer were
the nations of the world to ¥vrork cooperatively in providing
food relief. On the contrary, relief was left as a voluntary
measure on the part of individual governments.
A resolution making specific recommendations on action
required to improve world production and distribution of food
was adopted by the Economic and Financial Committee on Decem-
ber 3, and by the General Assembly on the 11th. The resolu-
tion directed six recommendations to the food-producing
9
countries
:
Union of South Africa, Canada, the United Kingdom and one U.S.
4. NYT , June 4, 1946, p. 26; June 21, p. 3; June 22, p. 2. 5*NYT,
June 26,1945,0.22. 6. "Factors in Food Dis tri oution, 77 Unite
Nations Bulletin
,
I (Nov. 25, 1945)
,
p. 33* 7* NET, June 2l, l9"4o,
p.3* 3.NYT, Jan. 31,1946, p.7« 9* "Food Shortage Recom-
mendations, 77 United Nati ons Bulletin , I ( Dec. 10, 1946) , pp. 43-44.
-.
1. Increase the output and collection of foodstuff's to
the maximum.
2. Prevent reduction of areas under grain cultivation.
3. Improve the transportation facilities for cereals
and other foodstuffs.
4. Increase exports to countries suffering from a short-
age of foodstuffs.
5 . Continue and strengthen international machinery with
a view to utilizing exportable food supplies, and
with due consideration for the urgency of the food
requirements in the needy countries.
6. Take measures against any un arranted increases in the.
price of grain and other foodstuffs.
According to the resolution, however, "the final decision
as to allocation will remain with the individual contriouting
countries, which will conduct their relief negotiations
bilaterally after informal consultations. The resolution. . .
contained assurances that relief supplies \ ould not be used
politically, that member nations would assist in providing
relief and that the Secretary General would arrange for
consultation among governments concerning their relief plans
and arrangements whenever it would promote the purposes of
the resolution." But what assurance do we have that the
United Nations will back up its "assurances"? Here, as in
other realms of its jurisdiction, the United Nations has
been unable to overcome the desire of individual nations to
rets in their complete individual sovereignty.
The Assembly did establish sA dt^AA A6} Special
Technical Committee on Post-UNRRA Requirements, representing
Argentina, Denmark, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Poland,
fO
the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR. Its
purpose however was merely investigatory. It was not an
10. NYT, Dec. 10, 1946, p.6.
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operating agency. We have already considered its report
in Chapter IX.
LA GUARDI A* 3 FOOD PLAN
Although the United Nations did decide to leave food
relief to individual nations, other plans were offered to
the Assembly. The most outstanding was that of La Guardia:
( 1) There shall be established by the United Nations
General Assembly at its present session a United Na-
tions Emergency Food Fund to meet the food needs of
countries in 194-7 which are unable to finance their
essential requirements.
(2) All of the United Nations would oe called upon to
contribute to the Fund in money or goods. The fund
should consist of supplies and money worth at least
$400,000,000. The Fund should also be composed of
commodities which some of the Countries having pre-
viously received UNRRA aid will be in a position to
contribute. The General Assembly shall establish the
proportionate contribution to oe made by each country,
but no country shall be called upon to contribute more
than 49^ of the Fund.
(3) The Fund would be administered under operating
policies determined by an executive board of Govern-
ments to oe nominated by the General Assembly. It
would be the responsibility of the board to establish
which countries are in need, the extent of their re-
quirements, and the programs and allocations to oe
approved to meet those requirements. It would also be
the function of the board to arrange and facilitate
barter deals and to investigate the possibility of
reviving and expanding the movement of labor across
national frontiers to areas where production is retarded
by shortages of manpower. The decision of the board
. shall be final.
(4) The small staff which would be required to implement
the decisions of the executive board would be provided
by the Secretariat of the United Nations. No new-
separate bureaucracy or agency and no separate field
offices would be established.
(3) All procurement, shipping, transportation and dis-
tribution would be the responsi oili ly Oi the receiving
Governments, f rants from the Fund oeing provided to
such Governments to meet the foreign exchange costs
necessarily incurred. Rehabilitation costs incidental
to the execution of the foregoing program within a
. ;i
•
'J
. . .
.
. i:
.
.
.
-
.
C
country may be met from the local currency proceeds
derived from the sale of UNRRA supplies, out not used
for administrative expens s.
(6) The activities of the Fund would be designed to deal
with the food problem until the 194-7 harvest, at which
time the General Assembly of the United Nations can de-
termine whether further action ,-ill oe necessary during
the winter of 1947-43.
La Guardia first submitted his plan to the Assembly in
November. But he met considerable opposition, especially
from the United States, which had already decided to follow
a unilateral policy in the matter of food relief. So on the
fourth of December La Guardia presented a compromise plan
to the Economic and Financial Committee, modifying his
original plan by substitution for the food fund an emergency
food board with three principal functions!
(1) To review the 1947 needs for financing food
imports to the extent that they connot be met by other
means after the UNRRA' s end.
(2) To make such recommendations of financial as-
sistance as might be required to meet the needs existing
as a result of foreign-exchange difficulties that can-
not be dealt with by existing agencies.
(3) To inform Governments as to the allocations of
resources that they make available for relief purposes
on the basis of need and free from political considera-
tions
La Guardia has now approached a little more closely
the weak plan finally adopted by the United Nations.
UNITED STATES POLICY
The United States was largely responsible for the indi-
vidualistic policy adopted by the United Nations. Many citi-
zens of the United States had been dismayed by reports that
Russia had been using UNRRA supplies, financed nearly 75^ by
11. Text 4f La Guardir ' s food plan. NTT, Nov. 12, 1946, p. 6.
12.
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this country, as a political weapon to strengthen her hold
upon eastern Europe. Moreover, since we were the largest
supplier, we should have a greater voice in its distribution.
This is similar to the isolationist attitude adopted after
World War I regarding food relief. The broad outlines of
the new policy are revealed by an agreement reached by the
United States, Great Britain and Canada in July:
First, that a new refugee organization will have
to be established to care for displaced persons, proba-
bly under the United Nations;
Second, that the health activities of UNRRA should
be taken over by the new World wealth Organization, also
under the United Nations.
Third, that some of the rehabilitation functions
of UNRRA may be taken over by the World Bank; out
Fourth, and most important, that the major UNRRA
tasks of delivering supplies for relief and delivering
supplies for the rehabilitation of devastated areas will
have to be dealt with on an national basis, with those
who need the relief and rehabilitation seeking aid
wherever they think they can get it.
Herbert Hoover has outlined several principles of policy
for the United States relief programs:
(1) No relief other than food, medicine, seed and
fertilizers should be furnished under these relief
appropriations. In some cases limited supplies of
clothing might be included.
(2)
^ Relief from our contribution. . .should be
limited to United States products and to transportation.
We should not use American dollars to purchase elsewhere.
(3) No money should be used for countries which
are able to pay in cash or to secure credit or supplies
through other channels.
(4) A further estimate of need and costs of . . .
relief should be made after full examination on the
ground by specialists appointe by the United states
Department of Agriculture and the United States Puolic
Health oervice and the International Emergency Food
Council.
13. See Chapter I. 14. See Chapter XI. 15. NYT .July 27,
1946, p. 1.
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These estimates should include only the period from
the end of UNRRA to the 194-7 harvest. At that time the
whole relief problem should be reconsidered in the light of
the situation then.
(5) The distribution should be continuously under
the supervision of, and satisfactory to, specialists
from the agencies named.
(6) No obligation or promise should be entered into
with any country for any specific amount of relief; the
distribution must be a month- to-raonth program, termin-
able at any time.
(7) No food from relief or domestic production in
any relief country should be used for political pressure
and there should be no racial or other discrimination.
(8) No relief should be given where either commod-
ities or cash are going out of that country for repara-
tions of the purchase of arms.
(9) Any nation receiving relief should obligate
itself to pay the cost thereof, either to the United
States and other donors, or, preferably to a fund to
be established by the United Nations for future famine
relief.
'
The United States program has not yet been sufficiently
developed so that we can appraise the extent to which these
policies will be adopted. We can be sure, however, that the
Republicans in Congress will consiaer seriously any proposals
submitted by Herbert Hoover.
What has the United States actually done in providing
relief according to her new individualistic policy? Very
little, it seems. To be sure, in June, 1946, Congress did
appropriate $350,000,000 for Army government and relief in
occupied countries. But no action has yet been taken re-
garding the $553,000,000 G-erman and Austrian relief require-
ments recommended oy Herbert Hoover.
16. Statement on relief before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, NYT, March 1,1947. 17-NYT, June 22, 1946, p.8.
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And no action has as yet been taken on other aspects
of relief. On the 21st of February, 1947, Truman asKea
Congress to appropriate $350,000,000 to carry on relief in
liberated countries after the end of UNRRA. The oeneficiary
countries would be Greece, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Austria
and China, in accordance with the report of the oepcial
Technical Committee of the United nations. The bill has
not yet been passed. But the measure finally approved oy
the House Foreign Affiars Committee did contain the restric-
tions proposed by Hoover, and the further provision that
relief may be terminated at any time by Congress when the
restrictions are not adhered to by the recipient countries.
The relief situation has been complicated by the
recent request of President Truman of ^400,000,000 for aid
to Greece and Turkey, a request implying political and
military commitments beyond the basic essentials of life.
From present indications, it seems clear that the United
States will provide some form of relief, but there will be
so many strings attached and so many delays that is a matter
of pure conjecture to what extent the existing needs shall
actually be met.
It is likewise uncertain at this point what lines the
United States food policy will take in the long range inter-
national situation. Shall we return to the policy we adnered
to between the war, when we acquired enormous surpluses only
18.NYT, Feb. 23, 1947- 19-NYT, March 20, 1947, p.l.
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to destroy them, deliberately devising means of producing
less? Or shall we find some new means to produce the maxi-
mum that our resources permit? Already it seems as if we
might adopt the former policy. Only a few days ago came an
announcement that the 194-7 Maine planting program contemplated
a 15.t cut in the acreage of potatoes. To be sure, sur-
pluses of potatoes had to be destroyed last year. The proolem
however, is to find some means to distribute them. They can
hardly be called surpluses, for their is such acute need
all over the world. In Chapter XII we shall discuss in de-
tail some aspects of the long range view.
But first let us pause long enough to review the
agencies which have been established to take over the health,
welfare and refugee functions of the UNRRA.
20. Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 194-7, p. 1.
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CHAPTER XI THE NEii? AGENCIES
INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND
On the 16 th of August, UNRRA established, an International
Emergency Children's Fund to “aid childrenand adolescents of
countries which were victims of aggression, and will be used
for child health purposes generally.' 1 The fund was to be
financed by funds left over from the liquidation of UNRRA,
by contributions from the forty-eight governments who were
members of UNRWA’s council, and by private contributions. It
was to be administered by an Executive Director, appointed
by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Fund's
Executive Board, composed of representatives of 25 countries.
The board is to formulate the policies of the Fund. In
December the United Nations Assembly voted unanimously in
favor of it.
In February, however, Rooks, the Director General of
UNRRA, stated that “contract cancellations on UNRRA*
s
expiration would revert to the contributing countries and
would not furnish any moneys for the International Children's
Fund. All that it can hope for from UNRRA is a small resi-
due from the operations on which UNRRA itself has cash in
hand. 90% of UNRRA contributions are made 'in kina'. “ ^ The
International Children's Fund will therefore depend almost
1.
“International Children's Fund Established," United nations
Bulleti n, I (December 24* 1946), pp. 54-55*
2. NYT
,
Feb. 3, 1947, p.2.
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entirely upon voluntary contributions.
The first request by a member government v*as made by
Greece, which asked the International Children's Emergency
Fund to provide supplementary food for its entire child
population.
WELFARE ACTIVI T I SS
In December, the General Assembly of the United Nations
allocated |670,000 for taking over UNRRA’s advisory social
welfare functions for the coming year. The program of the
United Nations was to be:
1. Retaining a requisite number of social welfare
experts to provide advisory services, on the request
of governments which show the need for them, and to put
into practice new technical methods in any branch of
social welfare.
2. Retaining a requisite number of social welfare
officials to observe and familizrize themselves with
the experience of other countries administering social
welfare programs;
3. Providing advice, demonstration and instruction
in connection with the manufacture of prosthenic ap-
pliances and the vocational training of physically
handicapped persons, and furnishing the necessary equip-
ment and tools;
4. Furnishing, to Member countries which have been
devastated by the war, technical publications helpful
in the training of social welfare workers".
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
On February 15, 1946, the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations established an International Technical
Preparatory Committee of sixteen experts, with representatives
of the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, the Office International
3. NZT , Feb. 26, 194-7. 4. "International Children's fund
Established," loc. cit., p.55*
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the League of Nations Health Organiza-
tion and the UNRRA. The committee met in Paris and prepared
a preliminary report on international health action.
From June 19 to July 22, an International Health Con-
ference was held at Hunter College in New York. The Conf'erenc
drafted a consitution for a World Health Organization, and
all sixty-one nations which attenaed the conference signed
the document. China and the Unitea Kingdom, however were
the only nations to sign the consitution unconditionally.
The remaining signatures require ratification. The consti-
tution will come into force when 26 nations become parties
to it.
The consitution provides for an assembly representing
all its member nations, which will hold regular annual
sessions and special sessions whenever circums t-ances warrant.
There is to be an Executive Board of eighteen, the members
of which are to serve in their individual capacities and
not as representatives of their respective governments.
There is likewise to be a Secretariat headed by a Director-
General.
The basic principles of the World Health Organization
are- included in its consitution:
The States parties to this Constitution declare, in
conformity with the Charter of the United nations, tnat
the following principles are basic to the happiness,
harmonious relations and security of all the peoples:
5. "World nealth Organization," United Nations bulletin . I,
(August 4, 1946) , pp. 4-7.
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Health is a state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being and not merely the absence of
disease or infirmity.
The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of health is one of the fundamental rights of every
human being without distinction of race, religion, poli-
tical belief, economic or social condition.
The health of all peoples is fundamental to the
attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon
the fullest co-operation of individuals and States.
The achievement of any State in the promotion and
protection of health is of value to all.
Unequal development in different countries in tne
promotion of health and control of disease, especially
communicable disease, is a common danger.
Health divelopment of the child is of basic import-
ance; the ability to live harmoniously in a changing
total environment is essential to such development.
The extension to all peoples of the benefits of
medical, psychological ana related knowledge is essential
to the fullest attainment of health.
Informal opinion and active co-operation on the
part of the public are of the utmost importance in the
improvement of the health of the people.
Governments have a responsibility for the health
of their peoples which can be fulfilled only by the
provision of adequate health and social measures.4.
The International Health Conference established an
interim commission to act in behalf of WHO until that organ-
ization comes into being. The interim commission, consisting
of eighteen nations, held its first session during the final
meetings of the Health Conference, and its second session
in Geneva from November 4 to 10.
On the 22nd of October the transfer of UNRRA's epidemi-
ological functions to the interim commission took place,
specific health duties outlined in the International sani-
tary Convention of 1944 were transferred on December 1. A
transfer from UNRRA has also been made of emergency field
6. Ibid., p. 5* 7‘NYT, Aug. 15 , 1946, p. o . 8. Flans for ,<orla
Health Organization/' United NaLions bulletin
. I (November
25, 1946)7 p-33. 9 .NYT, Oc t . 23, 1946, p. 5 • bee Chap. VI.
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assistance in certain areas, particularly of malaria and
tuberculosis programs in Greece and activities of a medical
/ 0
mission in Ethiopia. The League of Nations Health Organiza-
tion and the Office international a 'Hygiene puolique have
likewise heen transferred.
After deliberations in its Social, Humanitarian and
Cultural Committee, the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions on the 14th of December adopted a resolution recom-
mending to all UN members their acceptance of the constitu-
tion of the World Health Organization. "The first resolu-
tion on WHO also approved a loan by the United Nations of a
maximum sum of $300,000 for the purposes of financing the
activities of the Interim Commission from the commencement
of its work to the end of the current year, and further
approved the inclusion in the 1947 budget of a maximum
sum of $1,000,000 as a further loan either to the Interim
Commission or to WHO itself, if established." The money is
in the form of a loan because WHO is to raise its own funds
from its member nations.
The interim commission has authorized six technical
committees including those dealing with yellow fever, malaria,
narcotics and other subjects of primary importance in the
field of public health. In addition, a scholarship and fel-
lowship program has been instituted whereby graduate students
and advanced specialists in public health, medicine and sani-
10. NYT, Feb. 13, 1947. 11. "Toward Adoption of Health Constitu-
tion", United Nations Bulleti n,! ( Dec . 10, 1946)
,
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tary engineering will study in the United States, Canada and
other countries.
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION
By 1946, three problems were complicating the settle-
ment of the refugee problem. The prospects of increasing
immigration to other countries had greatly diminished.
Prospects for repatriation were worse. And infiltration
from Soviet-occupied Germany and from the Soviet-inf luenced
countries of eastern Europe was continuing into the American
and British zones, where 90% of the displaced persons and
/ y
refugees were located.
The refugee problem has been a concern of international
organization since the early days of the League of Nations,
which in 1921 appointed a High Commissioner of Refugees and
set up the "Nansen" passport for stateless persons, recog-
nized by thirty-one governments. "In 1933, a League Hign
Commissioner for German and Austrian refugees was appointed,
who ultimately assumed responsibility for Spanish refugees
as well. This office was consolidated in 1933 with the
Nansen organization when a new body was created, the Inter-
Governmental Committee on Refugees( IGC ) .'
"The IGC is still active. It concerns itself primarily
with settlement and resettlement, and provides legal and
political protection for the limited categories of refugees
l3.NYT.Feb. 13,1947, l4.NYT,0ct. 7, 1946, p. 6. 15. In
October
,
1946, a new ‘‘travel document'' was authorized for refu-
gees; see Chapter VI. 16. See Chapter VI.
- j-.v. m
ill . :
.
‘ 0
.
t
.
-
.
• •
,
... . .C C.-
i
.
'
•. i c : oil r «
.
.
. t
.
. «
'
•
<
*
• j . . :
/tr
which are within its competence.
As a result of a study by a Preparatory Commission in
London last year, the General Assembly noted the urgency of
the refugee problem and urged the Economic and Social Council
to determine what form of international machinery should oe
established to handle the problem. The Economic and Social
Council then set up a Special Committee on Refugees and Dis-
placed Persons, which met in London from April 8 to the
beginning of June, producing a 200-page report showing its
failure to agree on a single item except that some form ol
international refugee organization should be established.
The committee did draw up a draft constitution, with the
following preamble:
The Governments accepting this Constitution recog-
nizing
that genuine refugees and displaced persons con-
stitute an urgent problem which is international in
scope and character;
that as regards displaced persons, the main task to
be performed is to encourage and assist in every way
possible their early return to their country of origin,
or in the case of Spanish Republicans to establish
themselves temporarily in order to enable them to re-
turn to Spain when the present Falangist regime is
succeeded by a democratic regime;
that genuine refugees and displaced persons should
be assisted by international action either to return to
their countries of nationality or former habitual
residence or to find new homes elsewhere under the con-
ditions provided for in this Constitution;
that resettlement of refugees and displaced persons
be contemplated only in cases indicated clearly in the
Constitution;
that genuine refugees and displaced persons, until
such time as their repatriation or resettlement ana re-
establishment is effectively completed, should be pro-
1?. U.N. to Assume Resettlement Task, ;l United Nations bulletin,
I, Aug. 3i 19^6, pp. 13-14. 13.NYT, June l,194b,p.2.
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tected in their rights and legitimate interests and
should receive care and assistance, and as far as pos-
siole should be put to useful employment in order to
avoid the evil and antisocial consequence of continued
idleness, have agreed, for the accomplishment of the
foregoing purposes in the shortest possible time to
establish and do hereby establish, a non-permanent or-
ganization to be called the International Refugee Organ-
ization, a specialized agency to be brought into rela-
tionship with the United Nations, and accordingly have
accepted the following articles.
On October 3> the Economic and Social Council approved
the draft consitution for IRO, with a budget of $160, 350, 000.
During November, the organization was under discussion in
the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee of the UN
G-eneral Assembly. There it met strong Russian opposition.
There were four objections to the IRO plan as revealed in
the Soviet position upheld by Vyshinsky in the committee
sessions
:
1. One of the principal tasks of the IRO should be
to promote the return of refugees and displaced persons
to their native countries. "Plants for the settlement
of refugees and displaced persons in distant foreign
lands are unacceptable and shoul : not be listed among
the tasks of the proposed Refugee Organization.'"
2. The IRO should not conern itself with persons
who, for hostile motives, do not wish to avail them-
selves of the assistance of the government of their
country of nationality, and refuse to return to that
country.
3. Not only war criminals, quislings and traitors
should not be aided by the IRO, but also persons who
voluntarily assisted the enemy forces, and members of
military and paramilitary formations which have not
been disbanded and which operated on the side of Hit-
lerite Germany.
4. Administration of refugee camps should be desig-
nated under the control of the United Nations in agree-
ment with the governments of the countries whose nation-
als represent the majority of persons in a particular
camp.
19. "Progress of Refugee Debate," UN Bull ... I ( Nov. 25 . 1946) t p. 27
»
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Mrs. Roosevelt upheld the United btates position, stating
that her country supported the principles or the General
Assembly resolution of February 12,1946, namely:
1. The problem is international in character;
2. There should be no compulsory repatriation.
3. Action taken by the IRO must not interfere with
existing international arrangements for apprehension
of war criminals, quislings ana traitors. ‘
With a vote of 18 to 5, with 5 abstentions, the Social,
Humanitarian ana Cultural Committee finally adoptee, the IRO
draft constitution on the 12th of December. On December
13, the Administrative and Budgetary Committee approved
IRO’s scale of assessments and forwarded it to the General
Asseraoly. On the 15th, the General Assembly adopted tne
constitution of IRO and submitted it to member states of
the United Nations.
Resolution No. 1 of the IRO constitution states that
a Preparatory Commission would come into existence as soon
as eight members have signed the document, and that IRO
itself will be established when fifteen states representing
75^ of the allocated contributions have signea it. The
Preparatory Commission came into existence on the 18th of
December, but the IRO itself is not yet established. As
of January 30, ten nations had decided to join, but their
total pledged •'ontriteutions amount only to 70^
•
The IRO has not yet been ratified by the United States.
The Senate approved the bill on March 24, but they attached
22. Ibid
. ,
p. 32. 23. USSR, White Russia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia,
Poland. 24.NYT, Dec . 10, 1946, p. 2; Dec . 13, 194o, p. 6 . 25» ’Refu-
gee Const. Adopted, 1 UN 3ul . , I ( Dec. 24, 1946) , p. 18. 26.NYT,
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a reservation to it that there should be no softening of
the American immigration policy. It is feared that the
House will restrict the measure still further. As has hap-
pened so many times before, the United States has proved that
it cannot be a leader ininternational cooperation. The
IRO is urgent and necessary, out the United states Congress
refuses to recognize it as such. And since we are to pro-
vide 45* 75/3 of the total budget, no action is possiole until
-
we do contribute our share. We can only hope that Con-
gress will authorize our complete participation, for it is
the only means currently available for dealing with the
refugee problem when UNRRA’s activities end on the 30th of
June.
Our task is nearly completed. We have seen how the
UNRRA functions of relief, rehabilitation, welfare, health
and care of displaced persons are being carried on. What
about food in general, however? What are the United Nations
doing to insure the peoples of the world that they have not
suffered in vain, that some day they may obtain freedom
from want? In Chapter XII we shall review the organization
which may be able to accomplish that aim, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
27 »NYT, March 27, 1947, p. 6. 28. NYT, Dec . 14, 1946, p. 3-
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CHAPTER XII FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
HOT SPRINGS CONFERENCE
It was in February, 194-3, that President Roosevelt
first disclosed plans for an exploratory conference of the
United Nations on post-war food problems of a permanent
nature, rather than the immediate problems of relief and
rehabilitation subsequently to oe considered oy the Atlantic
City meeting in November, which, as we have seen, led to
tne establishment of U 'RRA
.
The conference began on the 18th of May at the Home-
stead Hotel in Hot Springs, Virginia. All 4-3 governments
invited accepted the invitation. The United Nations members
present were: Australia, Belgium, 3razil, Canada, China,
Cosata Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, il
Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Iraq, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Philippine Islands, Poland,
Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
United States of America, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
The Associated Nations represented were Bolivia, Colombia,
Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Iceland, Iran, Liberia, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. France ana Denmark were added
to the list, France officially ana Denmark unofficially.
That brought the official list of delegates to 44.
l.NYT, Feb. 2A, 1943, p.l. 2 . NYT , May 12 , 1943, p. 33
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The conference opened at 9 P.M. , when Judge Marvin
Jones, the permanent president of the conference, ordered
%
the message of welcome of President Roosevelt to oe read.
The speech emphasized that the purpose of the conference
was to further the policies of the Atlantic Charter, tne
declaration of the United Nations, and the Rio do Janeiro
Conference of twenty-one American repuolics with respect
to post-war consumption, production and distrioution of
food and other agricultural products.
The work of the conference was done through an executive
committee composed of the chairmen of the 45 delegations,
a steering committee of eleven, and four section committees,
each dealing with one section of the Agenda: consumption,
production, distribution and recommendations. Mach section
had three or four working committees. The final plenary
session wah held on the third of June. The delegations,
representing 3/4 of the world's populations, departed in an
atmosphere of complete unity.
The United States State Department formulated the
outline of the agenda presented to the Hot Springs Confer-
ence:
I. Consumption levels and requirements.
A. Food
1. Character and extent of consumption
deficiencies in each country.
2. Causes and consequences of malnutri tion.
3. Measures for improving standards of con-
sumption (eduction, etc.).
3 . NYT , May 19,1943 4.NYT, May 20,1943; f ay 19,1943-
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4. Reasonable national and. international goals
for improved, food consumption.
B. Other essential agricultural products.
1. Pre-war consumption levels in various
countries as influenced by prosperity or
depression and by buying power of the
population.
2. Reasonable national and international goals
for improved consumption with sustained
employment and expanded industrial activity
II. Expansion of production and adaptation to consump-
tion needs.
A. Measures for direction of production toward
commodities, the supply of which should De in-
creased.
B. Measures for shifting production out of commod-
ities in chronic surplus.
C. Measures for improving agricultural productivity
and efficiency.
D. Measures for development ana conservation of
agricultural resources.
E. Opportunities for occupational adjustment in
agricultural populations.
III. Facilitation and improvement of distri oution.
A. Relation of national and international economic
policies to agricultural problems, with special
reference to the facilitation of the movement
of agricultural products in commerce.
1. Expansion of international trade.
2. Broad policies for assuring increased pro-
duction and consumption in general.
B. Improvement of agricultural marketing, processin
and distribution.
C. Special measures for wider food distribution.
1. Improvement of consumption of low- income
groups.
2. International disposition or commodities
in over- sup ply.
D. Buffer stocks and commodity arrangements to
assure eauitable prices and adequate supplies.
IV. Recommendations for continuing and carrying forward
the work of the conference'.
The conference d e oided "that more production was needed
if the people of the world were to have sufficient food for
adequate nutrition and that ootn new and existing production
would have to oe adjusted to secure more of those ' protec
-
5.NYT, April 28, 1943, p. 13.
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tive’ foods which are most necessary for good health.
The conference recognized, however, that it will be
necessary to reach freedom from hanger during the transition
period before plans for attaining freedom from want can be
carried out, and "that while shortages lasted there should
be coordinated action by government s both to secure in-
creased production and to prevent speculative and violent
fluctuations in prices.
'
General principles were adopted concerning "the ad-
justment of production to fit the long-term requirements of
a better diet but also improvements in the general efficiency
of production." Measures for new agricultural development
were recommended, recognizing that in overcrowded areas,
industry must be devloped along with improved methods oi
farming to relieve some of the pressure on the land.
The general level of employment in all countries must
be raised, since "poverty is the first cause of malnutrition
and hunger."
"The conference discussed the place and functions which
might be given. . . to international arrangements for the
control of basic stapled foodstuffs entering international
trade. . . .It was not possiole for the conference, in the
time available, to discuss future international commodity
arrangements in detail. Discussion in Section III was
directed to general questions of principle affecting the
operation of such arrangements as might later be made. The
two questions to which most attention was paid were--
.'
.
-
.
. 9
. . .
(A) The place which buffer stocks should occupy in
these arrangements, and
(B) How far it would be necessary to achieve the desired
objectives to include within the general arrangements agree-
ments for the regulation of production.'^
THE INTERIM COMMISSION
The Hot Springs Conference recognized at an early date
that some form of permanent organization should be estab-
lished to "act as a center of information and auvice on
both agricultural and nutrition questions and that it should
maintain a se?^vice of international statistics. . . . Ac-
cordingly, the conference recommended the establishment in
Washington of an interim commission, one of the functions
of which would be to draw up for submission to governments
and authorities represented a detailed plan for the per-
manent organization.
The interim commission was made up of representatives
of each of the 44 nations participating in the conference.
Meeting in 'Washington on the ,15th of July, it elected L.3.
Pearson of Canada as its chairman. It had an executive
committee and three main working committees. The first con-
centrated on the draft agreement submitted to the various
governments in September, 1943. The second studied the
structure of the projected Permanent Commission. And the
6. Official Summary of the Hot Springs Food -onference, pre-
pared by the parley's secretary general, June 3. NYT, June
4,1943.
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third considered what activities the Interim Commission
should undertake pending the establishment of the Permanent
Commission. In addition, two panels of experts were set up,
one of economists and the other of scientists in the field
of agriculture and nutrition. The panels were to report on
the extent to which the permanent organization can assist in
the promotion of scientific and economic researcn and the
7
collection and dissemination of information.
By August, 1944, the Interim Commission had prepared
a constitution for the permanent international organization,
which was to come into being when accepted by twenty nations.
According to the Preamble:
The Nations accepting this Constitution, being
determined to promote the common welfare by furthering
separate and collective action on their part for the
purposes of
raising levels of nutrition and standards of living
of the peoples under their respective jurisdictions,
securing improvements in the efficiency of the
production and distribution of all food and agricultural
products,
bettering the condition of rural populations,
and thus contributing toward an expanding world
economy,
hereby establish the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the Uni tec Nations. . . through which the
Members will report to one another on the measures
taken and the progree achieved in the fields or action
set forth above.
The functions of the organization would be:
To collect, analyze, interpret and disseminate in-
formation relating to nutrition, food and agriculture.
To promote, and where appropriate, recommend na-
tional and international action with respect to scienti-
fic, technological, social, and economic research rela-
7 . NYT , Sept. 10, 1943,p.l5. 3. Gove Hambldge, i AO, Cornerstone
for a House of Life . Washington: FA0,194o. Inside back cover.
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ting to nutrition, food and agriculture. The improve-
ment of education and administration relating to nutri-
tion, food and agriculture, and the spread of puolic
knowledge of nutritional and agricultural science and
practice.
The conservation of natural resources and the
adoption of improved methods of agricultural production.
The improvement of the processing, marketing and
distribution of food and agricultural products.
The adoption of policies for the provision of
adequate agricultural credit, national and international,
the adoption of international policies with respect
to agricultural commodity arrangements.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAQ) was to be
principally advisory. Its constitution gave it no power
to inaugurate programs or take definite actions.
The governing body of FAO was to be a general conference,
on which each member nation would have one voting represent-
ative. There would be an executive committee of nine to
fifteen members. There would also oe standing advisory
committees in the major fields of the organizati on’ s work.
The administration would consist of a director general and
an international staff selected for technical competence.
Direct contact with the public, consumers ana producers
would.be maintained through conferences with representatives
of national and international bodies concerned with food,
agriculture, forestry and fisheries.
The interim commission planned an estimated annual
budget of $5,000,000, with only half that amount for the
first year. The United States was to bear 25/° of the cost
for the first year, the United Kingdom 15; », Russia 3Z,
China 6
. 5r , and other countries smaller proportions down to
Q-NYT. Aug. 2~5. 19 44^^ 22^
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According to the constitution, original membership
was to be granted to those nations represented at the Hot
Springs Conference, when the constitution was accepted by
their governments. Other countries could be admitted by
a 2/3 vote of the representatives of all the member nations.
Initial membership would be for a period of five years, after
which members would have the privilege of withdrawing
The constitution was put into the form of an agreement
and not as a treaty.
“No international agency before has undertaken the dual
task of improving nutrition and agriculture. The Interna-
tional Laoor Organization has adopted a number of conventions
and recommdendations concerning agriculture and has a com-
mittee dealing. . . with agriculture. The United States
has promoted international agriculture research cooperation
through two statutes which authorise the lending of Depart-
ment of Agriculture technicians to Latin American govern-
ments and the training in the Department of technicians
from other countries. The outstanding international agency
in the field has seen the International Insitute of Agri-
culture at Rome, set up by convention signed on oune 7,
1905, to which the United States proclaimed its ratification
in 1903.“ The emphasis of that organization was on research
and agricultural statistics, not nutrition. It has the
10. Ibid. 11.31air Holies, "Pillars of the United Nations,
"
Foreign Policy Reports .XXI ( Dec . 1. 194-5 ) , p. 250.
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second most valuable agricultural library in the world. me
FAO was to absorb the International Institute of Agriculture.
On the fourth of August, 1945, Truman signed the Dill
providing for United States participation in FAO, and
authorizing $625,000 as the united States share for the
first year and $1,250,000 for subsequent years.
THS QUEBEC CONFERENCE
On the 16th of October, at Quebec, FAO came into
existence when thirty nations signed the FAO constitution.
By the end of the conference the total membership had been
raised to forty. Russia refused to join.
The executive committee, divided into three sections,
was set up at the Quebec Conference. Five members, from
Haiti, Canada, Britain, new Zealand and i.exico, were to
have one-year terms. Five more, India, Norway, Iraq,
France and Poland, were to serve two years. Five more had
three-year terms--Brazil, the United States, China, the
Union of South Africa and Belgium. The members of the
executive committee were to serve without pay.
Sir John Boyd Orr, a world-famed scientific nutritionist
and member of the British Parliament, was elected unanimous-
ly as the Director c-eneral. He will have a two-year term,
ending December 31,1947, with a salary of $18,000 a year
plus a $10,000 representation allowance.
12. The Work of FAO .( Washington : FAO , 1945 ), p . 4o . 13-NYT,
Oct; 28, 1:945 , p. 14." 14. Ibid.
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The Quebec Conference ended on the first day of Novem-
ber, when the administration was handed over to Qrr as he
took the following oath:
I solemnly undertake to exercise, in all loyalty,
discretion and conscience, the functions entrusted to
me as an officer of the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations: not to seek or accept
from any other authority instructions in regard to
the performance of my official duties and to discharge
those duties and regulate my conduct with the interests
of the organization alone in view.
'
At the conference the use of an international commodity
agreement was debated. A French proposal for u the formation
of a permanent subgroup within the FAO that would be the
highest advisory body on cartels, international commodity
agreement and related matters of international collabora-
tion, 1 however, was shelved in favor of a British proposal
for a permanent marketing advisory committee.
THE MAY EMERGENCY FOOD CONFERENCE
During the spring of 1946, FAO wan unable to set up
standing advisory committees because of difficulties in
selecting personnel on a sufficiently wide geographical
basis. Instead, temporary ad hoc committees were estab-
lished.
In the meantime, however, the terrific famine condi-
tions all over the world led to another FAO conference, an
emergency one, held in Washington in May. The conference,
said Orr, was a result of discussions of the United Nations
15.NYT. Nov. 2,1945, p.4.
17 • NYT , Oc t . 2o, 1945, p. 5-
16.NYT, Oc t . 25, 1945, p. 10.
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Assembly in London, where a resolution was unanimously passed
"requesting international organizations concerned with food
and agriculture to intensify efforts to obtain as full in-
formation as possible on the world food position ana future
outlook in order to assist governments in determining their
short and long term policy.
"
As a result of the conference, FAO urged:
(1) The formation of an international intelligence
service for food, which will keep the world situation
continually under survey and will report quarterly on
conditions throughout the world.
(2) Organization of an International Emergency
Food Council. . . .
(3) A list of measures, still unspecified, for
conserving and expanding food supplies. The list might
include such expedients as the adjustment of livestock
herds to the world grain shortage, increasing the ex-
traction rate of wheat flour and limitations on the use
of grain in beverage alcohol.
(4) Preparation for a long-range food body with
executive powers that could put into effect the recom-
mendations eventually to be made by the FAO.
(5) Continuance of the work of the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration even after the
organization has been ended oy the UNRRA Council. . . .
FAO and UNRRA should cooperate closely and coordinate
the work 'to effect a smooth transition from the short
term program to the long-term objectives of the FAO."
As a correlated move to the emergency conference, Tru-
man called upon the Secretary of Agriculture, Anderson, to
set up an interagency committee, representing the Departments
of Agriculture, State, Treasury, Commerce, Interior, Laoor,
the Federal Security Agency and the Bureau of the Budget, to
wro^k with FAO on world food proolems.
13.NYT, April 2,l946,p.l. l9-NYT,May 26, 1246, p. 3 .
20. See' Chapter X. 21.NYT, April 2,1946,p.l.
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THE COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE
By September, when an FAO conference was held in Copen-
hagen, there were 47 members of the organization:
Australia Guatemala Norway
Belgium Haiti Panama
Bolivia Honduras Paraguay
Brazil Hungary Peru
Canada Iceland Philippine
Chile India Commonwealth
China Iraq Poland
Colombia Ireland Portugal
Cuba Italy Switzerland
Czechoslovakia Lebanon Syria
Denmark Liberia U. of S. Africa
Dominican Repub. Luxembourg United Kingdom
Ecuador Mexico USA
Egypt Netherlands Uruguay
France New Zealand Venezuela
Greece Nicaragua Yugoslavia
During that conference, the FAO budget for the eighteen-
month period from July 1,1946 to Decemoer 31, 1947, was set
at $7, 500,000V
As an important part of its agenda, the Copenhagen
conferees considered the report of FAO ' s first special
mission, which recommended "a sweeping 25-year plan for
lifting poverty-ridden Greece to prosperity through inter-
national loans, industrial and agricultural development and
participation in world trade. ' The report of the mission,
which extensively studied the economy of Greece for three
months, was suomi tted by the FAO to the United Nations for
appropriate action.
As a second item 0 i ousiness, tne conference considered
22. "Plans for World Food 3oard," Un.N Bull ., I ( Sept. 23,
1946), p. 12. 25. NYT, Sept. 7, 1946, p. 3 .
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a report prepared by FAQ at the request of the Emergency
Food: Conference in May, based on data from 70 countries which
represent 90% of the world’s population. The report was
summarized in the United Nations bulle tin as follows:
In the late 1930’s, before war cut into food pro-
duction and disrupted distribution in many countries,
about half the world’s population was seriously under-
nourished, about one-sixth v as surviving at a marginal
level of nutrition, and somewhat less than a third was
enjoying high-calorie diets. The diet levels tnat the
world is struglling to regain in the next year or more
are health levels for only about one family out of three.
In areas containing over half the world's popula-
tion, food supplies at the retail level (not actual
intake) were sufficient to furnish an average of less
than 2,250 calories per caput daily.
Food supplies furnishing an average o_ more than
2,275 calories per caput daily were available in areas
containing somewhat less than a third of the world's
population.
The remaining areas, containing about one- sixth of
the world’s population had food supplies that were be-
tween these high and low levels.
In general the high-caloris areas included North
America, Australia and New Zealand, the USSR, much of
Europe, and three countries of South America. The
intermediate areas included most of southern Europe,
three countries in Asia, part of the Middle last, and
parts 0 Africa ana. South America. The low-calorie
areas included most of Asia, part of the Middle East,
all of Central America, and probably parts of South
America and Africa not covered by the survey.
Poverty is the chief cause of malnutrition. All
the countries in which the supply of calories per caput
was less than 2,250 a day were countries in which the
average per caput income was less than U.S. #100 a year.
Assuming a 25 percent gain in world production by
i960
,
the percentage increases in world production re-
quired for the various food groups would be:
24. "World Food Shortage Measured, " United Na ti ons Bulletin
,
I (August 12, 1946), pp. 6 - 9 .
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Commodity Per cent
Cereals( human consump-
tion only) 21
27
12
34
30
163
46
100
Roots and tubers . . .
Sugar
Fats
Pulses
Fruits and vegetables.
L'i eet..
Milk
During the summer of 1946, Orr, the Director G-eneral of
FAO, envisaged a World Food Board, with the following func-
1. To stablize prices of agricultural commodities
on the world markets, including provision of the neces-
sary funds for stabilizing operations;
2. To establish a world food reserve adequate for
any emergency that might arise through failure of
crops in any part of the world;
3* To provide funds for financing the disposal of
surplus agricultural products on special terms to coun-
tries when the need for them is most urgent;
4. To co-operate with organization concerned with
international credits for industrial and agricultural
development, and with trade and commodity policy, in
order that their common ends might be more quickly and
efficiently achieved.
The Orr plan in general provided for a world pool "of
farm commodities moving in international trade lor the pur-
pose of stabilizing the world price. Commodities would be
sold from this reserve to needy countries at a predetermined
price if and when the world market price rose above the
level established by the world food board, and oou/ght from
surplus-producing countries to raise the price if it fell
below the established mark."
tions
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The Copenhagen conference formally accepted Orr'
s
proposals, and thereupon recessed until its special commission
could submit a report.
PREPARATORY COMMISSION
Detailed plans for the world food board and the inter-
national price stabilization program were to be prepared by
a Preparatory Commission established by the Copenhagen
Conference, consisting of representatives of Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Den-
mark, Egypt, Prance, India, the Netherlands, the Philippine
Republic, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The Soviet Union and Argentina, not memoers oi FAO, were in-
vited to serve as associate members. Each member of FAO
could send one observer of the Preparatory Commission. Siam
would become a full member when the discussions relate to
rice. Invitations were sent to the ILO, the World Health
Organization, the International Ban.c for Reconstruction and
Development, and the International Monetary Fund. The United
Nations Economic and Social Council had two representatives,
A?
with the right to advise.
The Preparatory Commission opened in Washington on
October 28. In the meantime, however, the United States
had adopted a unilateral international food policy, and
30
interposed a number of oojections to the Orr plan:
27. NYT , Sept. 14, 1946, p. 3 . 23.NYT, Sept . 10, 1946, p. 2.
29 .NYT, Sept . 13, 1946, p. 3. 30. Norris E. Dodd, Under secretary
of Agriculture, Am. delegate to the Preparatory Commission.
NYT, Oct. 29, 1946, p.4.
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1. It is doubtful whether "a World food Board or
any similar device" could deal adequately with "the
effect that widespread Government intervention threatens
to have upon the agricultural demand and supply situa-
tion over the world once the present emergency has come
to an end."
2. It is doubtful whether any combination of
"buffer-stock and surplus-disposal operations using a
two-price system can oe successful ithout control over
supply.
“
3* A third objection related to the difference in
price and production problems for different commodities.
'An overall body, such as the proposed Jo rid Food
Board, would not suffice for dealing effectively with
these so different and rapidly changing problems, which
ought to be dealt with by special negotiations, commod-
ity by commodity."
4. Finally, the United States finds it unlikely
that Governments will make available the funds neces-
sary for financing a program in the hands of an inter-
national agency over whose operations and price policy
they would have little direct control.
Although supported by Great Britain, the united States,
in typical fashion, changed her mind again by the middle
of December, announcing that she would support a two-price
system. The final report, submitted on the 24th of January,
retained ma'y of the features of the Orr plan, including a
world fcoG council and provision for buffer stocks, but the
main obstacle to the plan had been skirted. No "over-all. . .
agency or board, over whose operations and price policy
individual nations woul have little direct control' 1 was to
be established. On the contrary, all tasks were placed with-
in the province of existing agencies, including the FAO.
Some features of the plan are:
31.NYT, Dec. 21, 1946, p.2.
Jan. 25, 1947.
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1. Formation of a world food council, composed of
eighteen member nations, to act as a continuing body
between FAO sessions and keep close taos on food and
agricultural trends.
2. Development of commodity agreements “as a major
device for stabilizing prices and expanding production
and consumption. 1 These, it was stipulated, should
include provisions for famine reserves, price staoili-
zafcion reserves or “buffer stocks', and sales of food-
stuffs “at special prices to supplement diets of neeuy
groups .
“
3. Annual review at the FAO conference of national
agricultural and nutritional programs.
These proposals still await consideration oy FAO and
by the United Nations. The outcome is still uncertain. A
e
can only hope that the action will be favorable. Even
though stronger international collaboration might be desir-
able, these proposals offer the only concrete plan now-
advanced to insure some degree of cooperation in world food
policies. Evolution may bring the ideal solution, a solu-
tion to act as an effective guarantee against future famine
and bring to all peoples a freedom from want. Perhaps the
Bible has still anothe lesson to teach this irreligious
age:
Behold, there come seven years of great plenty
throughout all the land of Egypt; and there shall
arise after them seven years of famine; and all the
plenty shall be forgotten in the land of Egypt; and
the famine shall consume the land.
So let them gather all the food of those good
years that come, and lay up corn under the hand of
Pharaoh, and let them keep food in the cities. And that
food shall be for store to the land against the seven
years of famine, which shall be in the land of Egypt;
that the land perish not through the famine.
33. Ibid. 34. Genesis 41:29,30,35,36*
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CONCLUSION
And so we are back to the point at which we began--
freedom from want. After the war the entire world was in a
situation of utter devastation and misery. The turmoil was
apparent even before the war was over, even when it was
barely beginning. At first the nations made isolated at-
tempts to relieve the misery of the peoples suffering abroad.
The United States, having suffered least from the effects
of war, was morally responsible to bear the greater share
of the burden of relief. Realizing this, President Roosevelt
in the fall of 1942 set up the Office of Foreign Relief and
Rehabilitation Operations with Herbert H. Lehman as its
director.
But unilateral action was not enough. The problems
of relief and rehabilitation were too vast for one nation
to tackle alone. And so the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration was established one year later,
in November, 1943* For the first year and a half of its
existence, the UNRRA was largely concerned with the task
of organization, but early in 1945 it was able to enter
the liberated nations and assume the task of relief.
UNRRA* s life is nearly at an end, but much still re-
mains to be done. The United Nations has estaolisneo. several
organizations to take over its functions-- the International
...
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Refugee Organization, the World Health Organization, and a
committee to carry on welfare work. Eut food relief itself
has been left largely to the voluntary action of individual
countries. We can only hope that the supplying nations will
feel a strong enough responsibility for their less fortu-
nate neighbors, lest the world lapse once again into com-
plete chaos.
But immediate relief is not the only aspect of freedom
from want. Long-range decisions had to be made. "From the
moment when two microscopic cells unite in conception, the
human body builds all its substance from the food it gets.
If the food be inadequate, the body will be correspondingly
inadequate. People who are not well nourished often lack
the energy and the ability-- even the imagination and the
will--to better their lot. They number perhaps three-fourths
of the world’s population. By so simple a means as enabling
them to get more and better food, great human potentials can
be unlocked. 11
In Asia and the tropics, three-fourths of the people
live on too low diets. ;l Pellagra, beriberi, rickets and
other bone trouoles, nutritional blindness, goiter, anemia,
and endemic dropsy are prevalent in many places. Life ex-
pectancy at birth is low--26.9 years for males in India
(1931) compared with 65.5 in New Zealand (1934—1933). Infant
mortality is high--170 for every 1,000 live births (I93I-I935)
in British India compated with 32 in the European population
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.
.
,
.
*
.
.
* “ J
of New Zealand. " In Chile, there are '*233 deaths from pul-
monary tuberculosis in every 100,000 of the population com-
pared with 36 in the Netherlands before the war.
"
Some progress has been made in highly developed countries
In the Netherlands, for instance, the expectation of life
at birth for males was 29*5 years in 1340-1351 and 65.7
in 1931-1940, and about half of this advance was made after
1900." But even the, ‘‘in western Europe 20 to 30 percent
of the population were malnourished according to the best
available prewar evidence, and in the United States a third
of the peoples was reported to have diets below modern
standards for good health .
"
The situation is certainly a serious one. How can
the problem be solved? There can be enough food in the
world to fill the needs of everyone. Between the wars much
food was deliberately destroyed because no markets could be
found for it. FAO has the task of improving the levels of
nutrition and agricultural production throughout the world.
If the nations fully cooperate, all peoples of the world
may someday truly achieve freedom from want.
As I lay in the meadow, listening to the busy life of
the farmlands which surrounded me, the aimless clouds over-
head drifted into an unending procession of gaunt, saddened
figures with upturned faces and outstretched hands. Shall we
ignore them? Can we ignore them? This is "one world" nowj
l.The Work of FA_>, op. cit.pp. 10-12.
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An Abstract of the Thesis
International policies for relief and rehabilitation
have been cyclical in nature. The policies originally were
unilateral. UNRRA was an attempt to make relief cooperative.
Now, in 194-7, the tendency is to conduct relief once more on
an individual basis.
During World War I a Commission for rtelief in Belgium,
under the chairmanship of Herbert Hoover, conducted an ex-
tensive program of war relief in Belgium and other occupied
areas. That Commission was supported by private contributions
Foreign food policies became official with the establishment
of the U. S. Food Administration after the United States
entrance into the war. During the Armistice period, an
attempt was made to create an Inter-Allied Supreme Council
for Relief and Reconstruction, but its existence was inef-
fectual, and relief became largely a matter of individual
action, with America playing the leading role.
In World War II relief likewise began as an enterprise
of private charity, with Herbert Hoover again as the leader.
He became the honorary chairman or the National committee on
Food for the Five Small Democracies, which, although not an
operating agency, was exceedingly effective in arousing U.S.
public opinion to the need for international relief. The
Red Cross among other private relief agencies did succeed
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in shipping food overseas in spite of the British blockade.
Early aid to G-reece was handled in this manner.
Late in 1942 President Roosevelt made relief official
by setting up the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation
Operations under the direction of Herbert H. Lehman, the
former Governor or New York. The primary task of that office
was the conducting of relief in connection with the military
campaigns in North Africa and Sicily.
By the middle of 1943 it became evident that some type
of international organization should be created to handle the
increasingly heavy relief buEdens. Instigated by the U. S.
State Department, a draft agreement was drawn up and signed
by 44 nations on November 9, 1943, creating the United Na-
tions nelief and Rehabilitation Administration. Immediately
afterwards a conference was held by the member nations at
Atlantic City. The UNRRA was launched
J
UNRRA was authorized to furnish relief supplies, relief
services, and rehabilitation supplies and services to all
nations which were to be liberated by the Allied armies if
they needed sucii relief and if the government of the area
requested it. Aid was later extended to ex-enemy countries
and to other areas if such aid should be determined to oe in
the interest of the United Nations.
The UNRRA was divided into two parts, the council and
the Administration. The Council, the policy making body,
represented equally all 48 UNRRA members, with all decisions
by a simple majority vote. Six meetings were held.
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A Central Committee, representing Uanada, uhina, France,
the USSR, the United Kingdom and the Unitea States, spOKe
for the Council between sessions. The council set up four
standing committees, on financial Control, supplies, Europe
and the Far East.
The executive powers of the UNRRA were vested in the
Director General, Herbert n. Lehman, succeeded, by Fiorello
La Guardia and Major General Lowell -> . Rooks. i'he work of
the administration was handled by nine divisions. Personnel
was selected on an international basis.
UNRRA was financed by two contributions of l/o of the
national income of each member government which had not been
occupied by enemy forces. Invaded countries were allocated
only administrative costs. The slowness of contributions
was one of the greatest difficulties UNRRA had to overcome.
The total United States contributions amounted to $2, 700, 000, OC
UNRRA had seven principle fields of operation--Food,
Clothing, Health, Displaced Persons, Agricultural and In-
dustrial Rehabilitation and Welfare.
UNRRA worked in close cooperation with the Combined
Boards, intergovernmental agencies representing Great Britain,
Canada and the United States, which allocated scarce commodi-
ties to the various claimant groups for liberated areas.
Supplies were procured through the regular agencies of
the various supplying countries. In the United states, UNRRA
procurement was handled by the foreign Economic Administrator,
Leo T. Crowley.
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Supplies were sold to governments possessing foreign
exchange, and given free to others. The recognized government
of the liberated area was responsible for distribution of
supplies, but there was to be no discrimination because of
race, creed or political belief.
The nations which received relief were Albania, Austria,
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia,
the Dodecanese, G-reece, Italy, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia. Limited programs were
extended to Finland, Hungary, the Philippines, Korea, Formosa
and Ethiopia. In Germany and Austria the UNRRA cared for the
displaced persons.
Activities in Europe ceased Larch 31, 1947. Work with
displaced persons and in the Far ^ast will end on June 30.
Yet the need is not yet over. Food situations are still
critical in many parts of the world. Many refugees await
permanent settlement. Health and welfare problems remain
unsolved. A committee of the United Nations estimated that
post-UNRRA needs in Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland
and Yugoslavia would amount to
7i 534, 000, 000. Millions more
are needed in occupied areas and in the Far East.
Provisions have been made for carrying on some of the
UNRRA activities. A United Nations committee has taken over
welfare activities. A World Health Organization has been
establishment, but awaits ratification. An International
Children's Emergency Fund has been created. A constitution
has been drawn up for an International Refugee Organization,
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but few nations have as yet decided to participate.
rood relief has become unilateral. Each individual na-
tion will carry on its own relief activities. xhe United
States is largely responsible for this policy. Congress is
now considering a 1350,000,000 relief measure, which the
House has already reduced to $200,000,000. Its outcome is
uncertain, but it is clear that relief will be hamstrung with
many hampering restrictions. That relief has become a
political measure is clearly demonstrated by Truman's demand
for a $400,000,000 program of aid to Greece and Turkey.
Long range food programs are being considered by the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, initiated
by the Hot Springs Conference of 1943* We hope that it may
experience some success in removing the threat or world famine
by creating buffer stocks, and stabilizing prices through the
development of commodity agreements. Only through such
cooperation may the peoples of the world achieve a true
freedom from want.
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